Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [13:03]

Fix BIND remote denial of service. [13:04] Security: CVE-2013-0166, CVE-2013-0169 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl Security: CVE-2013-2266 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind Approved by: so
Fix Denial of Service vulnerability in named(8) with DNS64. [13:01]
2026-10-30 20:35:03 +01:00 · 2013-04-02 17:34:42 +00:00 · 2013-02-19 13:27:20 +00:00 · 2012-11-22 22:52:15 +00:00 · 2012-08-06 21:33:11 +00:00 · 2012-06-12 12:10:10 +00:00
541 changed files with 42610 additions and 45465 deletions
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 The compilation of software known as FreeBSD is distributed under the
 following terms:

-Copyright (c) 1992-2011 The FreeBSD Project. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 1992-2012 The FreeBSD Project. All rights reserved.

 Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -182,10 +182,12 @@ buildworld: upgrade_checks
 #
 # In the following, the first 'rm' in a series will usually remove all
 # files and directories.  If it does not, then there are probably some
-# files with chflags set, so this unsets them and tries the 'rm' a
+# files with file flags set, so this unsets them and tries the 'rm' a
 # second time.  There are situations where this target will be cleaning
 # some directories via more than one method, but that duplication is
-# needed to correctly handle all the possible situations.
+# needed to correctly handle all the possible situations.  Removing all
+# files without file flags set in the first 'rm' instance saves time,
+# because 'chflags' will need to operate on fewer files afterwards.
 #
 BW_CANONICALOBJDIR:=${MAKEOBJDIRPREFIX}${.CURDIR}
 cleanworld:
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ CLEANDIR=	cleandir
 .endif

 CVS?=		cvs
-CVSFLAGS?=	-A -P -d -I!
+CVSFLAGS?=	-r RELENG_9_0 -P -d -I!
 SVN?=		svn
 SVNFLAGS?=	-r HEAD
 SUP?=		/usr/bin/csup
@@ -9,6 +9,50 @@ handbook.
 Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
 /usr/ports/UPDATING.  Please read that file before running portupgrade.

+20130402:	p7	FreeBSD-SA-13:03.openssl FreeBSD-SA-13:04.bind
+	Fix multiple vulnerabilities in OpenSSL.
+
+	Fix Denial of Service vulnerability in named(8).
+
+20130218:	p6	FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc
+	Fix Denial of Service vulnerability in named(8) with DNS64.
+
+	Fix Denial of Service vulnerability in libc's glob(3) functionality.
+
+20121122:	p5	FreeBSD-SA-12:06.bind FreeBSD-SA-12:07.hostapd
+			FreeBSD-SA-12:08.linux
+	Fix multiple Denial of Service vulnerabilities with named(8).
+
+	Fix insufficient message length validation for EAP-TLS messages.
+
+	Fix Linux compatibility layer input validation error.
+
+20120806:	p4	FreeBSD-SA-12:05.bind
+	Fix named(8) DNSSEC validation Denial of Service.
+
+20120612:	p3	FreeBSD-SA-12:03.bind
+			FreeBSD-SA-12:04.sysret
+			FreeBSD-EN-12:02.ipv6refcount
+	Fix a problem where zero-length RDATA fields can cause named to crash.
+	[12:03]
+
+	Correct a privilege escalation when returning from kernel if
+	running FreeBSD/amd64 on non-AMD processors. [12:04]
+
+	Fix reference count errors in IPv6 code. [EN-12:02]
+
+20120530:	p2	FreeBSD-SA-12:01.openssl (revised),
+			FreeBSD-SA-12:02.crypt
+	Update the previous openssl fix. [12:01]
+
+	Fix a bug in crypt(3) ignoring characters of a passphrase. [12:02]
+
+20120503:	p1	FreeBSD-SA-12:01.openssl
+	Fix multiple OpenSSL vulnerabilities.
+
+20120106:
+	9.0-RELEASE.
+
 20111101:
 	The broken amd(4) driver has been replaced with esp(4) in the amd64,
 	i386 and pc98 GENERIC kernel configuration files.
@@ -2190,8 +2190,10 @@ dump_block_stats(spa_t *spa)
 	 */
 	(void) bpobj_iterate_nofree(&spa->spa_deferred_bpobj,
 	    count_block_cb, &zcb, NULL);
-	(void) bpobj_iterate_nofree(&spa->spa_dsl_pool->dp_free_bpobj,
-	    count_block_cb, &zcb, NULL);
+	if (spa_version(spa) >= SPA_VERSION_DEADLISTS) {
+		(void) bpobj_iterate_nofree(&spa->spa_dsl_pool->dp_free_bpobj,
+		    count_block_cb, &zcb, NULL);
+	}

 	if (dump_opt['c'] > 1)
 		flags |= TRAVERSE_PREFETCH_DATA;
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static __inline int
 thr_create(void *stack_base, size_t stack_size, void *(*start_func) (void*),
    void *arg, long flags, thread_t *new_thread_ID)
 {
+	pthread_t dummy;
 	int ret;

 	assert(stack_base == NULL);
@@ -85,9 +86,12 @@ thr_create(void *stack_base, size_t stack_size, void *(*start_func) (void*),
 	pthread_attr_t attr;
 	pthread_attr_init(&attr);

-	if(flags & THR_DETACHED)
+	if (flags & THR_DETACHED)
 		pthread_attr_setdetachstate(&attr, PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED);

+	if (new_thread_ID == NULL)
+		new_thread_ID = &dummy;
+
 	/* This function ignores the THR_BOUND flag, since NPTL doesn't seem to support PTHREAD_SCOPE_PROCESS */

 	ret = pthread_create(new_thread_ID, &attr, start_func, arg);
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ again:	if ((t = tq->tq_freelist) != NULL && tq->tq_nalloc >= tq->tq_minalloc) {
 		}
 		mutex_exit(&tq->tq_lock);

-		t = kmem_alloc(sizeof (task_t), tqflags);
+		t = kmem_alloc(sizeof (task_t), tqflags & KM_SLEEP);

 		mutex_enter(&tq->tq_lock);
 		if (t != NULL)
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ CFLAGS+=	-I${.CURDIR}/../../../sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris \
 		-I${OPENSOLARIS_SYS_DISTDIR}/uts/common \
 		-DPIC ${PICFLAG}

-.include <bsd.prog.mk>
+.include <bsd.lib.mk>
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+	--- 9.8.1-P1 released ---
+
+3218.	[security]	Cache lookup could return RRSIG data associated with
+			nonexistent records, leading to an assertion
+			failure. [RT #26590]
+
 	--- 9.8.1 released ---

 	--- 9.8.1rc1 released ---
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 */

-/* $Id: query.c,v 1.353.8.11 2011-06-09 03:14:03 marka Exp $ */
+/* $Id: query.c,v 1.353.8.11.4.1 2011-11-16 09:32:08 marka Exp $ */

 /*! \file */

@@ -1137,13 +1137,6 @@ query_isduplicate(ns_client_t *client, dns_name_t *name,
 		mname = NULL;
 	}

-	/*
-	 * If the dns_name_t we're looking up is already in the message,
-	 * we don't want to trigger the caller's name replacement logic.
-	 */
-	if (name == mname)
-		mname = NULL;
-
 	*mnamep = mname;

 	CTRACE("query_isduplicate: false: done");
@@ -1341,6 +1334,7 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(rdataset) &&
 	    !query_isduplicate(client, fname, type, &mname)) {
 		if (mname != NULL) {
+			INSIST(mname != fname);
 			query_releasename(client, &fname);
 			fname = mname;
 		} else
@@ -1393,21 +1387,21 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 			goto addname;
 		if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) {
 			dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
-			/*
-			 * Negative cache entries don't have sigrdatasets.
-			 */
-			INSIST(sigrdataset == NULL ||
-			       ! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset));
+			if (sigrdataset != NULL &&
+			    dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
 		}
 		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 			mname = NULL;
 			if (!query_isduplicate(client, fname,
 					       dns_rdatatype_a, &mname)) {
+				if (mname != fname) {
 				if (mname != NULL) {
 					query_releasename(client, &fname);
 					fname = mname;
 				} else
 					need_addname = ISC_TRUE;
+				}
 				ISC_LIST_APPEND(fname->list, rdataset, link);
 				added_something = ISC_TRUE;
 				if (sigrdataset != NULL &&
@@ -1438,18 +1432,21 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 			goto addname;
 		if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) {
 			dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
-			INSIST(sigrdataset == NULL ||
-			       ! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset));
+			if (sigrdataset != NULL &&
+			    dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
 		}
 		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 			mname = NULL;
 			if (!query_isduplicate(client, fname,
 					       dns_rdatatype_aaaa, &mname)) {
+				if (mname != fname) {
 				if (mname != NULL) {
 					query_releasename(client, &fname);
 					fname = mname;
 				} else
 					need_addname = ISC_TRUE;
+				}
 				ISC_LIST_APPEND(fname->list, rdataset, link);
 				added_something = ISC_TRUE;
 				if (sigrdataset != NULL &&
@@ -1889,10 +1886,8 @@ query_addadditional2(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 		goto setcache;
 	if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) {
 		dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
-		/*
-		 * Negative cache entries don't have sigrdatasets.
-		 */
-		INSIST(! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset));
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
 	}
 	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 		/* Remember the result as a cache */
@@ -1963,6 +1958,7 @@ query_addadditional2(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 		    crdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_aaaa) {
 			if (!query_isduplicate(client, fname, crdataset->type,
 					       &mname)) {
+				if (mname != fname) {
 				if (mname != NULL) {
 					/*
 					 * A different type of this name is
@@ -1979,6 +1975,7 @@ query_addadditional2(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 					mname0 = mname;
 				} else
 					need_addname = ISC_TRUE;
+				}
 				ISC_LIST_UNLINK(cfname.list, crdataset, link);
 				ISC_LIST_APPEND(fname->list, crdataset, link);
 				added_something = ISC_TRUE;
@@ -4863,10 +4860,12 @@ dns64_ttl(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *version) {
 	isc_result_t result;
 	isc_uint32_t ttl = ISC_UINT32_MAX;

