Forced commit to sys/conf/newvers.sh to mark the real

10.1-RELEASE point. Approved by: re (implicit) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Set static abitag to the current value of __FreeBSD_version.
2026-10-30 04:15:06 +01:00 · 2014-11-11 19:52:24 +00:00 · 2014-11-11 19:51:27 +00:00 · 2014-11-11 05:54:50 +00:00 · 2014-11-11 05:46:10 +00:00 · 2014-11-11 05:00:51 +00:00
575 changed files with 8145 additions and 14356 deletions
@@ -38,11 +38,13 @@
 #   xargs -n1 | sort | uniq -d;
 # done

+# 20141015: OpenSSL 1.0.1j import
+OLD_FILES+=usr/share/openssl/man/man3/CMS_sign_add1_signer.3.gz
 # 20140917: hv_kvpd rc.d script removed in favor of devd configuration
 OLD_FILES+=etc/rc.d/hv_kvpd
 # 20140814: libopie version bump
-OLD_LIBS+=usr/lib/libopie.so.7
-OLD_LIBS+=usr/lib32/libopie.so.7
+OLD_LIBS+=usr/lib/libopie.so.8
+OLD_LIBS+=usr/lib32/libopie.so.8
 # 20140811: otp-sha renamed to otp-sha1
 OLD_FILES+=usr/bin/otp-sha
 OLD_FILES+=usr/share/man/man1/otp-sha.1.gz
@@ -1,7 +1,23 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # $FreeBSD$

-base=`basename $0`
+jail_name_to_jid()
+{
+	local check_name="$1"
+	(
+		line="$(jls -n 2> /dev/null | grep  name=$check_name  )"
+		for nv in $line; do
+			local name="${nv%=*}"
+			if [ "${name}" = "jid" ]; then
+				eval $nv
+				echo $jid
+				break
+			fi
+		done
+	)
+}
+
+base=pgrep_j_test

 echo "1..3"

@@ -9,21 +25,25 @@ name="pgrep -j <jid>"
 if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then
 	sleep=$(pwd)/sleep.txt
 	ln -sf /bin/sleep $sleep
-	jail / $base-1 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid=$!
-	jail / $base-2 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid2=$!
-	$sleep 5 &
-	chpid3=$!
-	sleep 0.5
-	jid=`jls | awk "/127\\.0\\.0\\.1.*${base}-1/ {print \$1}"`
-	pid=`pgrep -f -j $jid $sleep`
-	if [ "$pid" = "$chpid" ]; then
+	jail -c path=/ name=${base}_1_1 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+	    command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_1_1.pid $sleep 5 &
+
+	jail -c path=/ name=${base}_1_2 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+	    command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_1_2.pid $sleep 5 &
+
+	jid1=$(jail_name_to_jid ${base}_1_1)
+	jid2=$(jail_name_to_jid ${base}_1_2)
+	jid="${jid1},${jid2}"
+	pid1="$(pgrep -f -x -j $jid "$sleep 5" | sort)"
+	pid2=$(printf "%s\n%s" "$(cat ${PWD}/${base}_1_1.pid)" \
+	    $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_1_2.pid) | sort)
+	if [ "$pid1" = "$pid2" ]; then
 		echo "ok 1 - $name"
 	else
 		echo "not ok 1 - $name"
 	fi
-	kill $chpid $chpid2 $chpid3
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_1_1.pid ] && kill $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_1_1.pid)
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_1_2.pid ] && kill $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_1_2.pid)
 	rm -f $sleep
 else
 	echo "ok 1 - $name # skip Test needs uid 0."
@@ -33,21 +53,23 @@ name="pgrep -j any"
 if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then
 	sleep=$(pwd)/sleep.txt
 	ln -sf /bin/sleep $sleep
-	jail / $base-1 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid=$!
-	jail / $base-2 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid2=$!
-	$sleep 5 &
-	chpid3=$!
-	sleep 0.5
-	pids=`pgrep -f -j any $sleep | sort`
-	refpids=`{ echo $chpid; echo $chpid2; } | sort`
-	if [ "$pids" = "$refpids" ]; then
+	jail -c path=/ name=${base}_2_1 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+	    command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_2_1.pid $sleep 5 &
+
+	jail -c path=/ name=${base}_2_2 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+	    command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_2_2.pid $sleep 5 &
+
+	sleep 2
+	pid1="$(pgrep -f -x -j any "$sleep 5" | sort)"
+	pid2=$(printf "%s\n%s" "$(cat ${PWD}/${base}_2_1.pid)" \
+	    $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_2_2.pid) | sort)
+	if [ "$pid1" = "$pid2" ]; then
 		echo "ok 2 - $name"
 	else
 		echo "not ok 2 - $name"
 	fi
-	kill $chpid $chpid2 $chpid3
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_2_1.pid ] && kill $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_2_1.pid)
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_2_2.pid ] && kill $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_2_2.pid)
 	rm -f $sleep
 else
 	echo "ok 2 - $name # skip Test needs uid 0."
@@ -57,19 +79,19 @@ name="pgrep -j none"
 if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then
 	sleep=$(pwd)/sleep.txt
 	ln -sf /bin/sleep $sleep
-	$sleep 5 &
-	chpid=$!
-	jail / $base 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid2=$!
-	sleep 0.5
-	pid=`pgrep -f -j none $sleep`
-	if [ "$pid" = "$chpid" ]; then
+	daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_3_1.pid $sleep 5 &
+	jail -c path=/ name=${base}_3_2 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+	    command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_3_2.pid $sleep 5 &
+	sleep 2
+	pid="$(pgrep -f -x -j none "$sleep 5")"
+	if [ "$pid" = "$(cat ${PWD}/${base}_3_1.pid)" ]; then
 		echo "ok 3 - $name"
 	else
 		echo "not ok 3 - $name"
 	fi
-	kill $chpid $chpid2
 	rm -f $sleep
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_3_1.pid ] && kill $(cat $PWD/${base}_3_1.pid) 
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_3_2.pid ] && kill $(cat $PWD/${base}_3_2.pid) 
 else
 	echo "ok 3 - $name # skip Test needs uid 0."
 fi
@@ -1,7 +1,23 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # $FreeBSD$

-base=`basename $0`
+jail_name_to_jid()
+{
+	local check_name="$1"
+	(
+		line="$(jls -n 2> /dev/null | grep  name=$check_name  )"
+		for nv in $line; do
+			local name="${nv%=*}"
+			if [ "${name}" = "jid" ]; then
+				eval $nv
+				echo $jid
+				break
+			fi
+		done
+	)
+}
+
+base=pkill_j_test

 echo "1..3"

@@ -9,21 +25,28 @@ name="pkill -j <jid>"
 if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then
 	sleep=$(pwd)/sleep.txt
 	ln -sf /bin/sleep $sleep
-	jail / $base-1 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid=$!
-	jail / $base-2 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid2=$!
+        jail -c path=/ name=${base}_1_1 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+            command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_1_1.pid $sleep 5 &
+
+        jail -c path=/ name=${base}_1_2 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+            command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_1_2.pid $sleep 5 &
+
 	$sleep 5 &
-	chpid3=$!
 	sleep 0.5
-	jid=`jls | awk "/127\\.0\\.0\\.1.*${base}-1/ {print \$1}"`
-	if pkill -f -j $jid $sleep && sleep 0.5 &&
-	    ! kill $chpid && kill $chpid2 $chpid3; then
+	jid1=$(jail_name_to_jid ${base}_1_1)
+	jid2=$(jail_name_to_jid ${base}_1_2)
+	jid="${jid1},${jid2}"
+	if pkill -f -j "$jid" $sleep && sleep 0.5 &&
+	    ! -f ${PWD}/${base}_1_1.pid &&
+	    ! -f ${PWD}/${base}_1_2.pid ; then
 		echo "ok 1 - $name"
 	else
 		echo "not ok 1 - $name"
 	fi 2>/dev/null
 	rm -f $sleep
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_1_1.pid ] && kill $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_1_1.pid)
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_1_2.pid ] && kill $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_1_2.pid)
+	wait
 else
 	echo "ok 1 - $name # skip Test needs uid 0."
 fi
@@ -32,20 +55,26 @@ name="pkill -j any"
 if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then
 	sleep=$(pwd)/sleep.txt
 	ln -sf /bin/sleep $sleep
-	jail / $base-1 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid=$!
-	jail / $base-2 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid2=$!
+        jail -c path=/ name=${base}_2_1 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+            command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_2_1.pid $sleep 5 &
+
+        jail -c path=/ name=${base}_2_2 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+            command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_2_2.pid $sleep 5 &
+
 	$sleep 5 &
-	chpid3=$!
 	sleep 0.5
+	chpid3=$!
 	if pkill -f -j any $sleep && sleep 0.5 &&
-	    ! kill $chpid && ! kill $chpid2 && kill $chpid3; then
+	    [ ! -f ${PWD}/${base}_2_1.pid -a
+	      ! -f ${PWD}/${base}_2_2.pid ] && kill $chpid3; then
 		echo "ok 2 - $name"
 	else
 		echo "not ok 2 - $name"
 	fi 2>/dev/null
 	rm -f $sleep
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_2_1.pid ] && kill $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_2_1.pid)
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_2_2.pid ] && kill $(cat ${PWD}/${base}_2_2.pid)
+	wait
 else
 	echo "ok 2 - $name # skip Test needs uid 0."
 fi
@@ -54,18 +83,20 @@ name="pkill -j none"
 if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then
 	sleep=$(pwd)/sleep.txt
 	ln -sf /bin/sleep $sleep
-	$sleep 5 &
-	chpid=$!
-	jail / $base 127.0.0.1 $sleep 5 &
-	chpid2=$!
-	sleep 0.5
-	if pkill -f -j none $sleep && sleep 0.5 &&
-	    ! kill $chpid && kill $chpid2; then
+	daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_3_1.pid $sleep 5
+	jail -c path=/ name=${base}_3_2 ip4.addr=127.0.0.1 \
+            command=daemon -p ${PWD}/${base}_3_2.pid $sleep 5 &
+	sleep 1
+	if pkill -f -j none "$sleep 5" && sleep 1 &&
+	    [ ! -f ${PWD}/${base}_3_1.pid -a -f ${PWD}/${base}_3_2.pid ] ; then
 		echo "ok 3 - $name"
 	else
+		ls ${PWD}/*.pid
 		echo "not ok 3 - $name"
 	fi 2>/dev/null
 	rm -f $sleep
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_3_1.pid ] && kill $(cat ${base}_3_1.pid)
+	[ -f ${PWD}/${base}_3_2.pid ] && kill $(cat ${base}_3_2.pid)
 else
 	echo "ok 3 - $name # skip Test needs uid 0."
 fi
@@ -2546,7 +2546,7 @@ _bfd_score_elf_check_relocs (bfd *abfd,
 	}
      else if (r_symndx >= extsymoff + NUM_SHDR_ENTRIES (symtab_hdr))
        {
-          (*_bfd_error_handler) (_("%s: Malformed reloc detected for section %s"), abfd, name);
+          (*_bfd_error_handler) (_("%B: Malformed reloc detected for section %s"), abfd, name);
          bfd_set_error (bfd_error_bad_value);
          return FALSE;
        }
@@ -4357,8 +4357,8 @@ elf_link_add_object_symbols (bfd *abfd, struct bfd_link_info *info)
 	      if ((elf_dyn_lib_class (abfd) & DYN_NO_NEEDED) != 0)
 		{
 		  (*_bfd_error_handler)
-		    (_("%s: invalid DSO for symbol `%s' definition"),
-		     abfd, name);
+		    (_("%B: invalid DSO for symbol `%s' definition"),
+		    abfd, name);
 		  bfd_set_error (bfd_error_bad_value);
 		  goto error_free_vers;
 		}
@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ msgstr ""