+	dns_rdataset_init(&rdataset);
+
 	result = dns_db_getoriginnode(db, &node);
 	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
 		goto cleanup;
-	dns_rdataset_init(&rdataset);
+
 	result = dns_db_findrdataset(db, node, version, dns_rdatatype_soa,
 				     0, 0, &rdataset, NULL);
 	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
@@ -146,6 +146,17 @@ struct dns_rdata {
 #define DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata) \
 	(((rdata)->flags & ~(DNS_RDATA_UPDATE|DNS_RDATA_OFFLINE)) == 0)

+/*
+ * The maximum length of a RDATA that can be sent on the wire.
+ * Max packet size (65535) less header (12), less name (1), type (2),
+ * class (2), ttl(4), length (2).
+ *
+ * None of the defined types that support name compression can exceed
+ * this and all new types are to be sent uncompressed.
+ */
+
+#define DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH	65512U
+
 /*
 * Flags affecting rdata formatting style.  Flags 0xFFFF0000
 * are used by masterfile-level formatting and defined elsewhere.
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
 /*%
 * max message size - header - root - type - class - ttl - rdlen
 */
-#define MINTSIZ (65535 - 12 - 1 - 2 - 2 - 4 - 2)
+#define MINTSIZ DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH
 /*%
 * Size for tokens in the presentation format,
 * The largest tokens are the base64 blocks in KEY and CERT records,
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 */

-/* $Id: rbtdb.c,v 1.310.8.5 2011-06-08 23:02:42 each Exp $ */
+/* $Id: rbtdb.c,v 1.310.8.5.4.1 2011-11-16 09:32:08 marka Exp $ */

 /*! \file */

@@ -5053,7 +5053,7 @@ cache_find(dns_db_t *db, dns_name_t *name, dns_dbversion_t *version,
 			      rdataset);
 		if (need_headerupdate(found, search.now))
 			update = found;
-		if (foundsig != NULL) {
+		if (!NEGATIVE(found) && foundsig != NULL) {
 			bind_rdataset(search.rbtdb, node, foundsig, search.now,
 				      sigrdataset);
 			if (need_headerupdate(foundsig, search.now))
@@ -5685,7 +5685,7 @@ cache_findrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_dbversion_t *version,
 	}
 	if (found != NULL) {
 		bind_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtnode, found, now, rdataset);
-		if (foundsig != NULL)
+		if (!NEGATIVE(found) && foundsig != NULL)
 			bind_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtnode, foundsig, now,
 				      sigrdataset);
 	}
@@ -325,8 +325,8 @@ dns_rdata_compare(const dns_rdata_t *rdata1, const dns_rdata_t *rdata2) {

 	REQUIRE(rdata1 != NULL);
 	REQUIRE(rdata2 != NULL);
-	REQUIRE(rdata1->data != NULL);
-	REQUIRE(rdata2->data != NULL);
+	REQUIRE(rdata1->length == 0 || rdata1->data != NULL);
+	REQUIRE(rdata2->length == 0 || rdata2->data != NULL);
 	REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata1));
 	REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata2));

@@ -356,8 +356,8 @@ dns_rdata_casecompare(const dns_rdata_t *rdata1, const dns_rdata_t *rdata2) {

 	REQUIRE(rdata1 != NULL);
 	REQUIRE(rdata2 != NULL);
-	REQUIRE(rdata1->data != NULL);
-	REQUIRE(rdata2->data != NULL);
+	REQUIRE(rdata1->length == 0 || rdata1->data != NULL);
+	REQUIRE(rdata2->length == 0 || rdata2->data != NULL);
 	REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata1));
 	REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata2));

@@ -425,6 +425,7 @@ dns_rdata_fromwire(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass,
 	isc_buffer_t st;
 	isc_boolean_t use_default = ISC_FALSE;
 	isc_uint32_t activelength;
+	size_t length;

 	REQUIRE(dctx != NULL);
 	if (rdata != NULL) {
@@ -454,6 +455,14 @@ dns_rdata_fromwire(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass,
 		}
 	}

+	/*
+	 * Reject any rdata that expands out to more than DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH
+	 * as we cannot transmit it.
+	 */
+	length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - isc_buffer_usedlength(&st);
+	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS && length > DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH)
+		result = DNS_R_FORMERR;
+
 	/*
 	 * We should have consumed all of our buffer.
 	 */
@@ -462,8 +471,7 @@ dns_rdata_fromwire(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass,

 	if (rdata != NULL && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 		region.base = isc_buffer_used(&st);
-		region.length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) -
-				isc_buffer_usedlength(&st);
+		region.length = length;
 		dns_rdata_fromregion(rdata, rdclass, type, &region);
 	}

@@ -598,6 +606,7 @@ dns_rdata_fromtext(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass,
 	unsigned long line;
 	void (*callback)(dns_rdatacallbacks_t *, const char *, ...);
 	isc_result_t tresult;
+	size_t length;

 	REQUIRE(origin == NULL || dns_name_isabsolute(origin) == ISC_TRUE);
 	if (rdata != NULL) {
@@ -670,10 +679,13 @@ dns_rdata_fromtext(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass,
 		}
 	} while (1);

+	length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - isc_buffer_usedlength(&st);
+	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS && length > DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH)
+		result = ISC_R_NOSPACE;
+
 	if (rdata != NULL && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 		region.base = isc_buffer_used(&st);
-		region.length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) -
-				isc_buffer_usedlength(&st);
+		region.length = length;
 		dns_rdata_fromregion(rdata, rdclass, type, &region);
 	}
 	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
@@ -781,6 +793,7 @@ dns_rdata_fromstruct(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass,
 	isc_buffer_t st;
 	isc_region_t region;
 	isc_boolean_t use_default = ISC_FALSE;
+	size_t length;

 	REQUIRE(source != NULL);
 	if (rdata != NULL) {
@@ -795,10 +808,13 @@ dns_rdata_fromstruct(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_rdataclass_t rdclass,
 	if (use_default)
 		(void)NULL;

+	length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - isc_buffer_usedlength(&st);
+	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS && length > DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH)
+		result = ISC_R_NOSPACE;
+
 	if (rdata != NULL && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 		region.base = isc_buffer_used(&st);
-		region.length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) -
-				isc_buffer_usedlength(&st);
+		region.length = length;
 		dns_rdata_fromregion(rdata, rdclass, type, &region);
 	}
 	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ isc_result_t
 dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx,
 			   isc_region_t *region, unsigned int reservelen)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Use &removed as a sentinal pointer for duplicate
+	 * rdata as rdata.data == NULL is valid.
+	 */
+	static unsigned char removed;
 	struct xrdata  *x;
 	unsigned char  *rawbuf;
 #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED
@@ -168,6 +173,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx,
 		INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
 		dns_rdata_init(&x[i].rdata);
 		dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &x[i].rdata);
+		INSIST(x[i].rdata.data != &removed);
 #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED
 		x[i].order = i;
 #endif
@@ -200,8 +206,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx,
 	 */
 	for (i = 1; i < nalloc; i++) {
 		if (compare_rdata(&x[i-1].rdata, &x[i].rdata) == 0) {
-			x[i-1].rdata.data = NULL;
-			x[i-1].rdata.length = 0;
+			x[i-1].rdata.data = &removed;
 #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED
 			/*
 			 * Preserve the least order so A, B, A -> A, B
@@ -291,7 +296,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx,
 #endif

 	for (i = 0; i < nalloc; i++) {
-		if (x[i].rdata.data == NULL)
+		if (x[i].rdata.data == &removed)
 			continue;
 #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED
 		offsettable[x[i].order] = rawbuf - offsetbase;
@@ -8318,6 +8318,7 @@ dns_resolver_addbadcache(dns_resolver_t *resolver, dns_name_t *name,
 			goto cleanup;
 		bad->type = type;
 		bad->hashval = hashval;
+		bad->expire = *expire;
 		isc_buffer_init(&buffer, bad + 1, name->length);
 		dns_name_init(&bad->name, NULL);
 		dns_name_copy(name, &bad->name, &buffer);
@@ -8329,8 +8330,8 @@ dns_resolver_addbadcache(dns_resolver_t *resolver, dns_name_t *name,
 		if (resolver->badcount < resolver->badhash * 2 &&
 		    resolver->badhash > DNS_BADCACHE_SIZE)
 			resizehash(resolver, &now, ISC_FALSE);
-	}
-	bad->expire = *expire;
+	} else
+		bad->expire = *expire;
 cleanup:
 	UNLOCK(&resolver->lock);
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: version,v 1.53.8.9 2011-08-24 02:08:26 marka Exp $
+# $Id: version,v 1.53.8.9.6.1 2011-11-16 09:32:07 marka Exp $
 # 
 # This file must follow /bin/sh rules.  It is imported directly via
 # configure.
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@
 MAJORVER=9
 MINORVER=8
 PATCHVER=1
-RELEASETYPE=
-RELEASEVER=
+RELEASETYPE=-P
+RELEASEVER=1
@@ -3217,7 +3217,8 @@ legitimize_pic_address (rtx orig, enum machine_mode mode, rtx reg)
 	  gcc_assert (!no_new_pseudos);
 	  if (arm_pic_register != INVALID_REGNUM)
 	    {
-	      cfun->machine->pic_reg = gen_rtx_REG (Pmode, arm_pic_register);
+	      if (!cfun->machine->pic_reg)
+		cfun->machine->pic_reg = gen_rtx_REG (Pmode, arm_pic_register);

 	      /* Play games to avoid marking the function as needing pic
 		 if we are being called as part of the cost-estimation
@@ -3229,7 +3230,8 @@ legitimize_pic_address (rtx orig, enum machine_mode mode, rtx reg)
 	    {
 	      rtx seq;

-	      cfun->machine->pic_reg = gen_reg_rtx (Pmode);
+	      if (!cfun->machine->pic_reg)
+		  cfun->machine->pic_reg = gen_reg_rtx (Pmode);

 	      /* Play games to avoid marking the function as needing pic
 		 if we are being called as part of the cost-estimation
@@ -285,6 +285,13 @@ openpam_load_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 	size_t len;
 	int r;

+	/* don't allow to escape from policy_path */
+	if (strchr(service, '/')) {
+		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "invalid service name: %s",
+		    service);
+		return (-PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
+	}
+
 	for (path = openpam_policy_path; *path != NULL; ++path) {
 		len = strlen(*path);
 		if ((*path)[len - 1] == '/') {
@@ -721,6 +721,9 @@ encrypt_keyid(struct key_info *kp, unsigned char *keyid, int len)
 	int dir = kp->dir;
 	int ret = 0;

+	if (len > MAXKEYLEN)
+		len = MAXKEYLEN;
+
 	if (!(ep = (*kp->getcrypt)(*kp->modep))) {
 		if (len == 0)
 			return;
@@ -225,6 +225,14 @@ static int eap_server_tls_process_fragment(struct eap_ssl_data *data,
 			return -1;
 		}

+		if (len > message_length) {
+			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SSL: Too much data (%d bytes) in "
+				   "first fragment of frame (TLS Message "
+				   "Length %d bytes)",
+				   (int) len, (int) message_length);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
 		data->tls_in = wpabuf_alloc(message_length);
 		if (data->tls_in == NULL) {
 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: No memory for message");
@@ -736,6 +736,9 @@ encrypt_keyid(struct key_info *kp, unsigned char *keyid, int len)
    int dir = kp->dir;
    int ret = 0;

+    if (len > MAXKEYLEN)
+        len = MAXKEYLEN;
+
    if (!(ep = (*kp->getcrypt)(*kp->modep))) {
 	if (len == 0)
 	    return;
@@ -2,6 +2,171 @@
 OpenSSL CHANGES
 _______________

+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     (This is a backport)
+     [Rob Stradling <[email protected]>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 
+     'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+     int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by 
+     rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+     [Tomas Hoger <[email protected]>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <[email protected]> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <[email protected]> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <[email protected]> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+     [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+     paper describing this attack can be found at:
+                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+     <[email protected]> and Michael Tuexen <[email protected]>
+     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+  *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
+     [Ben Laurie, Kasper <[email protected]>]
+
+  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+     (CVE-2011-4576)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+     Kadianakis <[email protected]> for discovering this issue and
+     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+ 
+  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+     and Rob Austein <[email protected]> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+     [Rob Austein <[email protected]>]
+
+  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+     the last update always remained unused).
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+     for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+     by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+	http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+     [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
+
+  *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+     [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+     escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+     ambiguous.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
 Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]

  *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-debug",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG  -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-debug-64",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-ben-debug-noopt",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG  -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-ben-strict",	"gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
@@ -172,10 +173,10 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -m32 -g -pedantic -Wno-long-long -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared",
 "debug-steve-linux-pseudo64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -mcpu=i486 -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
 "debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
@@ -371,6 +372,9 @@ my %table=(
 "linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}",
 "linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}",

+# Android: Linux but without -DTERMIO and pointers to headers and libs.
+"android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
 #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
 "BSD-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "BSD-x86",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_out_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -425,8 +429,8 @@ my %table=(
 "aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64",
 # Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE
 # at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage!
-"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
-"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
+"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
+"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",

 #
 # Cray T90 and similar (SDSC)
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
 * What is an 'engine' version?
 * How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
+* How does the versioning scheme work?

 [LEGAL] Legal questions

@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?

 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.0c was released on Dec 2nd, 2010.
+OpenSSL 1.0.1d was released on Feb 5th, 2013.

 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
@@ -108,7 +109,9 @@ In addition, you can read the most current versions at
 <URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>. Note that the online documents refer
 to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features
 not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation
-that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using.
+that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
+documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
+directory.

 For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
 might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
@@ -173,6 +176,19 @@ just do:

   pgp TARBALL.asc

+* How does the versioning scheme work?
+
+After the release of OpenSSL 1.0.0 the versioning scheme changed. Letter 
+releases (e.g. 1.0.1a) can only contain bug and security fixes and no
+new features. Minor releases change the last number (e.g. 1.0.2) and 
+can contain new features that retain binary compatibility. Changes to
+the middle number are considered major releases and neither source nor
+binary compatibility is guaranteed.
+
+Therefore the answer to the common question "when will feature X be
+backported to OpenSSL 1.0.0/0.9.8?" is "never" but it could appear
+in the next minor release.
+
 [LEGAL] =======================================================================

 * Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
@@ -284,7 +300,7 @@ current directory in this case, but this has changed with 0.9.6a.)
 Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round
 the 'req', 'verify', 'ca' and 'pkcs12' utilities. For finer control check
 out the manual pages for the individual utilities and the certificate
-extensions documentation (currently in doc/openssl.txt).
+extensions documentation (in ca(1), req(1), x509v3_config(5) )


 * Why can't I create certificate requests?
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  ---------------

 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##

-VERSION=0.9.8q
+VERSION=0.9.8y
 MAJOR=0
 MINOR=9.8
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=0.9.8
@@ -5,6 +5,45 @@
  This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
  release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.

+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y:
+
+      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x:
+
+      o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w:
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v:
+
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u:
+
+      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
+      o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
+      o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
+      o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
+      o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
+
  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:

      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
@@ -181,6 +220,11 @@
      o Added initial support for Win64.
      o Added alternate pkg-config files.

+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m:
+
+      o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
+      o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
+
  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:

      o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@

- OpenSSL 0.9.8q 2 Dec 2010
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8y 5 Feb 2013

- Copyright (c) 1998-2009 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
 Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
 All rights reserved.