 #: elf32-score.c:2549
 #, c-format
-msgid "%s: Malformed reloc detected for section %s"
+msgid "%B: Malformed reloc detected for section %s"
 msgstr ""

 #: elf32-score.c:2600
@@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ msgstr ""

 #: elflink.c:4309
 #, c-format
-msgid "%s: invalid DSO for symbol `%s' definition"
+msgid "%B: invalid DSO for symbol `%s' definition"
 msgstr ""

 #: elflink.c:5535
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ struct opie {
 /* Maximum length of a seed */
 #define OPIE_SEED_MAX 16

-/* Max length of hash algorithm name (md4/md5/sha1) */
-#define OPIE_HASHNAME_MAX 4
+/* Max length of hash algorithm name (md4/md5) */
+#define OPIE_HASHNAME_MAX 3

-/* Maximum length of a challenge (otp-md? 9999 seed ext) */
-#define OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX (4+OPIE_HASHNAME_MAX+1+4+1+OPIE_SEED_MAX+1+3)
+/* Maximum length of a challenge (otp-md? 9999 seed) */
+#define OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX (4+OPIE_HASHNAME_MAX+1+4+1+OPIE_SEED_MAX)

 /* Maximum length of a response that we allow */
 #define OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX (9+1+19+1+9+OPIE_SEED_MAX+1+19+1+19+1+19)
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ fetch_url(const char *url, const char *proxyenv, char *proxyauth, char *wwwauth)
 	url_decode(decodedpath);

 	if (outfile)
-		savefile = ftp_strdup(outfile);
+		savefile = outfile;
 	else {
 		cp = strrchr(decodedpath, '/');		/* find savefile */
 		if (cp != NULL)
@@ -571,8 +571,7 @@ fetch_url(const char *url, const char *proxyenv, char *proxyauth, char *wwwauth)
 	rangestart = rangeend = entitylen = -1;
 	mtime = -1;
 	if (restartautofetch) {
-		if (strcmp(savefile, "-") != 0 && *savefile != '|' &&
-		    stat(savefile, &sb) == 0)
+		if (stat(savefile, &sb) == 0)
 			restart_point = sb.st_size;
 	}
 	if (urltype == FILE_URL_T) {		/* file:// URLs */
@@ -1098,17 +1097,25 @@ fetch_url(const char *url, const char *proxyenv, char *proxyauth, char *wwwauth)
 	}		/* end of ftp:// or http:// specific setup */

 			/* Open the output file. */
-	if (strcmp(savefile, "-") == 0) {
-		fout = stdout;
-	} else if (*savefile == '|') {
-		oldintp = xsignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-		fout = popen(savefile + 1, "w");
-		if (fout == NULL) {
-			warn("Can't execute `%s'", savefile + 1);
-			goto cleanup_fetch_url;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only trust filenames with special meaning if they came from
+	 * the command line
+	 */
+	if (outfile == savefile) {
+		if (strcmp(savefile, "-") == 0) {
+			fout = stdout;
+		} else if (*savefile == '|') {
+			oldintp = xsignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+			fout = popen(savefile + 1, "w");
+			if (fout == NULL) {
+				warn("Can't execute `%s'", savefile + 1);
+				goto cleanup_fetch_url;
+			}
+			closefunc = pclose;
 		}
-		closefunc = pclose;
-	} else {
+	}
+	if (fout == NULL) {
 		if ((rangeend != -1 && rangeend <= restart_point) ||
 		    (rangestart == -1 && filesize != -1 && filesize <= restart_point)) {
 			/* already done */
@@ -1318,7 +1325,8 @@ fetch_url(const char *url, const char *proxyenv, char *proxyauth, char *wwwauth)
 		(*closefunc)(fout);
 	if (res0)
 		freeaddrinfo(res0);
-	FREEPTR(savefile);
+	if (savefile != outfile)
+		FREEPTR(savefile);
 	FREEPTR(uuser);
 	if (pass != NULL)
 		memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
@@ -2,6 +2,57 @@
 OpenSSL CHANGES
 _______________

+ Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
+
+  *) SRTP Memory Leak.
+
+     A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
+     sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
+     to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
+     exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
+     1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
+     whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
+     have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
+
+     The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
+     (CVE-2014-3513)
+     [OpenSSL team]
+
+  *) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
+
+     When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
+     integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
+     ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
+     causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
+     tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
+     attack.
+     (CVE-2014-3567)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
+
+     When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
+     could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
+     configured to send them.
+     (CVE-2014-3568)
+     [Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
+
+  *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+     Client applications doing fallback retries should call
+     SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
+     (CVE-2014-3566)
+     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+ 
+     Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+     verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
+     DigestInfo structures.
+
+     Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
 Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]

  *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
@@ -1767,6 +1767,9 @@ open(OUT,'>crypto/opensslconf.h.new') || die "unable to create crypto/opensslcon
 print OUT "/* opensslconf.h */\n";
 print OUT "/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */\n\n";

+print OUT "#ifdef  __cplusplus\n";
+print OUT "extern \"C\" {\n";
+print OUT "#endif\n";
 print OUT "/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */\n";
 my $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans = $openssl_algorithm_defines;
 $openssl_experimental_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+OPENSSL_NO_(.*)/#ifndef OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$1\n# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_$1\n#  define OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# endif\n#endif/mg;
@@ -1871,6 +1874,9 @@ while (<IN>)
 		{ print OUT $_; }
 	}
 close(IN);
+print OUT "#ifdef  __cplusplus\n";
+print OUT "}\n";
+print OUT "#endif\n";
 close(OUT);
 rename("crypto/opensslconf.h","crypto/opensslconf.h.bak") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h\n" if -e "crypto/opensslconf.h";
 rename("crypto/opensslconf.h.new","crypto/opensslconf.h") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h.new\n";
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##

-VERSION=1.0.1i
+VERSION=1.0.1j
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.1
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@
  This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
  release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.

+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3513
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3567
+      o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability)
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3568
+
  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]

      o Fix for CVE-2014-3512
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@

- OpenSSL 1.0.1i 6 Aug 2014
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1j 15 Oct 2014

 Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
 Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1       - just use TLSv1.1\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1         - just use TLSv1\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1        - just use DTLSv1\n");    
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu          - set the link layer MTU\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs         - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
@@ -617,6 +618,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	char *sess_out = NULL;
 	struct sockaddr peer;
 	int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
+	int fallback_scsv = 0;
 	int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
 	long socket_mtu = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
@@ -823,6 +825,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			meth=DTLSv1_client_method();
 			socket_type=SOCK_DGRAM;
 			}
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
+			{
+			fallback_scsv = 1;
+			}
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-timeout") == 0)
 			enable_timeouts=1;
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-mtu") == 0)
@@ -1235,6 +1241,10 @@ bad:
 		SSL_set_session(con, sess);
 		SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
 		}
+
+	if (fallback_scsv)
+		SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	if (servername != NULL)
 		{
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ CPUID_OBJ=mem_clr.o
 LIBS=

 GENERAL=Makefile README crypto-lib.com install.com
+TEST=constant_time_test.c

 LIB= $(TOP)/libcrypto.a
 SHARED_LIB= libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
@@ -44,7 +45,8 @@ SRC= $(LIBSRC)

 EXHEADER= crypto.h opensslv.h opensslconf.h ebcdic.h symhacks.h \
 	ossl_typ.h
-HEADER=	cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h $(EXHEADER)
+HEADER=	cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h \
+	constant_time_locl.h $(EXHEADER)

 ALL=    $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)