@@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	X509_NAME *n = NULL;
 	int nid;

-	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values)
+	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
 		goto error;
@@ -2156,6 +2156,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+	OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	return n;

 error:
@@ -2164,6 +2165,8 @@ error:
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	if (ne_types)
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
+	if (mval)
+		OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	if (buf)
 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return NULL;
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf)

 	atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf);
 	NCONF_free(cnf);
+	cnf = NULL;

 	if (!atyp)
 		return -1;
@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
 				cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
 #endif
+		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) 
+				flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) 
 				flags |= CMS_TEXT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) 
@@ -611,7 +613,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file   signer certificate file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip  file   recipient certificate file for decryption\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-skeyid        use subject key identifier\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid         use subject key identifier\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file       input file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg    input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file    input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");
@@ -1013,6 +1015,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ret = 4;
 	if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
 		{
+		if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+			CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);

 		if (secret_key)
 			{
@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ bad:
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"This is going to take a long time\n");
 			if(!dh || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, &cb))
 				{
-				if(dh) DH_free(dh);
 				ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 				goto end;
 				}
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
 organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default	=

-commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName			= Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
 commonName_max			= 64

 emailAddress			= Email Address
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)

    if (!twopass) BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass);

-    if (options & INFO) BIO_printf (bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n", p12->mac->iter ? ASN1_INTEGER_get (p12->mac->iter) : 1);
+    if ((options & INFO) && p12->mac) BIO_printf (bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n", p12->mac->iter ? ASN1_INTEGER_get (p12->mac->iter) : 1);
    if(macver) {
 #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
    CRYPTO_push_info("verify MAC");
@@ -345,13 +345,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	char *jpake_secret = NULL;
 #endif

-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_client_method();
-#endif

 	apps_startup();
 	c_Pause=0;
@@ -781,13 +781,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
        tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING};
 #endif

-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_server_method();
-#endif

 	local_argc=argc;
 	local_argv=argv;
@@ -1556,6 +1550,12 @@ end:
 	if (dpass)
 		OPENSSL_free(dpass);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (tlscstatp.host)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
+	if (tlscstatp.port)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
+	if (tlscstatp.path)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);
 	if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx2);
 	if (s_cert2)
 		X509_free(s_cert2);
@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ bad:
 				else
 					{
 					pk=load_key(bio_err,
-						keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0,
+						keyfile, keyformat, 0,
 						passin, e, "request key");
 					if (pk == NULL) goto end;
 					}
@@ -790,6 +790,10 @@ esac
 #  options="$options -DATALLA"
 #fi

+($CC -Wa,--help -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1 | \
+ grep \\--noexecstack) 2>&1 > /dev/null && \
+  options="$options -Wa,--noexecstack"
+
 # gcc < 2.8 does not support -march=ultrasparc
 if [ "$OUT" = solaris-sparcv9-gcc -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ]
 then
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 */

 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
@@ -143,17 +144,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 	BUF_MEM *b;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	int i;
-	int ret=-1;
 	ASN1_const_CTX c;
-	int want=HEADER_SIZE;
+	size_t want=HEADER_SIZE;
 	int eos=0;
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64)
-	/* pathetic compiler bug in all known versions as of Nov. 2002 */
-	long off=0;
-#else
-	int off=0;
-#endif
-	int len=0;
+	size_t off=0;
+	size_t len=0;

 	b=BUF_MEM_new();
 	if (b == NULL)
@@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			want-=(len-off);

-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
+			if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 				{
 				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 				goto err;
@@ -181,7 +176,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 				goto err;
 				}
 			if (i > 0)
+				{
+				if (len+i < len)
+					{
+					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+					goto err;
+					}
 				len+=i;
+				}
 			}
 		/* else data already loaded */

@@ -206,6 +208,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			/* no data body so go round again */
 			eos++;
+			if (eos < 0)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
 			want=HEADER_SIZE;
 			}
 		else if (eos && (c.slen == 0) && (c.tag == V_ASN1_EOC))
@@ -220,10 +227,16 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 		else 
 			{
 			/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
-			want=(int)c.slen;
+			want=c.slen;
 			if (want > (len-off))
 				{
 				want-=(len-off);
+				if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
+					len+want < len)
+						{
+						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+						goto err;
+						}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 					{
 					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -238,11 +251,18 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 						    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
 						goto err;
 						}
+					/* This can't overflow because
+					 * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
 					len+=i;
-					want -= i;
+					want-=i;
 					}
 				}
-			off+=(int)c.slen;
+			if (off + c.slen < off)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			off+=c.slen;
 			if (eos <= 0)
 				{
 				break;
@@ -252,9 +272,15 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			}
 		}

+	if (off > INT_MAX)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	*pb = b;
 	return off;
 err:
 	if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b);
-	return(ret);
+	return -1;
 	}
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num)
 				ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT);
 				goto err;
 				}
-			if (!use_bn && l > (ULONG_MAX / 10L))
+			if (!use_bn && l >= ((ULONG_MAX - 80) / 10L))
 				{
 				use_bn = 1;
 				if (!bl)
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
 	 * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
 	 */
-	for (i = 0, p = *pp + 1; i < len - 1; i++, p++)
+	for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
 		{
 		if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
 			{
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@

 #define CHARTYPE_BS_ESC		(ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253)

+#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \
+		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \
+		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
+		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
+

 /* Three IO functions for sending data to memory, a BIO and
 * and a FILE pointer.
@@ -148,6 +153,13 @@ static int do_esc_char(unsigned long c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes, ch
 		if(!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 3)) return -1;
 		return 3;
 	}
+	/* If we get this far and do any escaping at all must escape 
+	 * the escape character itself: backslash.
+	 */
+	if (chtmp == '\\' && flags & ESC_FLAGS) {
+		if(!io_ch(arg, "\\\\", 2)) return -1;
+		return 2;
+	}
 	if(!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -292,11 +304,6 @@ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = {
 	4, -1, 2		/* 28-30 */
 };

-#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \
-		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \
-		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
-		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
-
 /* This is the main function, print out an
 * ASN1_STRING taking note of various escape
 * and display options. Returns number of
@@ -560,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
 	if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
 	mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
 	stmp.data = NULL;
+	stmp.length = 0;
 	ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
 	if(ret < 0) return ret;
 	*out = stmp.data;
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void)
 * default:   the default value, Printable, T61, BMP.
 */

-int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p)
+int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p)
 {
 	unsigned long mask;
 	char *end;
@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signat
 	unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
 	int ret= -1,i,inl;

+	if (!pkey)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
 	type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d,
 ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct);

 void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask);
-int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p);
+int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p);
 unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void);
 int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
 					int inform, unsigned long mask);
@@ -418,9 +418,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)

 		if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
 			strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
-			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
 			ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
 			return NULL;
 		}
@@ -790,12 +790,17 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
 static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
 			const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
+		return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name;
+
 	return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
 }

 static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a,
 			const MIME_PARAM * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
+		return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name;
 	return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
 }

@@ -196,7 +196,9 @@ static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len
 	*val = nm.a;
 	*in = p;
 	return ret;
-	err:
+err:
+        if (nm.x != NULL)
+		X509_NAME_free(nm.x);
 	ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -367,7 +367,19 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 		goto err;
 		}

-	key->pkey = ret;
+	/* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+	if (key->pkey)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+		ret = key->pkey;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		key->pkey = ret;
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		}
 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	return(ret);
 err:
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start:
 	/* add to buffer and return */
 	if (i >= inl)
 		{
-		memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
+		memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
 		ctx->obuf_len+=inl;
 		return(num+inl);
 		}
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start:
 		{
 		if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */
 			{
-			memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
+			memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
 			in+=i;
 			inl-=i;
 			num+=i;
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES:
 		ret=0;
 		p1=ctx->ibuf;
-		for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
+		for (i=0; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
 			{
-			if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++;
+			if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++;
 			}
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		for (;;)
 			{
 			BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-			if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off)
+			if (ctx->obuf_len > 0)
 				{
 				r=BIO_write(b->next_bio,
 					&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]),
-					ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off);
+					ctx->obuf_len);
 #if 0
-fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r);
+fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r);
 #endif
 				BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
 				if (r <= 0) return((long)r);
 				ctx->obuf_off+=r;
+				ctx->obuf_len-=r;
 				}
 			else
 				{
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern "C" {
 /* #endif */

 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU          40 /* as kernel for current MTU */
+#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU   47
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU            41 /* get cached value for MTU */
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU            42 /* set cached value for
 					      * MTU. want to use this
@@ -321,6 +322,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)

 typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct
 	{
+	/* Buffers are setup like this:
+	 *
+	 * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------+
+	 * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+	 */
+
 	/* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */
 	int ibuf_size;	/* how big is the input buffer */
 	int obuf_size;	/* how big is the output buffer */
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
 *
 */

-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -65,6 +64,7 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"

 #include <openssl/bio.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM

 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
@@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 		 */
 		dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b);
 		ret=recvfrom(b->num,out,outl,0,&peer,(void *)&peerlen);
-		dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b);

 		if ( ! data->connected  && ret >= 0)
 			BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &peer);
@@ -302,6 +301,8 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 				data->_errno = get_last_socket_error();
 				}
 			}
+
+		dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b);
 		}
 	return(ret);
 	}
@@ -493,6 +494,9 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		ret = 0;
 #endif
 		break;
+	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
+		ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU:
 		return data->mtu;
 		break;
@@ -654,9 +658,13 @@ static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int i)
 		{
 		err=get_last_socket_error();

-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && 0 /* more microsoft stupidity? perhaps not? Ben 4/1/99 */
-		if ((i == -1) && (err == 0))
-			return(1);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+	/* If the socket return value (i) is -1
+	 * and err is unexpectedly 0 at this point,
+	 * the error code was overwritten by
+	 * another system call before this error
+	 * handling is called.
+	 */
 #endif

 		return(BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(err));
@@ -719,7 +727,6 @@ int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int err)
 		}
 	return(0);
 	}
-#endif

 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
 	{
@@ -737,3 +744,5 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
 	gettimeofday(t, NULL);
 #endif
 	}
+
+#endif
@@ -539,8 +539,10 @@ $sbit=$num;
 	&jle	(&label("sqradd"));

 	&mov	($carry,"edx");
-	&lea	("edx",&DWP(0,$sbit,"edx",2));
+	&add	("edx","edx");
 	&shr	($carry,31);
+	&add	("edx",$sbit);
+	&adc	($carry,0);
 &set_label("sqrlast");
 	&mov	($word,$_n0);
 	&mov	($inp,$_np);
@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ sub data {
 	addze	r11,r0
 					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
 	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
-	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
 	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
 	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
 	addc	r12,r8,r12
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st
 	BIGNUM *mod; /* just a reference */
 	unsigned long thread_id; /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b;
 				  * used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */
-	unsigned int  counter;
+	int counter;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
 	int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -157,7 +157,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, /* const */ BIGN
 	if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
 		BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

-	ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+	/* Set the counter to the special value -1
+	 * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding
+	 * that does not need updating before first use. */
+	ret->counter = -1;
 	return(ret);
 err:
 	if (ret != NULL) BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
@@ -186,7 +189,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		goto err;
 		}

-	if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL &&
+	if (b->counter == -1)
+		b->counter = 0;
+
+	if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL &&
 		!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE))
 		{
 		/* re-create blinding parameters */
@@ -201,8 +207,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)

 	ret=1;
 err:
-	if (b->counter == 0)
-		b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+	if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER)
+		b->counter = 0;
 	return(ret);
 	}

@@ -223,6 +229,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		return(0);
 		}

+	if (b->counter == -1)
+		/* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */
+		b->counter = 0;
+	else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+		return(0);
+
 	if (r != NULL)
 		{
 		if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0;
@@ -243,22 +255,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ct
 	int ret;

 	bn_check_top(n);
-	if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL))
-		{
-		BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-		return(0);
-		}

 	if (r != NULL)
 		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
 	else
-		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
-
-	if (ret >= 0)
 		{
-		if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+		if (b->Ai == NULL)
+			{
+			BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
 			return(0);
+			}
+		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
 		}
+
 	bn_check_top(n);
 	return(ret);
 	}
@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		{
 		while (!BN_is_odd(u))
 			{
+			if (BN_is_zero(u)) goto err;
 			if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err;
 			if (BN_is_odd(b))
 				{
@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
 			a->neg=!(a->neg);
 		return(i);
 		}
-	/* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */
-	if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) &&
-			(bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL))
-		return(0);
-	i=0;
-	for (;;)
+	for (i=0;w!=0 && i<a->top;i++)
 		{
-		if (i >= a->top)
-			l=w;
-		else
-			l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
-		a->d[i]=l;
-		if (w > l)
-			w=1;
-		else
-			break;
-		i++;
+		a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
+		w = (w>l)?1:0;
 		}
-	if (i >= a->top)
+	if (w && i==a->top)
+		{
+		if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0;
 		a->top++;
+		a->d[i]=w;
+		}
 	bn_check_top(a);
 	return(1);
 	}
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>

+/* LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That
+ * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit ensures
+ * that the result fits in an int. */
+#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc
+
 BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *ret;
@@ -94,6 +99,11 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 	char *ret;
 	unsigned int n;

+	if (len < 0)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	if (str->length >= len)
 		{
 		str->length=len;
@@ -105,6 +115,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
@@ -130,6 +146,11 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 	char *ret;
 	unsigned int n;

+	if (len < 0)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	if (str->length >= len)
 		{
 		memset(&str->data[len],0,str->length-len);
@@ -142,6 +163,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
 #define CMS_PARTIAL			0x4000
 #define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST		0x8000
 #define CMS_USE_KEYID			0x10000
+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT		0x20000

 const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
 	X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
 	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+	unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+	size_t tkeylen;

 	int ok = 0;

@@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 				CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
 		goto err;
 		}
-
-
-	if (enc && !ec->key)
+	tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+	/* Generate random session key */
+	if (!enc || !ec->key)
 		{
-		/* Generate random key */
-		if (!ec->keylen)
-			ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
-		ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
-		if (!ec->key)
+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+		if (!tkey)
 			{
 			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
 							ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
 			goto err;
-		keep_key = 1;
 		}
-	else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
+
+	if (!ec->key)
+		{
+		ec->key = tkey;
+		ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+		tkey = NULL;
+		if (enc)
+			keep_key = 1;
+		else
+			ERR_clear_error();
+		
+		}
+
+	if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
 		{
 		/* If necessary set key length */
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
 			{
-			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
-				CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
-			goto err;
+			/* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
+			 * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
+			 */
+			if (enc || ec->debug)
+				{
+				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+						CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Use random key */
+				OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+				OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+				ec->key = tkey;
+				ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+				tkey = NULL;
+				ERR_clear_error();
+				}
 			}
 		}

@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
 		ec->key = NULL;
 		}
+	if (tkey)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+		}
 	if (ok)
 		return b;
 	BIO_free(b);
@@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 	unsigned char *ek = NULL;
 	int eklen;
 	int ret = 0;
+	CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+	ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;

 	if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
 		{
@@ -382,8 +384,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,

 	ret = 1;

-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
+	if (ec->key)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+		}
+
+	ec->key = ek;
+	ec->keylen = eklen;

 	err:
 	if (!ret && ek)
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int cms_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
 		cmsbio = tmpbio;
 		}

-	return 1;
+	return r;

 	}

@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
 	unsigned char *key;
 	size_t keylen;
+	/* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
+	int debug;
 	};

 struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st
@@ -622,7 +622,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 	STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
 	CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
 	int i, r;
+	int debug = 0;
 	ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+	if (ris)
+		debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
 		{
 		ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
@@ -636,17 +639,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
 			r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
-			if (r > 0)
-				return 1;
 			if (cert)
 				{
+				/* If not debugging clear any error and
+				 * return success to avoid leaking of
+				 * information useful to MMA
+				 */
+				if (!debug)
+					{
+					ERR_clear_error();
+					return 1;
+					}
+				if (r > 0)
+					return 1;
 				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
 						CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
 				return 0;
 				}
-			ERR_clear_error();
+			/* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
+			 * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
+			 * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
+			 * of a successful decrypt.
+			 */
+			else if (r > 0 && debug)
+				return 1;
 			}
 		}
+	/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
+	if (!cert && !debug)
+		{
+		ERR_clear_error();
+		return 1;
+		}

 	CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
 	return 0;
@@ -705,9 +729,14 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
 		}
 	if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
 		return 0;
+	if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+	else
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+	if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+		return 1;
 	if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
 		return 0;
-
 	cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
 	if (!cont)
 		return 0;
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int rle_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 	{
 	int i;

-	if (olen < (ilen-1))
+	if (ilen == 0 || olen < (ilen-1))
 		{
 		/* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
 		return(-1);
@@ -59,4 +59,3 @@ static int rle_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 		}
 	return(ilen-1);
 	}
-
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 #endif

 #include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/conf_api.h>
@@ -396,7 +396,6 @@ BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason,
 	case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
 		break;
 	case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
-		ERR_remove_state(0);
 		break;
 	case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
 		break;
@@ -543,3 +542,19 @@ void OpenSSLDie(const char *file,int line,const char *assertion)
 	}

 void *OPENSSL_stderr(void)	{ return stderr; }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+	const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+	unsigned char x = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+	return x;
+	}
+#endif
@@ -588,15 +588,22 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void);

 #endif /* def OPENSSL_FIPS */

+#define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT	1
+void OPENSSL_init(void);
+
+/* CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal. It
+ * takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the contents
+ * of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements into a
+ * defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other than to be
+ * non-zero. */
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
 * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
 */
 void ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void);

-#define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT	1
-void OPENSSL_init(void);
-
 /* Error codes for the CRYPTO functions. */

 /* Function codes. */
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_
 	field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;	

 	/* only support affine coordinates */
-	if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err;
+	if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1;