@@ -525,6 +525,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	aesni_ecb_encrypt,\@function,5
 .align	16
 aesni_ecb_encrypt:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	lea	-0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+	movaps	%xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+.Lecb_enc_body:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
 	and	\$-16,$len
 	jz	.Lecb_ret

@@ -805,6 +815,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	movups	$inout5,0x50($out)

 .Lecb_ret:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+	movaps	0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+	movaps	0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+	lea	0x58(%rsp),%rsp
+.Lecb_enc_ret:
+___
+$code.=<<___;
 	ret
 .size	aesni_ecb_encrypt,.-aesni_ecb_encrypt
 ___
@@ -2730,28 +2750,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
-.type	ecb_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.type	ecb_ccm64_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
 .align	16
-ecb_se_handler:
-	push	%rsi
-	push	%rdi
-	push	%rbx
-	push	%rbp
-	push	%r12
-	push	%r13
-	push	%r14
-	push	%r15
-	pushfq
-	sub	\$64,%rsp
-
-	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
-
-	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
-.size	ecb_se_handler,.-ecb_se_handler
-
-.type	ccm64_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align	16
-ccm64_se_handler:
+ecb_ccm64_se_handler:
 	push	%rsi
 	push	%rdi
 	push	%rbx
@@ -2788,7 +2789,7 @@ ccm64_se_handler:
 	lea	0x58(%rax),%rax		# adjust stack pointer

 	jmp	.Lcommon_seh_tail
-.size	ccm64_se_handler,.-ccm64_se_handler
+.size	ecb_ccm64_se_handler,.-ecb_ccm64_se_handler

 .type	ctr32_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
 .align	16
@@ -2993,14 +2994,15 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
 .LSEH_info_ecb:
 	.byte	9,0,0,0
-	.rva	ecb_se_handler
+	.rva	ecb_ccm64_se_handler
+	.rva	.Lecb_enc_body,.Lecb_enc_ret		# HandlerData[]
 .LSEH_info_ccm64_enc:
 	.byte	9,0,0,0
-	.rva	ccm64_se_handler
+	.rva	ecb_ccm64_se_handler
 	.rva	.Lccm64_enc_body,.Lccm64_enc_ret	# HandlerData[]
 .LSEH_info_ccm64_dec:
 	.byte	9,0,0,0
-	.rva	ccm64_se_handler
+	.rva	ecb_ccm64_se_handler
 	.rva	.Lccm64_dec_body,.Lccm64_dec_ret	# HandlerData[]
 .LSEH_info_ctr32:
 	.byte	9,0,0,0
@@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
 	mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
 	stmp.data = NULL;
 	stmp.length = 0;
+	stmp.flags = 0;
 	ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
 	if(ret < 0) return ret;
 	*out = stmp.data;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int

 	if (n <= 0) return 0;

-	asm (
+	asm volatile (
 	"	subq	%2,%2		\n"
 	".p2align 4			\n"
 	"1:	movq	(%4,%2,8),%0	\n"
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
 	"	sbbq	%0,%0		\n"
 		: "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i)
 		: "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
-		: "cc"
+		: "cc", "memory"
 	);

  return ret&1;
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int

 	if (n <= 0) return 0;

-	asm (
+	asm volatile (
 	"	subq	%2,%2		\n"
 	".p2align 4			\n"
 	"1:	movq	(%4,%2,8),%0	\n"
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
 	"	sbbq	%0,%0		\n"
 		: "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i)
 		: "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
-		: "cc"
+		: "cc", "memory"
 	);

  return ret&1;
@@ -874,7 +874,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
 	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
 	if (bits == 0)
 		{
-		ret = BN_one(rr);
+		/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+		if (BN_is_one(m))
+			{
+			ret = 1;
+			BN_zero(rr);
+			}
+		else
+			ret = BN_one(rr);
 		return ret;
 		}
 	if (a == 0)
@@ -1088,9 +1088,9 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	/* ... and right shift */
 	for (val=t_d[0],i=0; i<BN_NIST_521_TOP-1; i++)
 		{
-		tmp = val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT;
-		val = t_d[i+1];
-		t_d[i] = (tmp | val<<BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT) & BN_MASK2;
+		t_d[i] = ( val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT |
+			  (tmp=t_d[i+1])<<BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT ) & BN_MASK2;
+		val=tmp;
 		}
 	t_d[i] = val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT;
 	/* lower 521 bits */
@@ -71,6 +71,43 @@

 static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";

+/* test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success. */
+static int test_exp_mod_zero() {
+	BIGNUM a, p, m;
+	BIGNUM r;
+	BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	BN_init(&m);
+	BN_one(&m);
+
+	BN_init(&a);
+	BN_one(&a);
+
+	BN_init(&p);
+	BN_zero(&p);
+
+	BN_init(&r);
+	BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(&r))
+		ret = 0;
+	else
+		{
+		printf("1**0 mod 1 = ");
+		BN_print_fp(stdout, &r);
+		printf(", should be 0\n");
+		}
+
+	BN_free(&r);
+	BN_free(&a);
+	BN_free(&p);
+	BN_free(&m);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	{
 	BN_CTX *ctx;
@@ -190,7 +227,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
 	CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out);
 	BIO_free(out);
-	printf(" done\n");
+	printf("\n");
+
+	if (test_exp_mod_zero() != 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	printf("done\n");
+
 	EXIT(0);
 err:
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/* crypto/constant_time_locl.h */
+/*
+ * Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
+ *
+ * Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org)
+ * Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
+ * (Google).
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
+#define HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
+
+#include "e_os.h"  /* For 'inline' */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true
+ * and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result
+ * of a conditional in constant time. For example,
+ *
+ * if (a < b) {
+ *   c = a;
+ * } else {
+ *   c = b;
+ * }
+ *
+ * can be written as
+ *
+ * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b);
+ * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b);
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Returns the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. Uses the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to
+ * replace this with something else on odd CPUs.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a < b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a >= b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a == 0 and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a);
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a == b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Signed integers. */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b);
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b).
+ *
+ * When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above),
+ * the select methods return either |a| (if |mask| is nonzero) or |b|
+ * (if |mask| is zero).
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+	unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for unsigned chars. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
+	unsigned char a, unsigned char b);
+/* Convenience method for signed integers. */
+static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b);
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	return (unsigned int)((int)(a) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	unsigned int lt;
+	/* Case 1: msb(a) == msb(b). a < b iff the MSB of a - b is set.*/
+	lt = ~(a ^ b) & (a - b);
+	/* Case 2: msb(a) != msb(b). a < b iff the MSB of b is set. */
+	lt |= ~a & b;
+	return constant_time_msb(lt);
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_lt(a, b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	unsigned int ge;
+	/* Case 1: msb(a) == msb(b). a >= b iff the MSB of a - b is not set.*/
+	ge = ~((a ^ b) | (a - b));
+	/* Case 2: msb(a) != msb(b). a >= b iff the MSB of a is set. */
+	ge |= a & ~b;
+	return constant_time_msb(ge);
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_ge(a, b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_is_zero(a));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_eq(a, b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b)
+	{
+	return constant_time_eq((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
+	{
+	return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+	unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
+	unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b));
+	}
+
+inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
+	{
+	return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
+	}
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif  /* HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H */
@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+/* crypto/constant_time_test.c */
+/*
+ * Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
+ *
+ * Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org)
+ * Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
+ * (Google).
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_TRUE = (unsigned)(~0);
+static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_FALSE = 0;
+static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_TRUE_8 = 0xff;
+static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_FALSE_8 = 0;
+
+static int test_binary_op(unsigned int (*op)(unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
+	const char* op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true)
+	{
+	unsigned c = op(a, b);
+	if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
+			"(TRUE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for  %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
+			"(FALSE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE,
+			c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+        return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_binary_op_8(unsigned char (*op)(unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
+	const char* op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true)
+	{
+	unsigned char c = op(a, b);
+	if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
+			"(TRUE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for  %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
+			"(FALSE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8,
+			c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+        return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_is_zero(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	unsigned int c = constant_time_is_zero(a);
+	if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+			"expected %du (TRUE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+			"expected %du (FALSE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE,
+			c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+        return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	unsigned char c = constant_time_is_zero_8(a);
+	if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+			"expected %u (TRUE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+			"expected %u (FALSE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8,
+			c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+        return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_select(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	unsigned int selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
+	if (selected != a)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
+			"%du): expected %du(first value), got %du\n",
+			CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
+	if (selected != b)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
+			"%du): expected %du(second value), got %du\n",
+			CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_select_8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+	{
+	unsigned char selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, a, b);
+	if (selected != a)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
+			"%u): expected %u(first value), got %u\n",
+			CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, a, b);
+	if (selected != b)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
+			"%u): expected %u(second value), got %u\n",
+			CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_select_int(int a, int b)
+	{
+	int selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
+	if (selected != a)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
+			"%d): expected %d(first value), got %d\n",
+			CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
+	if (selected != b)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
+			"%d): expected %d(second value), got %d\n",
+			CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_eq_int(int a, int b)
+	{
+	unsigned int equal = constant_time_eq_int(a, b);
+	if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
+			"expected %du(TRUE), got %du\n",
+			a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, equal);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
+			"expected %du(FALSE), got %du\n",
+			a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE, equal);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
+	{
+	unsigned char equal = constant_time_eq_int_8(a, b);
+	if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
+			"expected %u(TRUE), got %u\n",
+			a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, equal);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
+			"expected %u(FALSE), got %u\n",
+			a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, equal);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static unsigned int test_values[] = {0, 1, 1024, 12345, 32000, UINT_MAX/2-1,
+                                     UINT_MAX/2, UINT_MAX/2+1, UINT_MAX-1,
+                                     UINT_MAX};
+
+static unsigned char test_values_8[] = {0, 1, 2, 20, 32, 127, 128, 129, 255};
+
+static int signed_test_values[] = {0, 1, -1, 1024, -1024, 12345, -12345,
+				   32000, -32000, INT_MAX, INT_MIN, INT_MAX-1,
+				   INT_MIN+1};
+
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+	{
+	unsigned int a, b, i, j;
+	int c, d;
+	unsigned char e, f;
+	int num_failed = 0, num_all = 0;
+	fprintf(stdout, "Testing constant time operations...\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values)/sizeof(int); ++i)
+		{
+		a = test_values[i];
+		num_failed += test_is_zero(a);
+		num_failed += test_is_zero_8(a);
+		num_all += 2;
+		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values)/sizeof(int); ++j)
+			{
+			b = test_values[j];
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
+				"constant_time_lt", a, b, a < b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
+				"constant_time_lt_8", a, b, a < b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
+				"constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
+				"constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
+				"constant_time_ge", a, b, a >= b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
+				"constant_time_ge_8", a, b, a >= b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
+				"constant_time_ge", b, a, b >= a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
+				"constant_time_ge_8", b, a, b >= a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq,
+				"constant_time_eq", a, b, a == b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8,
+				"constant_time_eq_8", a, b, a == b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq,
+				"constant_time_eq", b, a, b == a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8,
+				"constant_time_eq_8", b, a, b == a);
+			num_failed += test_select(a, b);
+			num_all += 13;
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(signed_test_values)/sizeof(int); ++i)
+		{
+		c = signed_test_values[i];
+		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(signed_test_values)/sizeof(int); ++j)
+			{
+			d = signed_test_values[j];
+			num_failed += test_select_int(c, d);
+			num_failed += test_eq_int(c, d);
+			num_failed += test_eq_int_8(c, d);
+			num_all += 3;
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values_8); ++i)
+		{
+		e = test_values_8[i];
+		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values_8); ++j)
+			{
+			f = test_values_8[j];
+			num_failed += test_select_8(e, f);
+			num_all += 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (!num_failed)
+		{
+		fprintf(stdout, "ok (ran %d tests)\n", num_all);
+		return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		fprintf(stdout, "%d of %d tests failed!\n", num_failed, num_all);
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}
@@ -307,6 +307,12 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 	unsigned char *dp = NULL;
 	int dplen;