 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		{
@@ -871,6 +871,9 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT
 		{
 		return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
 		}
+
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+		return 1;
 	
 	if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one)
 		{
@@ -304,7 +304,13 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
 		return 0;
 		}
-	
+
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
 		goto err;
 	if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
@@ -1406,6 +1406,9 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *
 		{
 		return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
 		}
+
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+		return 1;
 	
 	if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one)
 		{
@@ -168,10 +168,9 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 		return 0;
 		}
 	fbytes_counter ++;
-	ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf);	
-	if (ret == 0 || ret != num)
+	if (num != BN_num_bytes(tmp) || !BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf))
 		ret = 0;
-	else
+	else 
 		ret = 1;
 	if (tmp)
 		BN_free(tmp);
@@ -287,9 +286,13 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 	size_t		crv_len = 0, n = 0;
 	EC_KEY		*eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL;
 	EC_GROUP	*group;
+	ECDSA_SIG	*ecdsa_sig = NULL;
 	unsigned char	digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
-	unsigned char	*signature = NULL; 
-	unsigned int	sig_len;
+	unsigned char	*signature = NULL;
+	const unsigned char	*sig_ptr;
+	unsigned char	*sig_ptr2;
+	unsigned char	*raw_buf = NULL;
+	unsigned int	sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
 	int		nid, ret =  0;
 	
 	/* fill digest values with some random data */
@@ -339,7 +342,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 		if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
 			goto builtin_err;
 		EC_GROUP_free(group);
-		if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) < 160)
+		degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+		if (degree < 160)
 			/* drop the curve */ 
 			{
 			EC_KEY_free(eckey);
@@ -415,26 +419,89 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 			}
 		BIO_printf(out, ".");
 		(void)BIO_flush(out);
-		/* modify a single byte of the signature */
-		offset = signature[10] % sig_len;
-		dirt   = signature[11];
-		signature[offset] ^= dirt ? dirt : 1; 
+		/* wrong length */
+		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1,
+			eckey) == 1)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+		BIO_printf(out, ".");
+		(void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+		/* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't
+		 * garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and
+		 * modify a byte in one of the bignums directly. */
+		sig_ptr = signature;
+		if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+
+		/* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */
+		r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r);
+		s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s);
+		bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
+		if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len))
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+		buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
+		if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL)
+			goto builtin_err;
+		/* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */
+		memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len);
+		BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
+		BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
+
+		/* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */
+		offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
+		dirt   = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
+		raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+		/* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */
+		if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+			goto builtin_err;
+
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
 		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
 			goto builtin_err;
 			}
+		/* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */
+		raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+		if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+			goto builtin_err;
+
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
+		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
 		BIO_printf(out, ".");
 		(void)BIO_flush(out);
 		
 		BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
 		/* cleanup */
+		/* clean bogus errors */
+		ERR_clear_error();
 		OPENSSL_free(signature);
 		signature = NULL;
 		EC_KEY_free(eckey);
 		eckey = NULL;
 		EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
 		wrong_eckey = NULL;
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
+		ecdsa_sig = NULL;
+		OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
+		raw_buf = NULL;
 		}

 	ret = 1;	
@@ -443,8 +510,12 @@ builtin_err:
 		EC_KEY_free(eckey);
 	if (wrong_eckey)
 		EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
+	if (ecdsa_sig)
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
 	if (signature)
 		OPENSSL_free(signature);
+	if (raw_buf)
+		OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
 	if (curves)
 		OPENSSL_free(curves);

@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 			}
 		while (BN_is_zero(k));

+		/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+		 * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+		 * bit-length. */
+
+		if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
+		if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
+			if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
+
 		/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
 		if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))
 		{
@@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ int main(int argc,char **argv)
 	    EXIT(3);
 	    }
 	}
+	fclose(f);

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
    ENGINE_cleanup();
@@ -372,6 +372,10 @@ void *CRYPTO_realloc_clean(void *str, int old_len, int num, const char *file,

 	if (num <= 0) return NULL;

+	/* We don't support shrinking the buffer. Note the memcpy that copies
+	 * |old_len| bytes to the new buffer, below. */
+	if (num < old_len) return NULL;
+
 	if (realloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		realloc_debug_func(str, NULL, num, file, line, 0);
 	ret=malloc_ex_func(num,file,line);
@@ -93,4 +93,18 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void)
 #endif
 	}
 		
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS

+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+	const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+	unsigned char x = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+	return x;
+	}
+#endif
@@ -169,14 +169,14 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath, int *pss

 	char *host, *port;

-	/* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */
-	buf = BUF_strdup(url);
-	if (!buf) goto mem_err;
-
 	*phost = NULL;
 	*pport = NULL;
 	*ppath = NULL;

+	/* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */
+	buf = BUF_strdup(url);
+	if (!buf) goto mem_err;
+
 	/* Check for initial colon */
 	p = strchr(buf, ':');

@@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 		{
 		EVP_PKEY *skey;
 		skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
-		ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
-		if(ret <= 0)
+		if (skey)
+			{
+			ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+			EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+			}
+		if(!skey || ret <= 0)
 			{
 			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
 			goto end;
@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
 		if(!init_res)
 			{
+			ret = -1;
 			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
 			goto end;
 			}
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
 * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
 *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
 */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x0090811f
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x0090819fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8q-fips 2 Dec 2010"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8y-fips 5 Feb 2013"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8q 2 Dec 2010"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8y 5 Feb 2013"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
 * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current.
 */
 #define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY ""
-#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "0.9.8"
+#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "6"


 #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */
@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ sub cbc
 	&jmp_ptr($count);

 &set_label("ej7");
-	&xor("edx",		"edx") if $ppro; # ppro friendly
 	&movb(&HB("edx"),	&BP(6,$in,"",0));
 	&shl("edx",8);
 &set_label("ej6");
@@ -170,7 +169,6 @@ sub cbc
 	&jmp(&label("ejend"));
 &set_label("ej3");
 	&movb(&HB("ecx"),	&BP(2,$in,"",0));
-	&xor("ecx",		"ecx") if $ppro; # ppro friendly
 	&shl("ecx",8);
 &set_label("ej2");
 	&movb(&HB("ecx"),	&BP(1,$in,"",0));
@@ -420,6 +420,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 		int max;
 		X509_OBJECT ret;
 #endif
+		unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+		int tkeylen;
 		int jj;

 		if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL)
@@ -461,36 +463,42 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)

 		if (pcert == NULL)
 			{
+			/* Temporary storage in case EVP_PKEY_decrypt
+			 * overwrites output buffer on error.
+			 */
+			unsigned char *tmp2;
+			tmp2 = OPENSSL_malloc(jj);
+			if (!tmp2)
+				goto err;
+			jj = -1;
+			/* Always attempt to decrypt all cases to avoid
+			 * leaking timing information about a successful
+			 * decrypt.
+			 */
 			for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++)
 				{
+				int tret;
 				ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
-				jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp,
+				tret=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp2,
 					M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
 					M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
 						pkey);
-				if (jj > 0)
-					break;
+				if (tret > 0)
+					{
+					memcpy(tmp, tmp2, tret);
+					OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, tret);
+					jj = tret;
+					}
 				ERR_clear_error();
-				ri = NULL;
-				}
-			if (ri == NULL)
-				{
-				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
-				      PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
-				goto err;
 				}
+			OPENSSL_free(tmp2);
 			}
 		else
 			{
 			jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp,
 				M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
 				M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey);
-			if (jj <= 0)
-				{
-				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
-								ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
+			ERR_clear_error();
 			}

 		evp_ctx=NULL;
@@ -499,24 +507,49 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 			goto err;
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
 			goto err;
+		/* Generate random key to counter MMA */
+		tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+		if (!tkey)
+			goto err;
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
+			goto err;
+		/* If we have no key use random key */
+		if (jj <= 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+			jj = tkeylen;
+			tmp = tkey;
+			tkey = NULL;
+			}

-		if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
+		if (jj != tkeylen) {
 			/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
 			 * and effective key length. The key length is
 			 * determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key.
 			 */
 			if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, jj))
 				{
-				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
-					PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
-				goto err;
+				/* As MMA defence use random key instead */
+				OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, jj);
+				OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+				jj = tkeylen;
+				tmp = tkey;
+				tkey = NULL;
 				}
 		} 
+		ERR_clear_error();
 		if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0)
 			goto err;

 		OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj);