+	if (!pkey->pkey.dsa || !pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key)
+		{
+		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	params = ASN1_STRING_new();

 	if (!params)
@@ -701,4 +707,3 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[] =
 		old_dsa_priv_encode
 		}
 	};
-
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@

 #include <sys/types.h>

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
 /* Avoid name clashes with other applications */
 #define os_toascii   _openssl_os_toascii
 #define os_toebcdic  _openssl_os_toebcdic
@@ -16,4 +20,7 @@ extern const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256];
 void *ebcdic2ascii(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count);
 void *ascii2ebcdic(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count);

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 #endif
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN
 int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx);

-/** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^num p[i] * m[i]
+/** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^{num-1} p[i] * m[i]
 *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
 *  \param  r      EC_POINT object for the result
 *  \param  n      BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)
@@ -80,9 +80,6 @@

 const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
 	{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	return fips_ec_gf2m_simple_method();
-#else
 	static const EC_METHOD ret = {
 		EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
 		NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field,
@@ -125,8 +122,12 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
 		0 /* field_decode */,
 		0 /* field_set_to_one */ };

-	return &ret;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		return fips_ec_gf2m_simple_method();
 #endif
+
+	return &ret;
 	}


@@ -453,14 +453,16 @@ static int do_EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x, int off, int ktype)
 	if (ktype > 0)
 		{
 		public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(x);
-		if ((pub_key = EC_POINT_point2bn(group, public_key,
-			EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), NULL, ctx)) == NULL)
+		if (public_key != NULL)
 			{
-			reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (pub_key)
+			if ((pub_key = EC_POINT_point2bn(group, public_key,
+				EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), NULL, ctx)) == NULL)
+				{
+				reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
+				goto err;
+				}
 			buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+			}
 		}

 	if (ktype == 2)
@@ -1183,30 +1183,47 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
 		goto err;
 		}

+	if (ret->pub_key)
+		EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
+	ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
+	if (ret->pub_key == NULL)
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	if (priv_key->publicKey)
 		{
 		const unsigned char *pub_oct;
-		size_t pub_oct_len;
+		int pub_oct_len;

-		if (ret->pub_key)
-			EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
-		ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
-		if (ret->pub_key == NULL)
-			{
-			ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
 		pub_oct     = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
 		pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
-		/* save the point conversion form */
+		/* The first byte - point conversion form - must be present. */
+                if (pub_oct_len <= 0)
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		/* Save the point conversion form. */
 		ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
 		if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key,
-			pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL))
+					pub_oct, (size_t)(pub_oct_len), NULL))
 			{
 			ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
 			goto err;
 			}
 		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (!EC_POINT_mul(ret->group, ret->pub_key, ret->priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		/* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */
+		ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
+		}

 	ok = 1;
 err:
@@ -1230,7 +1247,8 @@ int	i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
 	size_t          buf_len=0, tmp_len;
 	EC_PRIVATEKEY   *priv_key=NULL;

-	if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL)
+	if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL ||
+	    (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL))
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY,
                      ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
@@ -72,9 +72,6 @@

 const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void)
 	{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	return fips_ec_gfp_mont_method();
-#else
 	static const EC_METHOD ret = {
 		EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
 		NID_X9_62_prime_field,
@@ -114,8 +111,12 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void)
 		ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
 		ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one };

-	return &ret;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		return fips_ec_gfp_mont_method();
 #endif
+
+	return &ret;
 	}


@@ -73,9 +73,6 @@

 const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void)
 	{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	return fips_ec_gfp_nist_method();
-#else
 	static const EC_METHOD ret = {
 		EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
 		NID_X9_62_prime_field,
@@ -115,8 +112,12 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void)
 		0 /* field_decode */,
 		0 /* field_set_to_one */ };

-	return &ret;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		return fips_ec_gfp_nist_method();
 #endif
+
+	return &ret;
 	}

 int ec_GFp_nist_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
@@ -73,9 +73,6 @@

 const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void)
 	{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	return fips_ec_gfp_simple_method();
-#else
 	static const EC_METHOD ret = {
 		EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
 		NID_X9_62_prime_field,
@@ -115,8 +112,12 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void)
 		0 /* field_decode */,
 		0 /* field_set_to_one */ };

-	return &ret;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		return fips_ec_gfp_simple_method();
 #endif
+
+	return &ret;
 	}


@@ -1317,8 +1318,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT
 		{
 		for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
 			{
-			if (prod_Z[i] != NULL)
-				BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]);
+			if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) break;
+			BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]);
 			}
 		OPENSSL_free(prod_Z);
 		}
@@ -251,14 +251,15 @@ static void group_order_tests(EC_GROUP *group)
 		if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT;

 		/* Exercise EC_POINTs_mul, including corner cases. */
+		if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;
 		scalars[0] = n1; points[0] = Q; /* => infinity */
 		scalars[1] = n2; points[1] = P; /* => -P */
 		scalars[2] = n1; points[2] = Q; /* => infinity */
 		scalars[3] = n2; points[3] = Q; /* => infinity */
 		scalars[4] = n1; points[4] = P; /* => P */
 		scalars[5] = n2; points[5] = Q; /* => infinity */
-		if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, Q, NULL, 5, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT;
-		if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT;
+		if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 6, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT;
+		if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;
 		}
 	fprintf(stdout, "ok\n");

@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
 evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-evp_enc.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_enc.c evp_locl.h
+evp_enc.o: ../constant_time_locl.h ../cryptlib.h evp_enc.c evp_locl.h
 evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
 #define VPAES_CAPABLE	(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
 #endif
 #ifdef BSAES_ASM
-#define BSAES_CAPABLE	VPAES_CAPABLE
+#define BSAES_CAPABLE	(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
 #endif
 /*
 * AES-NI section
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 #include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 #include "evp_locl.h"

 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
@@ -500,21 +501,21 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)

 int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 	{
-	int i,n;
-	unsigned int b;
+	unsigned int i, b;
+        unsigned char pad, padding_good;
 	*outl=0;

 	if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
 		{
-		i = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
-		if (i < 0)
+		int ret = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
+		if (ret < 0)
 			return 0;
 		else
-			*outl = i;
+			*outl = ret;
 		return 1;
 		}

-	b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
+	b=(unsigned int)(ctx->cipher->block_size);
 	if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
 		{
 		if(ctx->buf_len)
@@ -533,28 +534,34 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 			return(0);
 			}
 		OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
-		n=ctx->final[b-1];
-		if (n == 0 || n > (int)b)
+		pad=ctx->final[b-1];
+
+		padding_good = (unsigned char)(~constant_time_is_zero_8(pad));
+		padding_good &= constant_time_ge_8(b, pad);
+
+                for (i = 1; i < b; ++i)
 			{
-			EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-			return(0);
+			unsigned char is_pad_index = constant_time_lt_8(i, pad);
+			unsigned char pad_byte_good = constant_time_eq_8(ctx->final[b-i-1], pad);
+			padding_good &= constant_time_select_8(is_pad_index, pad_byte_good, 0xff);
 			}
-		for (i=0; i<n; i++)
-			{
-			if (ctx->final[--b] != n)
-				{
-				EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-				return(0);
-				}
-			}
-		n=ctx->cipher->block_size-n;
-		for (i=0; i<n; i++)
-			out[i]=ctx->final[i];
-		*outl=n;
+
+		/*
+		 * At least 1 byte is always padding, so we always write b - 1
+		 * bytes to avoid a timing leak. The caller is required to have |b|
+		 * bytes space in |out| by the API contract.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < b - 1; ++i)
+			out[i] = ctx->final[i] & padding_good;
+		/* Safe cast: for a good padding, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH >= b >= pad */
+		*outl = padding_good & ((unsigned char)(b - pad));
+		return padding_good & 1;
 		}
 	else
-		*outl=0;
-	return(1);
+		{
+		*outl = 0;
+		return 1;
+		}
 	}

 void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
@@ -678,4 +685,3 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
 		return in->cipher->ctrl((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)in, EVP_CTRL_COPY, 0, out);
 	return 1;
 	}
-
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ sub round4_step
 EOF
 }

+no warnings qw(uninitialized);
 my $flavour = shift;
 my $output  = shift;
 if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
@@ -119,7 +120,6 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";

-no warnings qw(uninitialized);
 open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
 *STDOUT=*OUT;

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@

 #include <stddef.h>

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
 typedef void (*block128_f)(const unsigned char in[16],
 			unsigned char out[16],
 			const void *key);
@@ -133,3 +136,6 @@ typedef struct xts128_context XTS128_CONTEXT;

 int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char iv[16],
 	const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc);
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
@@ -436,8 +436,11 @@ static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm
 	if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN))
 		{
 		signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
-		*psigner = signer;
-		return 1;
+		if (signer)
+			{
+			*psigner = signer;
+			return 1;
+			}
 		}

 	signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 /* opensslconf.h */
 /* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
 /* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND

@@ -233,3 +236,6 @@ YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!