+		if (tkey)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+			OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+			}
+
 		if (out == NULL)
 			out=etmp;
 		else
@@ -486,15 +486,34 @@ int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags)
 			return 0;
 		}
 		ret = SMIME_text(bread, data);
+		if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
+			{
+			if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+				ret = 0;
+			}
 		BIO_free_all(bread);
 		return ret;
 	} else {
 		for(;;) {
 			i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
-			if(i <= 0) break;
-			BIO_write(data, buf, i);
+			if(i <= 0)
+				{
+				ret = 1;
+				if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
+					{
+					if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+						ret = 0;
+					}
+					
+				break;
+				}
+			if (BIO_write(data, buf, i) != i)
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				break;
+				}
 		}
 		BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
-		return 1;
+		return ret;
 	}
 }
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	movzb	($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d
 	test	\$-8,$len
 	jz	.Lcloop1
-	cmp	\$0,260($dat)
+	cmpl	\$0,260($dat)
 	jnz	.Lcloop1
 	push	%rbx
 	jmp	.Lcloop8
@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data)
 		 */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 		unsigned long *ia32cap_ptr = OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc();
-		if (ia32cap_ptr && (*ia32cap_ptr & (1<<28))) {
+		if (ia32cap_ptr && (*ia32cap_ptr & (1<<20))) {
 #else
-		if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P & (1<<28)) {
+		if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P & (1<<20)) {
 #endif
 			unsigned char *cp=(unsigned char *)d;

@@ -312,51 +312,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	return ret;
 }

-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-	BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	if (local)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+	BN_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	if (unblind == NULL)
+		/* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+		 * in BN_BLINDING. */
 		return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
 	else
 		{
-		int ret;
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		return ret;
-		}
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-	BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	if (local)
-		return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
-	else
-		{
+		/* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+		 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
 		int ret;
 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+		ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
 		return ret;
 		}
-}
+	}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+	BN_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	/* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+	 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+	 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+	 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+	 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+	 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+	 */
+	return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+	}

 /* signing */
 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 	int local_blinding = 0;
+	/* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+	 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+	 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+	BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
 	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;

 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -404,8 +409,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+		{
+		if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+			goto err;
+		}

 	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
 		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
@@ -439,7 +451,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}

 	if (blinding)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
 			goto err;

 	if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
@@ -478,18 +490,21 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+	BIGNUM *f, *ret;
 	int j,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 	int local_blinding = 0;
+	/* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+	 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+	 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+	BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
 	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;

 	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -527,8 +542,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+		{
+		if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+			goto err;
+		}

 	/* do the decrypt */
 	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
@@ -562,7 +584,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}

 	if (blinding)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
 			goto err;

 	p=buf;
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

 	EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);

-	if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
 		goto decoding_err;
 	else
 		{
@@ -252,15 +252,15 @@
 #define EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m \
                                                EC_POINT_set_compr_coords_GF2m
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish        ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish       ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant
 #define ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant	ec_GF2m_simple_grp_chk_discrim
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish        ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish       ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity     ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity    ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine        ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine       ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates
 #define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates \
                                                ec_GF2m_smp_pt_set_af_coords
@@ -288,8 +288,6 @@
 #define ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity     ec_GFp_simple_pt_set_to_inf
 #undef ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine
 #define ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine        ec_GFp_simple_pts_make_affine
-#undef ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp
-#define ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp       ec_GFp_simple_grp_get_curve_GFp
 #undef ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp
 #define ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp \
                                                ec_GFp_smp_set_Jproj_coords_GFp
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
 	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
 	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;

-	if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+	if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
 		return 0;

 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
@@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ static int ref_cmp(const X509_POLICY_REF * const *a,

 static void policy_map_free(X509_POLICY_REF *map)
 	{
-	if (map->subjectDomainPolicy)
-		ASN1_OBJECT_free(map->subjectDomainPolicy);
 	OPENSSL_free(map);
 	}

@@ -95,6 +93,7 @@ int policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps)
 	{
 	POLICY_MAPPING *map;
 	X509_POLICY_REF *ref = NULL;
+	ASN1_OBJECT *subjectDomainPolicyRef;
 	X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
 	X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache = x->policy_cache;
 	int i;
@@ -153,13 +152,16 @@ int policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps)
 		if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(data->expected_policy_set, 
 						map->subjectDomainPolicy))
 			goto bad_mapping;
+                /* map->subjectDomainPolicy will be freed when
+                 * cache->data is freed. Set it to NULL to avoid double-free. */
+                subjectDomainPolicyRef = map->subjectDomainPolicy;
+                map->subjectDomainPolicy = NULL;
 		
 		ref = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_REF));
 		if (!ref)
 			goto bad_mapping;

-		ref->subjectDomainPolicy = map->subjectDomainPolicy;
-		map->subjectDomainPolicy = NULL;
+		ref->subjectDomainPolicy = subjectDomainPolicyRef;
 		ref->data = data;

 		if (!sk_X509_POLICY_REF_push(cache->maps, ref))
@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
 		case 2:
 		return 1;

+                /* Some internal error */
+		case -1:
+		return -1;
+
 		/* Some internal error */
 		case 0:
 		return 0;
@@ -691,4 +695,3 @@ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
 	return 0;

 	}
-
@@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
 * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array.
 * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed.
 */
-static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
+static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
 			const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
 			const int length,
 			const unsigned char fill)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length);
+  if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length)
+    return 0;
  if (bs->length > 0) {
    memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length);
    if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) {
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
    }
  }
  memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length);
+  return 1;
 }

 /*
@@ -177,13 +179,17 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out,
  unsigned char addr[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
  int i, n;

+  if (bs->length < 0)
+    return 0;
  switch (afi) {
  case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill))
+      return 0;
    BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
    break;
  case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill))
+      return 0;
    for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2)
      ;
    for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2)
@@ -309,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
 /*
 * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange
 * elements.
+ *
+ * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an
+ * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool,
+ * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this
+ * function returns -1.  If this messes up your preferred sort order
+ * for garbage input, tough noogies.
 */
 static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
 				const IPAddressOrRange *b,
@@ -321,22 +333,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,

  switch (a->type) {
  case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
    prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix);
    break;
  case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
    prefixlen_a = length * 8;
    break;
  }

  switch (b->type) {
  case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
    prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix);
    break;
  case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
    prefixlen_b = length * 8;
    break;
  }
@@ -378,6 +394,7 @@ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min,
  unsigned char mask;
  int i, j;

+  OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0);
  for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++)
    ;
  for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--)
@@ -651,22 +668,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
 /*
 * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange.
 */
-static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
+static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
 			    unsigned char *min,
 			    unsigned char *max,
 			    int length)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+  if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL)
+    return 0;
  switch (aor->type) {
  case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) &&
+	    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF));
  case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) &&
+	    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF));
  }
+  return 0;
 }

 /*
@@ -682,9 +699,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
  if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL ||
      afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length ||
      (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix &&
-       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange))
+       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) ||
+      !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length))
    return 0;
-  extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length);
+
  return afi_length;
 }

@@ -766,8 +784,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
      IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
      IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);

-      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-      extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+	  !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+	return 0;

      /*
       * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
@@ -795,14 +814,17 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
    }

    /*
-     * Check final range to see if it should be a prefix.
+     * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a
+     * prefix.
     */
    j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
    {
      IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
-      if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
-	extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-	if (range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
+      if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+	if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
+	  return 0;
+	if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+	    range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
 	  return 0;
      }
    }
@@ -836,8 +858,16 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
    unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
    unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];

-    extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-    extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+	!extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+      return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Punt inverted ranges.
+     */
+    if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+	memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0)
+      return 0;

    /*
     * Punt overlaps.
@@ -864,6 +894,20 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
    }
  }

+  /*
+   * Check for inverted final range.
+   */
+  j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
+  {
+    IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+      unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
+      if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0)
+	return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
  return 1;
 }

@@ -1012,6 +1056,11 @@ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(struct v3_ext_method *method,
 	X509V3_conf_err(val);
 	goto err;
      }
+      if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) {
+	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+	X509V3_conf_err(val);
+	goto err;
+      }
      if (!v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) {
 	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	goto err;
@@ -1097,13 +1146,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,

  p = 0;
  for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
-    extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
-		    c_min, c_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
+			 c_min, c_max, length))
+      return -1;
    for (;; p++) {
      if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
 	return 0;
-      extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
-		      p_min, p_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
+			   p_min, p_max, length))
+	return 0;
      if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
 	continue;
      if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <assert.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
@@ -172,11 +171,11 @@ static int ASIdOrRange_cmp(const ASIdOrRange * const *a_,
 {
  const ASIdOrRange *a = *a_, *b = *b_;

-  assert((a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && a->u.id != NULL) ||
+  OPENSSL_assert((a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && a->u.id != NULL) ||
 	 (a->type == ASIdOrRange_range && a->u.range != NULL &&
 	  a->u.range->min != NULL && a->u.range->max != NULL));

-  assert((b->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->u.id != NULL) ||
+  OPENSSL_assert((b->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->u.id != NULL) ||
 	 (b->type == ASIdOrRange_range && b->u.range != NULL &&
 	  b->u.range->min != NULL && b->u.range->max != NULL));