 #endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
 #endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
 #define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
 /* Numeric release version identifier:
 * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
 * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas
@@ -25,11 +29,11 @@
 * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
 *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
 */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000109fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x100010afL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1i-fips 6 Aug 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1j-fips 15 Oct 2014"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1i-freebsd 6 Aug 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1j-freebsd 15 Oct 2014"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

@@ -86,4 +90,7 @@
 #define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "7"


+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
 #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H
 #define HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
 #include <openssl/e_os2.h>

 #ifdef NO_ASN1_TYPEDEFS
@@ -199,4 +203,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_req_ctx_st OCSP_REQ_CTX;
 typedef struct ocsp_response_st OCSP_RESPONSE;
 typedef struct ocsp_responder_id_st OCSP_RESPID;

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 #endif /* def HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H */
@@ -233,10 +233,6 @@ DECLARE_PKCS12_STACK_OF(PKCS7)
 		(OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped)
 #define PKCS7_type_is_data(a)   (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_data)
 #define PKCS7_type_is_digest(a)   (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_digest)
-#define PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(a) \
-		(OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_encrypted)
-
-#define PKCS7_type_is_digest(a)   (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_digest)

 #define PKCS7_set_detached(p,v) \
 		PKCS7_ctrl(p,PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE,v,NULL)
@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
 typedef struct _pqueue *pqueue;

 typedef struct _pitem
@@ -91,4 +94,7 @@ pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *iter);
 void   pqueue_print(pqueue pq);
 int    pqueue_size(pqueue pq);

+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 #endif /* ! HEADER_PQUEUE_H */
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
 rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-rsa_oaep.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_oaep.c
+rsa_oaep.o: ../constant_time_locl.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_oaep.c
 rsa_pk1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
 rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
 rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
 rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_pk1.c
+rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+rsa_pk1.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_pk1.c
 rsa_pmeth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
 rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 #define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE	 158
 #define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE	 148
 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED			 114
+#define RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR			 159
 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME				 128
 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME				 129
 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED		 130
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"operation not allowed in fips mode"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),"operation not supported for this keytype"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"pkcs decoding error"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 * an equivalent notion.
 */

+#include "constant_time_locl.h"

 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -95,92 +96,117 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 	const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
 	const unsigned char *param, int plen)
 	{
-	int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
-	const unsigned char *maskeddb;
-	int lzero;
-	unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char *padded_from;
-	int bad = 0;
+	int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
+	unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
+	const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
+	/* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes:
+	 * em = Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB */
+	unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
+		phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

-	if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
-		/* 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the
-		 * particular ciphertext. */
+        if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
+	 * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
+	 * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
+	 * num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2 must hold for the modulus
+	 * irrespective of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
+	 * This does not leak any side-channel information.
+	 */
+	if (num < flen || num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2)
 		goto decoding_err;

-	lzero = num - flen;
-	if (lzero < 0)
-		{
-		/* signalling this error immediately after detection might allow
-		 * for side-channel attacks (e.g. timing if 'plen' is huge
-		 * -- cf. James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
-		 * Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001),
-		 * so we use a 'bad' flag */
-		bad = 1;
-		lzero = 0;
-		flen = num; /* don't overflow the memcpy to padded_from */
-		}
-
-	dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-	db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen + num);
-	if (db == NULL)
+	dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1;
+	db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
+	em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+	if (db == NULL || em == NULL)
 		{
 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return -1;
+		goto cleanup;
 		}

-	/* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when lzero == 0)
-	 * to avoid leaking timing info about the value of lzero. */
-	padded_from = db + dblen;
-	memset(padded_from, 0, lzero);
-	memcpy(padded_from + lzero, from, flen);
+	/*
+	 * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
+	 * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
+	 * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access
+	 * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
+	 *
+	 * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
+	 */
+	memset(em, 0, num);
+	memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);

-	maskeddb = padded_from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	/*
+	 * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
+	 * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
+	 * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
+	 */
+	good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+
+	maskedseed = em + 1;
+	maskeddb = em + 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;

 	if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
-		return -1;
+		goto cleanup;
 	for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
-		seed[i] ^= padded_from[i];
-  
+		seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
+
 	if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-		return -1;
+		goto cleanup;
 	for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
 		db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];

 	if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
-		return -1;
+		goto cleanup;

-	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+	good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
+
+	found_one_byte = 0;
+	for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
+		{
+		/* Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. */
+		unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
+		unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);
+		one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,
+			i, one_index);
+		found_one_byte |= equals1;
+		good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);
+		}
+
+	good &= found_one_byte;
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,
+	 * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
+	 * concern.
+	 */
+	if (!good)
 		goto decoding_err;
+
+	msg_index = one_index + 1;
+	mlen = dblen - msg_index;
+
+	if (tlen < mlen)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+		mlen = -1;
+		}
 	else
 		{
-		for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
-			if (db[i] != 0x00)
-				break;
-		if (i == dblen || db[i] != 0x01)
-			goto decoding_err;
-		else
-			{
-			/* everything looks OK */
-
-			mlen = dblen - ++i;
-			if (tlen < mlen)
-				{
-				RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-				mlen = -1;
-				}
-			else
-				memcpy(to, db + i, mlen);
-			}
+		memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
+		goto cleanup;
 		}
-	OPENSSL_free(db);
-	return mlen;

 decoding_err:
-	/* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
-	 * which kind of decoding error happened */
+	/* To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
+	 * which kind of decoding error happened. */
 	RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+cleanup:
 	if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db);
-	return -1;
+	if (em != NULL) OPENSSL_free(em);
+	return mlen;
 	}

 int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */

+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
+
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -181,44 +183,87 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 	     const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
 	{
-	int i,j;
-	const unsigned char *p;
+	int i;
+	/* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+	unsigned char *em = NULL;
+	unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
+	int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;

-	p=from;
-	if ((num != (flen+1)) || (*(p++) != 02))
+        if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography
+	 * Standard", section 7.2.2. */
+
+	if (flen > num)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (num < 11)
+		goto err;
+
+	em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+	if (em == NULL)
 		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
-		return(-1);
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return -1;
 		}
-#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
-	return(num-11);
-#endif
+	memset(em, 0, num);
+	/*
+	 * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
+	 * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
+	 * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access
+	 * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
+	 *
+	 * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
+	 */
+	memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);

-	/* scan over padding data */
-	j=flen-1; /* one for type. */
-	for (i=0; i<j; i++)
-		if (*(p++) == 0) break;
+	good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+	good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);

-	if (i == j)
+	found_zero_byte = 0;
+	for (i = 2; i < num; i++)
 		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
-		return(-1);
+		unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+		zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index);
+		found_zero_byte |= equals0;
 		}

-	if (i < 8)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
-	j-=i;
-	if (j > tlen)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	memcpy(to,p,(unsigned int)j);
+	/*
+	 * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+         * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+	 * also fails.
+	 */
+	good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);

-	return(j);
+	/* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+	 * but in this case we also do not copy the message out. */
+	msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+	mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+	/* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
+	 * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding. */
+	good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
+
+	/*
+	 * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
+	 * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
+	 * information at the API boundary.
+	 * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
+	 * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
+	 */
+	if (!good)
+		{
+		mlen = -1;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
+
+err:
+	if (em != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(em);
+	if (mlen == -1)
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+	return mlen;
 	}
-
@@ -151,6 +151,25 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
 	return(ret);
 	}

+/*
+ * Check DigestInfo structure does not contain extraneous data by reencoding
+ * using DER and checking encoding against original. 
+ */
+static int rsa_check_digestinfo(X509_SIG *sig, const unsigned char *dinfo, int dinfolen)
+	{
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen;
+	int ret = 0;
+	derlen = i2d_X509_SIG(sig, &der);
+	if (derlen <= 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (derlen == dinfolen && !memcmp(dinfo, der, derlen))
+		ret = 1;
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+	OPENSSL_free(der);
+	return ret;
+	}
+
 int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
 			  unsigned int m_len,
 			  unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
@@ -228,7 +247,7 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
 		if (sig == NULL) goto err;

 		/* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
-		if(p != s+i)
+		if(p != s+i || !rsa_check_digestinfo(sig, s, i))
 			{
 			RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
 			goto err;
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@

 #include <openssl/stack.h>

+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
 #ifndef CHECKED_PTR_OF
 #define CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, p) \
    ((void*) (1 ? p : (type*)0))
@@ -2660,4 +2664,8 @@ DECLARE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK, void)
 #define lh_SSL_SESSION_free(lh) LHM_lh_free(SSL_SESSION,lh)
 /* End of util/mkstack.pl block, you may now edit :-) */

+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
 #endif /* !defined HEADER_SAFESTACK_H */
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=for comment
+Original text by James Westby, contributed under the OpenSSL license.
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+c_rehash - Create symbolic links to files named by the hash values
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<c_rehash>
+[ I<directory>...]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+B<c_rehash> scans directories and calculates a hash value of each C<.pem>
+file in the specified directory list and creates symbolic links
+for each file, where the name of the link is the hash value.
+This utility is useful as many programs that use OpenSSL require
+directories to be set up like this in order to find certificates.
+
+If any directories are named on the command line, then those are
+processed in turn. If not, then the B<SSL_CERT_DIR> environment variable
+is consulted; this shold be a colon-separated list of directories,
+like the Unix B<PATH> variable.
+If that is not set then the default directory (installation-specific
+but often B</usr/local/ssl/certs>) is processed.
+
+In order for a directory to be processed, the user must have write
+permissions on that directory, otherwise it will be skipped.
+The links created are of the form C<HHHHHHHH.D>, where each B<H>
+is a hexadecimal character and B<D> is a single decimal digit.
+When processing a directory, B<c_rehash> will first remove all links
+that have a name in that syntax. If you have links in that format
+used for other purposes, they will be removed.
+Hashes for CRL's look similar except the letter B<r> appears after
+the period, like this: C<HHHHHHHH.rD>.
+
+Multiple objects may have the same hash; they will be indicated by
+incrementing the B<D> value. Duplicates are found by comparing the
+full SHA-1 fingerprint. A warning will be displayed if a duplicate
+is found.
+
+A warning will also be displayed if there are B<.pem> files that
+cannot be parsed as either a certificate or a CRL.
+
+The program uses the B<openssl> program to compute the hashes and
+fingerprints. If not found in the user's B<PATH>, then set the
+B<OPENSSL> environment variable to the full pathname.
+Any program can be used, it will be invoked as follows for either
+a certificate or CRL:
+
+  $OPENSSL x509 -hash -fingerprint -noout -in FFFFFF
+  $OPENSSL crl -hash -fingerprint -noout -in FFFFFF
+
+where B<FFFFFF> is the filename. It must output the hash of the
+file on the first line, and the fingerprint on the second,
+optionally prefixed with some text and an equals sign.
+
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT
+
+=over
+
+=item B<OPENSSL>
+
+The path to an executable to use to generate hashes and
+fingerprints (see above).
+
+=item B<SSL_CERT_DIR>
+
+Colon separated list of directories to operate on.
+Ignored if directories are listed on the command line.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>,
+L<crl(1)|crl(1)>.
+L<x509(1)|x509(1)>.
@@ -2,16 +2,17 @@

 =head1 NAME

-dgst, md5, md4, md2, sha1, sha, mdc2, ripemd160 - message digests
+dgst, sha, sha1, mdc2, ripemd160, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, md2, md4, md5, dss1 - message digests

 =head1 SYNOPSIS

 B<openssl> B<dgst> 
-[B<-md5|-md4|-md2|-sha1|-sha|-mdc2|-ripemd160|-dss1>]
+[B<-sha|-sha1|-mdc2|-ripemd160|-sha224|-sha256|-sha384|-sha512|-md2|-md4|-md5|-dss1>]
 [B<-c>]
 [B<-d>]
 [B<-hex>]
 [B<-binary>]
+[B<-r>]
 [B<-out filename>]
 [B<-sign filename>]
 [B<-keyform arg>]
@@ -20,17 +21,19 @@ B<openssl> B<dgst>
 [B<-prverify filename>]
 [B<-signature filename>]
 [B<-hmac key>]
+[B<-non-fips-allow>]
+[B<-fips-fingerprint>]
 [B<file...>]

-[B<md5|md4|md2|sha1|sha|mdc2|ripemd160>]
-[B<-c>]
-[B<-d>]
-[B<file...>]
+B<openssl>
+[I<digest>]
+[B<...>]

 =head1 DESCRIPTION

 The digest functions output the message digest of a supplied file or files
-in hexadecimal form. They can also be used for digital signing and verification.
+in hexadecimal.  The digest functions also generate and verify digital
+signatures using message digests.

 =head1 OPTIONS

@@ -48,12 +51,17 @@ print out BIO debugging information.
 =item B<-hex>

 digest is to be output as a hex dump. This is the default case for a "normal"
-digest as opposed to a digital signature.
+digest as opposed to a digital signature.  See NOTES below for digital
+signatures using B<-hex>.

 =item B<-binary>

 output the digest or signature in binary form.

+=item B<-r>
+
+output the digest in the "coreutils" format used by programs like B<sha1sum>.
+
 =item B<-out filename>

 filename to output to, or standard output by default.
@@ -64,8 +72,8 @@ digitally sign the digest using the private key in "filename".

 =item B<-keyform arg>

-Specifies the key format to sign digest with. Only PEM and ENGINE
-formats are supported by the B<dgst> command.
+Specifies the key format to sign digest with. The DER, PEM, P12,
+and ENGINE formats are supported.

 =item B<-engine id>

@@ -117,7 +125,7 @@ Following options are supported by both by B<HMAC> and B<gost-mac>:
 =over 8

 =item B<key:string>
-	
+
 Specifies MAC key as alphnumeric string (use if key contain printable
 characters only). String length must conform to any restrictions of
 the MAC algorithm for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
@@ -138,6 +146,15 @@ Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character.
 The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
 all others. 

+=item B<-non-fips-allow>
+
+enable use of non-FIPS algorithms such as MD5 even in FIPS mode.
+
+=item B<-fips-fingerprint>
+
+compute HMAC using a specific key
+for certain OpenSSL-FIPS operations.
+
 =item B<file...>

 file or files to digest. If no files are specified then standard input is
@@ -145,18 +162,41 @@ used.

 =back

+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+To create a hex-encoded message digest of a file:
+ openssl dgst -md5 -hex file.txt
+
+To sign a file using SHA-256 with binary file output:
+ openssl dgst -sha256 -sign privatekey.pem -out signature.sign file.txt
+
+To verify a signature:
+ openssl dgst -sha256 -verify publickey.pem \
+ -signature signature.sign \
+ file.txt
+
+
 =head1 NOTES

 The digest of choice for all new applications is SHA1. Other digests are
 however still widely used.

-If you wish to sign or verify data using the DSA algorithm then the dss1
-digest must be used.
+When signing a file, B<dgst> will automatically determine the algorithm
+(RSA, ECC, etc) to use for signing based on the private key's ASN.1 info.
+When verifying signatures, it only handles the RSA, DSA, or ECDSA signature
+itself, not the related data to identify the signer and algorithm used in
+formats such as x.509, CMS, and S/MIME.

 A source of random numbers is required for certain signing algorithms, in
-particular DSA.
+particular ECDSA and DSA.

 The signing and verify options should only be used if a single file is
 being signed or verified.

+Hex signatures cannot be verified using B<openssl>.  Instead, use "xxd -r"
+or similar program to transform the hex signature into a binary signature
+prior to verification.
+
+
 =cut
@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ the accept socket. See L<BIO_s_fd(3)|BIO_s_fd(3)>
 BIO_set_accept_port() uses the string B<name> to set the accept
 port. The port is represented as a string of the form "host:port",
 where "host" is the interface to use and "port" is the port.
-Either or both values can be "*" which is interpreted as meaning
-any interface or port respectively. "port" has the same syntax
+The host can be can be "*" which is interpreted as meaning
+any interface; "port" has the same syntax
 as the port specified in BIO_set_conn_port() for connect BIOs,
 that is it can be a numerical port string or a string to lookup
 using getservbyname() and a string table.
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@

 =head1 NAME

- CMS_sign_add1_signer, CMS_SignerInfo_sign - add a signer to a CMS_ContentInfo signed data structure.
+ CMS_add1_signer, CMS_SignerInfo_sign - add a signer to a CMS_ContentInfo signed data structure.

 =head1 SYNOPSIS

 #include <openssl/cms.h>

- CMS_SignerInfo *CMS_sign_add1_signer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags);
+ CMS_SignerInfo *CMS_add1_signer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags);

 int CMS_SignerInfo_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);


 =head1 DESCRIPTION

-CMS_sign_add1_signer() adds a signer with certificate B<signcert> and private
+CMS_add1_signer() adds a signer with certificate B<signcert> and private
 key B<pkey> using message digest B<md> to CMS_ContentInfo SignedData
 structure B<cms>.

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ are both set.

 =head1 NOTES

-The main purpose of CMS_sign_add1_signer() is to provide finer control
+The main purpose of CMS_add1_signer() is to provide finer control
 over a CMS signed data structure where the simpler CMS_sign() function defaults
 are not appropriate. For example if multiple signers or non default digest
 algorithms are needed. New attributes can also be added using the returned
@@ -80,13 +80,13 @@ bit AES, 128 bit AES, triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2.
 If any of these algorithms is not available then it will not be included: for example the GOST algorithms will not be included if the GOST ENGINE is
 not loaded.

-CMS_sign_add1_signer() returns an internal pointer to the CMS_SignerInfo
+CMS_add1_signer() returns an internal pointer to the CMS_SignerInfo
 structure just added, this can be used to set additional attributes 
 before it is finalized.

 =head1 RETURN VALUES

-CMS_sign1_add_signers() returns an internal pointer to the CMS_SignerInfo
+CMS_add1_signer() returns an internal pointer to the CMS_SignerInfo
 structure just added or NULL if an error occurs.