@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ int v3_asid_add_inherit(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which)
  if (*choice == NULL) {
    if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL)
      return 0;
-    assert((*choice)->u.inherit == NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.inherit == NULL);
    if (((*choice)->u.inherit = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
      return 0;
    (*choice)->type = ASIdentifierChoice_inherit;
@@ -250,7 +249,7 @@ int v3_asid_add_id_or_range(ASIdentifiers *asid,
  if (*choice == NULL) {
    if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL)
      return 0;
-    assert((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL);
    (*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges = sk_ASIdOrRange_new(ASIdOrRange_cmp);
    if ((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL)
      return 0;
@@ -286,7 +285,7 @@ static void extract_min_max(ASIdOrRange *aor,
 			    ASN1_INTEGER **min,
 			    ASN1_INTEGER **max)
 {
-  assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+  OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
  switch (aor->type) {
  case ASIdOrRange_id:
    *min = aor->u.id;
@@ -359,6 +358,20 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
      goto done;
  }

+  /*
+   * Check for inverted range.
+   */
+  i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+  {
+    ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+    ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+      extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+	goto done;
+    }
+  }
+
  ret = 1;

 done:
@@ -373,7 +386,7 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
 int v3_asid_is_canonical(ASIdentifiers *asid)
 {
  return (asid == NULL ||
-	  (ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->asnum) ||
+	  (ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->asnum) &&
 	   ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->rdi)));
 }

@@ -393,9 +406,18 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
    return 1;

  /*
-   * We have a list.  Sort it.
+   * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken.
+   */
+  if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges ||
+      sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) {
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+	      X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * We have a non-empty list.  Sort it.
   */
-  assert(choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges);
  sk_ASIdOrRange_sort(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges);

  /*
@@ -413,7 +435,14 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
    /*
     * Make sure we're properly sorted (paranoia).
     */
-    assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
+    OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
+
+    /*
+     * Punt inverted ranges.
+     */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 ||
+	ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0)
+      goto done;

    /*
     * Check for overlaps.
@@ -466,13 +495,27 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
 	break;
      }
      ASIdOrRange_free(b);
-      (void)sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
+      (void) sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
      i--;
      continue;
    }
  }

-  assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */
+  /*
+   * Check for final inverted range.
+   */
+  i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+  {
+    ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+    ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+      extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+	goto done;
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */

  ret = 1;

@@ -499,6 +542,7 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
 			       struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx,
 			       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
 {
+  ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
  ASIdentifiers *asid = NULL;
  int i;

@@ -509,7 +553,6 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,

  for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
    CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
-    ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
    int i1, i2, i3, is_range, which;

    /*
@@ -579,18 +622,19 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
      max = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s + i2);
      OPENSSL_free(s);
      if (min == NULL || max == NULL) {
-	ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
-	ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
 	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	goto err;
      }
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(min, max) > 0) {
+	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+	goto err;
+      }
    }
    if (!v3_asid_add_id_or_range(asid, which, min, max)) {
-      ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
-      ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
      X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
      goto err;
    }
+    min = max = NULL;
  }

  /*
@@ -602,6 +646,8 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,

 err:
  ASIdentifiers_free(asid);
+  ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
+  ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
  return NULL;
 }

@@ -709,9 +755,9 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
  int i, ret = 1, inherit_as = 0, inherit_rdi = 0;
  X509 *x = NULL;

-  assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0);
-  assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL);
-  assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);
+  OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0);
+  OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL);
+  OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);

  /*
   * Figure out where to start.  If we don't have an extension to
@@ -723,7 +769,7 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
  } else {
    i = 0;
    x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
-    assert(x != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
    if ((ext = x->rfc3779_asid) == NULL)
      goto done;
  }
@@ -756,7 +802,7 @@ static int v3_asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
   */
  for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
    x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
-    assert(x != NULL);
+    OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
    if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL) {
      if (child_as != NULL || child_rdi != NULL)
 	validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ following methods:

 - in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled
   before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable
-   OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY with some non-empty value.
+   OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS with some non-empty value.

 There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the
 default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future.
@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ prints a usage message.

 =item B<-newcert>

-creates a new self signed certificate. The private key and certificate are
-written to the file "newreq.pem".
+creates a new self signed certificate. The private key is written to the file
+"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem".

 =item B<-newreq>

-creates a new certificate request. The private key and request are
-written to the file "newreq.pem".
+creates a new certificate request. The private key is written to the file
+"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem".

 =item B<-newreq-nodes>

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ section for information on the required format.
 =item B<-infiles>

 if present this should be the last option, all subsequent arguments
-are assumed to the the names of files containing certificate requests. 
+are assumed to be the names of files containing certificate requests. 

 =item B<-out filename>

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.

 =item B<-verify filename>

-verify the signature using the the public key in "filename".
+verify the signature using the public key in "filename".
 The output is either "Verification OK" or "Verification Failure".

 =item B<-prverify filename>
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ implemented by ENGINEs should be numbered from. Any command value lower than
 this symbol is considered a "generic" command is handled directly by the
 OpenSSL core routines.

-It is using these "core" control commands that one can discover the the control
+It is using these "core" control commands that one can discover the control
 commands implemented by a given ENGINE, specifically the commands;

 #define ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION		10
@@ -39,10 +39,16 @@ for a description of the method's properties.
 SSL_clear() resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The
 reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions
 (some of these settings were made automatically during the last
-handshake). It only makes sense when opening a new session (or reusing
-an old one) with the same peer that shares these settings.
-SSL_clear() is not a short form for the sequence
-L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>; .
+handshake). It only makes sense for a new connection with the exact
+same peer that shares these settings, and may fail if that peer
+changes its settings between connections. Use the sequence
+L<SSL_get_session(3)|SSL_get_session(3)>;
+L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>;
+L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)>;
+L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>
+instead to avoid such failures
+(or simply L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>
+if session reuse is not desired).

 =head1 RETURN VALUES

@@ -420,28 +420,36 @@ static int capi_init(ENGINE *e)
 	CAPI_CTX *ctx;
 	const RSA_METHOD *ossl_rsa_meth;
 	const DSA_METHOD *ossl_dsa_meth;
-	capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+	if (capi_idx < 0)
+		{
+		capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		if (capi_idx < 0)
+			goto memerr;
+
+		cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+		/* Setup RSA_METHOD */
+		rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
+		capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
+
+		/* Setup DSA Method */
+		dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+		capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify;
+		capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp;
+		capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
+		}

 	ctx = capi_ctx_new();
-	if (!ctx || (capi_idx < 0))
+	if (!ctx)
 		goto memerr;

 	ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, capi_idx, ctx);
-	/* Setup RSA_METHOD */
-	rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
-	capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
-
-	/* Setup DSA Method */
-	dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
-	capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify;
-	capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp;
-	capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;

 #ifdef OPENSSL_CAPIENG_DIALOG
 	{
@@ -1133,6 +1141,7 @@ static int capi_list_containers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out)
 		{
 		CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR);
 		capi_addlasterror();
+		CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
 		return 0;
 		}
 	CAPI_trace(ctx, "Got max container len %d\n", buflen);
@@ -1400,10 +1409,13 @@ static PCCERT_CONTEXT capi_find_cert(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *id, HCERTSTORE h
 static CAPI_KEY *capi_get_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *contname, char *provname, DWORD ptype, DWORD keyspec)
 	{
 	CAPI_KEY *key;
+    DWORD dwFlags = 0; 
 	key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CAPI_KEY));
 	CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_get_key, contname=%s, provname=%s, type=%d\n", 
 						contname, provname, ptype);
-	if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, 0))
+    if(ctx->store_flags & CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE)
+        dwFlags = CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET;
+    if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, dwFlags)) 
 		{
 		CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY, CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR);
 		capi_addlasterror();
@@ -1550,6 +1562,8 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, LPSTR pname, DWORD type, int che
 			}
 		CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
 		}
+	if (ctx->cspname)
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx->cspname);
 	ctx->cspname = BUF_strdup(pname);
 	ctx->csptype = type;
 	return 1;
@@ -1559,9 +1573,12 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname_idx(CAPI_CTX *ctx, int idx)
 	{
 	LPSTR pname;
 	DWORD type;
+	int res;
 	if (capi_get_provname(ctx, &pname, &type, idx) != 1)
 		return 0;
-	return capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
+	res = capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
+	OPENSSL_free(pname);
+	return res;
 	}

 static int cert_issuer_match(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 *x)
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
 #ifndef HEADER_CAPI_ERR_H
 #define HEADER_CAPI_ERR_H

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
 * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 	(defined(__linux) && (defined(__arm) || defined(__arm__)))	|| \
 	(defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__))				|| \
 	(defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__))			|| \
+	defined(__ANDROID__)						|| \
 	(defined(vax) || defined(__vax__))
 #  define POINTER_TO_FUNCTION_IS_POINTER_TO_1ST_INSTRUCTION
 # endif