 =head1 SEE ALSO
@@ -96,6 +96,6 @@ L<CMS_final(3)|CMS_final(3)>,

 =head1 HISTORY

-CMS_sign_add1_signer() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.8
+CMS_add1_signer() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.8

 =cut
@@ -26,13 +26,13 @@ EVP digest routines
 int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
 void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);

- int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out,const EVP_MD_CTX *in);  
+ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out,const EVP_MD_CTX *in);

 int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
 int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md,
        unsigned int *s);

- int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out,EVP_MD_CTX *in);  
+ int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out,EVP_MD_CTX *in);

 #define EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE 64	/* SHA512 */

@@ -136,10 +136,10 @@ reasons.
 EVP_md2(), EVP_md5(), EVP_sha(), EVP_sha1(), EVP_sha224(), EVP_sha256(),
 EVP_sha384(), EVP_sha512(), EVP_mdc2() and EVP_ripemd160() return B<EVP_MD>
 structures for the MD2, MD5, SHA, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, MDC2
-and RIPEMD160 digest algorithms respectively. 
+and RIPEMD160 digest algorithms respectively.

 EVP_dss() and EVP_dss1() return B<EVP_MD> structures for SHA and SHA1 digest
-algorithms but using DSS (DSA) for the signature algorithm. Note: there is 
+algorithms but using DSS (DSA) for the signature algorithm. Note: there is
 no need to use these pseudo-digests in OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later, they are
 however retained for compatibility.

@@ -177,21 +177,21 @@ The B<EVP> interface to message digests should almost always be used in
 preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
 transparent to the digest used and much more flexible.

-New applications should use the SHA2 digest algorithms such as SHA256. 
+New applications should use the SHA2 digest algorithms such as SHA256.
 The other digest algorithms are still in common use.

 For most applications the B<impl> parameter to EVP_DigestInit_ex() will be
 set to NULL to use the default digest implementation.

-The functions EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestFinal() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy() are 
+The functions EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestFinal() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy() are
 obsolete but are retained to maintain compatibility with existing code. New
-applications should use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and 
+applications should use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and
 EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() because they can efficiently reuse a digest context
 instead of initializing and cleaning it up on each call and allow non default
 implementations of digests to be specified.

 In OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if digest contexts are not cleaned up after use
-memory leaks will occur. 
+memory leaks will occur.

 Stack allocation of EVP_MD_CTX structures is common, for example:

@@ -245,15 +245,19 @@ digest name passed on the command line.
 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(mdctx);

 printf("Digest is: ");
- for(i = 0; i < md_len; i++) printf("%02x", md_value[i]);
+ for(i = 0; i < md_len; i++)
+ 	printf("%02x", md_value[i]);
 printf("\n");
+
+ /* Call this once before exit. */
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ exit(0);
 }

 =head1 SEE ALSO

-L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>,
-L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>,
-L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>
+L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>,
+L<evp(3)|evp(3)>

 =head1 HISTORY

@@ -269,7 +273,7 @@ EVP_dss(), EVP_dss1(), EVP_mdc2() and EVP_ripemd160() were
 changed to return truely const EVP_MD * in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

 The link between digests and signing algorithms was fixed in OpenSSL 1.0 and
-later, so now EVP_sha1() can be used with RSA and DSA, there is no need to
+later, so now EVP_sha1() can be used with RSA and DSA; there is no need to
 use EVP_dss1() any more.

 OpenSSL 1.0 and later does not include the MD2 digest algorithm in the
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates
 the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.

 Unlike other functions the return value 0 from EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() only
-indicates that the signature did not not verify successfully (that is tbs did
+indicates that the signature did not verify successfully (that is tbs did
 not match the original data or the signature was of invalid form) it is not an
 indication of a more serious error.

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ For some key types and parameters the random number generator must be seeded
 or the operation will fail. 

 The call to EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest
-context. This means that calls to EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can
+context. This means that EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can
 be called later to digest and verify additional data.

 Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
@@ -387,27 +387,7 @@ for certain common S/MIME ciphers (RC2, DES, triple DES) in CBC mode.

 =head1 EXAMPLES

-Get the number of rounds used in RC5:
-
- int nrounds;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC5_ROUNDS, 0, &nrounds);
-
-Get the RC2 effective key length:
-
- int key_bits;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS, 0, &key_bits);
-
-Set the number of rounds used in RC5:
-
- int nrounds;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC5_ROUNDS, nrounds, NULL);
-
-Set the effective key length used in RC2:
-
- int key_bits;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key_bits, NULL);
-
-Encrypt a string using blowfish:
+Encrypt a string using IDEA:

 int do_crypt(char *outfile)
 	{
@@ -421,8 +401,9 @@ Encrypt a string using blowfish:
 	char intext[] = "Some Crypto Text";
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
 	FILE *out;
+
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_bf_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
+	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_idea_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);

 	if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen, intext, strlen(intext)))
 		{
@@ -451,28 +432,34 @@ Encrypt a string using blowfish:
 	}

 The ciphertext from the above example can be decrypted using the B<openssl>
-utility with the command line:
+utility with the command line (shown on two lines for clarity):
 
- S<openssl bf -in cipher.bin -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F -iv 0102030405060708 -d>
+ openssl idea -d <filename
+          -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F -iv 0102030405060708

-General encryption, decryption function example using FILE I/O and RC2 with an
-80 bit key:
+General encryption and decryption function example using FILE I/O and AES128
+with a 128-bit key:

 int do_crypt(FILE *in, FILE *out, int do_encrypt)
 	{
 	/* Allow enough space in output buffer for additional block */
-	inbuf[1024], outbuf[1024 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char inbuf[1024], outbuf[1024 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
 	int inlen, outlen;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
 	/* Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from
 	 * another source.
 	 */
-	unsigned char key[] = "0123456789";
-	unsigned char iv[] = "12345678";
-	/* Don't set key or IV because we will modify the parameters */
+	unsigned char key[] = "0123456789abcdeF";
+	unsigned char iv[] = "1234567887654321";
+
+	/* Don't set key or IV right away; we want to check lengths */
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_rc2(), NULL, NULL, NULL, do_encrypt);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, 10);
-	/* We finished modifying parameters so now we can set key and IV */
+	EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL,
+		do_encrypt);
+	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&ctx) == 16);
+	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) == 16);
+
+	/* Now we can set key and IV */
 	EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, do_encrypt);

 	for(;;) 
@@ -511,4 +498,7 @@ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), EVP_CipherInit_ex(),
 EVP_CipherFinal_ex() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() appeared in
 OpenSSL 0.9.7.

+IDEA appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.7 but was often disabled due to
+patent concerns; the last patents expired in 2012.
+
 =cut
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and
 EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key in B<pkey> or
 B<NULL> if the key is not of the correct type.

-EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
 and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() also set the referenced key to B<key>
 however these use the supplied B<key> internally and so B<key>
 will be freed when the parent B<pkey> is freed.
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ In accordance with the OpenSSL naming convention the key obtained
 from or assigned to the B<pkey> using the B<1> functions must be
 freed as well as B<pkey>.

-EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
-EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() are implemented as macros.
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() are implemented as macros.

 =head1 RETURN VALUES

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and
 EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key or B<NULL> if 
 an error occurred.

-EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
 and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

 =head1 SEE ALSO
@@ -28,9 +28,14 @@ B<sig> and the amount of data written to B<siglen>.

 =head1 NOTES

+EVP_PKEY_sign() does not hash the data to be signed, and therefore is
+normally used to sign digests. For signing arbitrary messages, see the
+L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)|EVP_DigestSignInit(3)> and
+L<EVP_SignInit(3)|EVP_SignInit(3)> signing interfaces instead.
+
 After the call to EVP_PKEY_sign_init() algorithm specific control
 operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
-operation.
+operation (see L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(3)>).

 The function EVP_PKEY_sign() can be called more than once on the same
 context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
@@ -49,13 +54,17 @@ Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and SHA256 digest:
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>

 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ /* md is a SHA-256 digest in this example. */
 unsigned char *md, *sig;
- size_t mdlen, siglen; 
+ size_t mdlen = 32, siglen;
 EVP_PKEY *signing_key;
- /* NB: assumes signing_key, md and mdlen are already set up
-  * and that signing_key is an RSA private key
+
+ /*
+  * NB: assumes signing_key and md are set up before the next
+  * step. signing_key must be an RSA private key and md must
+  * point to the SHA-256 digest to be signed.
  */
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key);
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
 if (!ctx)
 	/* Error occurred */
 if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) <= 0)
@@ -83,6 +92,7 @@ Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and SHA256 digest:
 =head1 SEE ALSO

 L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
@@ -48,12 +48,13 @@ even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) key, as this key was
 only used for signing.

 In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
-(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate a new
-DH key during the negotiation, when the DH parameters are supplied via
-callback and/or when the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of
-L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> is set. It will
-immediately create a DH key, when DH parameters are supplied via
-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set. In this case,
+(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
+The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
+if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
+It will  immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
+SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
+In this case,
 it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
 being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
 negotiation is being saved.
@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ partly left out.)
      dh_tmp = dh_512;
      break;
    case 1024:
-      if (!dh_1024) 
+      if (!dh_1024)
        dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
      dh_tmp = dh_1024;
      break;
@@ -373,7 +373,16 @@ static unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
 #  define check_winnt() (1)
 #else
 #  define check_winnt() (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
-#endif 
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however
+ * __inline is available for C, see
+ * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
+ */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__cplusplus) && !defined(inline)
+#  define inline __inline
+#endif

 #else /* The non-microsoft world */

@@ -738,4 +747,3 @@ struct servent *getservbyname(const char *name, const char *proto);
 #endif

 #endif
-
@@ -547,26 +547,27 @@ s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_both.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c
+s3_cbc.o: ssl_locl.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -671,28 +672,29 @@ s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
 s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_pkt.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h
+s3_srvr.o: s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
 ssl_algs.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
 ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
@@ -1492,6 +1492,9 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	/* Read type and payload length first */
 	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
 		return 0; /* silently discard */
+	if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+
 	hbtype = *p++;
 	n2s(p, payload);
 	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
@@ -266,6 +266,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 	case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
 		ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
 		break;
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+		/* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
+		 * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
+		 * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
+#  error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
+#endif
+		/* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
+		 * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
+		return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;

 	default:
 		ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
 	return 1;
 	}

-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
-			       SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
-	{
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
-
-	p=srtp_known_profiles;
-	while(p->name)
-		{
-		if(p->id == profile_num)
-			{
-			*pptr=p;
-			return 0;
-			}
-		p++;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
 static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
 	{
 	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTE
 		if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
 					 col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
 			{
+			if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+				sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+				return 1;
+				}
+
 			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
 			}
 		else
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
+			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
 			return 1;
 			}

@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max

 int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
 	{
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
+	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
        int ct;
        int mki_len;
-	int i,j;
-	int id;
-	int ret;
+	int i, srtp_pref;
+	unsigned int id;

         /* Length value + the MKI length */
        if(len < 3)
@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 		return 1;
 		}

+	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+	s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+	/* Search all profiles for a match initially */
+	srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
        
-	clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
-
 	while(ct)
 		{
 		n2s(d,id);
 		ct-=2;
                len-=2;

-		if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
+		/*
+		 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
+		 * current match.
+		 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
+		 * does nothing.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
 			{
-			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			; /* Ignore */
+			sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
+			if (sprof->id == id)
+				{
+				s->srtp_profile = sprof;
+				srtp_pref = i;
+				break;
+				}
 			}
 		}

@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 		return 1;
 		}

-	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-
-	/* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
-	 configured then the outer loop doesn't run 
-	 (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
-	 and so we just return without doing anything */
-	for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
-		{
-		sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
-
-		for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
-			{
-			cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
-            
-			if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
-				{
-				s->srtp_profile=sprof;
-				*al=0;
-				ret=0;
-				goto done;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	ret=0;
-    
-done:
-	if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
-
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 	}

 int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif

 #define DTLS1_VERSION			0xFEFF
+#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION		DTLS1_VERSION
+
 #define DTLS1_BAD_VER			0x0100

 #if 0
@@ -284,4 +286,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
@@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
 	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv2_client_method());
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv3_client_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_client_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
@@ -698,6 +700,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		{
 		/* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */

+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 		if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
 			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
 			{
@@ -712,7 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
 			s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
 			}
-		else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+		else
+#endif
+		if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
 			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
 			{
 			s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
@@ -736,6 +741,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			goto err;
 			}

+		/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+		OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
 		if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
 			{
 			/* fatal alert */
@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
 	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv2_server_method());
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv3_server_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_server_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
@@ -421,6 +423,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			}
 		}

+	/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
 		{
@@ -597,6 +602,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
 		{
 		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
+                s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+		if (s->method == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+			goto err;
+			}

 		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;

@@ -624,14 +635,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
 			s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
 			}
-		if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
-		else
-			s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
 #if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
 		s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
 #endif
@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
 		ret=s->hit;
 		break;
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+		return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
 	default:
 		break;
 		}
@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
 	if (p != NULL)
 		{
 		l=c->id;
-		if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
+		if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
 		p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
 		p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
 		p[2]=((unsigned char)(l     ))&0xFF;
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 *
 */

+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
 #include "ssl_locl.h"

 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -67,37 +68,6 @@
 * supported by TLS.) */
 #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128

-/* Some utility functions are needed:
- *
- * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
- * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
- * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
- * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
-
-/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	a -= b;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
-	}
-
-/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	a -= b;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
-	}
-
-/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	unsigned c = a ^ b;
-	c--;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
-	}
-
 /* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
 * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
 *
@@ -126,8 +96,8 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
 	rec->length -= padding_length;
 	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
-	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
-}
+	return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+	}

 /* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
 * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
@@ -208,7 +178,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,

 	for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
 		{
-		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
 		unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
 		/* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
 		 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
@@ -216,20 +186,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 		}

 	/* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
-	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
-	 * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
-	 * bits. */
-	good &= good >> 4;
-	good &= good >> 2;
-	good &= good >> 1;
-	good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
-	good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
-
+	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
+	 */
+	good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
 	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
 	rec->length -= padding_length;
 	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */

-	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+	return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
 	}

 /* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
@@ -296,8 +260,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
 	memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
 	for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
 		{
-		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
-		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
+		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
 		unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
 		rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
 		j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
@@ -683,12 +647,12 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
 				b = data[k-header_length];
 			k++;

-			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
-			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c+1);
 			/* If this is the block containing the end of the
 			 * application data, and we are at the offset for the
 			 * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
-			b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+                        b =  constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
 			/* If this the the block containing the end of the
 			 * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
 			 * just write zero. */
@@ -704,7 +668,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
 			if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
 				{
 				/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
-				b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+				b = constant_time_select_8(
+					is_block_b, length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)], b);
 				}
 			block[j] = b;
 			}
@@ -326,9 +326,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				break;
 				}
 #endif
-			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
+			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
 			/* or PSK */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
 			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 				{
 				ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
@@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif
 	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
 	unsigned char *param,*p;
-	int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
-	long n,alg_k,alg_a;
+	int al,j,ok;
+	long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
 	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -1354,36 +1354,48 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
 		}

+	/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
 	param_len=0;
+
 	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);

+	al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
 		{
 		char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];

-		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		param_len = 2;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
 		/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
 		 * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the
 		 * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
 		 * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
 		if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
 			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
-		if (param_len > n)
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 				SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
 		 * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
 		 * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
@@ -1395,6 +1407,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
 		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
 			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto f_err;
 			}	   
@@ -1407,14 +1420,22 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
 		{
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1422,14 +1443,24 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;

+
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1437,15 +1468,25 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;

+
+		if (1 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 1;
+
 		i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
 		p++;
-		param_len+=i+1;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1453,14 +1494,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;

+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1498,14 +1548,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1513,14 +1572,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;

+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1552,14 +1620,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1567,14 +1644,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;

+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1582,14 +1668,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;

+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1641,12 +1736,19 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		 */

 		/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
-		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
+		 * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
 		 */
-		param_len=3;
-		if ((param_len > n) ||
-		    (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
-		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) 
+		param_len=4;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
+		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
@@ -1688,15 +1790,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)

 		encoded_pt_len = *p;  /* length of encoded point */
 		p+=1;
-		param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
-		if ((param_len > n) ||
+
+		if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
 		    (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, 
 			p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += encoded_pt_len;

 		n-=param_len;
 		p+=encoded_pt_len;
@@ -1739,7 +1841,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		{
 		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
-			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+			int sigalg;
+			if (2 > n)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
 			/* Should never happen */
 			if (sigalg == -1)
 				{
@@ -1757,7 +1867,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			if (md == NULL)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				goto f_err;
 				}
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
@@ -1768,15 +1877,21 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 			}
 		else
 			md = EVP_sha1();
-			
+
+		if (2 > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		n2s(p,i);
 		n-=2;
 		j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);

+		/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
 		if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
 			{
 			/* wrong packet length */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
@@ -1785,6 +1900,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
 			int num;
+			unsigned int size;

 			j=0;
 			q=md_buf;
@@ -1797,9 +1913,9 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
-				q+=i;
-				j+=i;
+				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
+				q+=size;
+				j+=size;
 				}
 			i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
 								pkey->pkey.rsa);
@@ -1835,8 +1951,8 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-			/* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
+		/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
+		if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			goto err;
@@ -1844,7 +1960,6 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		/* still data left over */
 		if (n != 0)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
@@ -2846,7 +2961,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 		else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
 			{
-			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
+			/* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes
+			 * to return a \0-terminated identity. The last byte
+			 * is for us for simulating strnlen. */
+			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
+			size_t identity_len;
 			unsigned char *t = NULL;
 			unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
 			unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
@@ -2860,8 +2979,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				goto err;
 				}

+			memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
 			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
-				identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+				identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
 				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
 			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
 				{
@@ -2875,7 +2995,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
 				goto psk_err;
 				}
-
+			identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
+			identity_len = strlen(identity);
+			if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
 			/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
 			pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
 			t = psk_or_pre_ms;
@@ -2909,14 +3036,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			s->session->master_key_length =
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
 					s->session->master_key,
-					psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 
-			n = strlen(identity);
-			s2n(n, p);
-			memcpy(p, identity, n);
-			n+=2;
+					psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+			s2n(identity_len, p);
+			memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
+			n = 2 + identity_len;
 			psk_err = 0;
 		psk_err:
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
 			OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
 			if (psk_err != 0)
 				{
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+	case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
 	default:			return(-1);
 		}
 	}
-
@@ -3355,6 +3355,33 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 #endif

 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+		/* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
+		 * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
+		 * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
+		if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
+			return 1;
+		/* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
+		 * (not at its highest protocol version). */
+		if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
+			{
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
+#  error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
+#endif
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+				return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+				return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+				return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+				return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+				return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
+			}
+		return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
+
 	default:
 		break;
 		}
@@ -3714,6 +3741,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
 		break;
 #endif
 #endif
+
 	default:
 		return(0);
 		}
@@ -3822,10 +3850,15 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 		emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
 		emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		mask_k=cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
-		emask_k=cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+		if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)
+			{
+			mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+			emask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+			mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+			emask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+			}
 #endif
-			
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 /*		printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -4291,4 +4324,3 @@ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
 		return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
 	return alg2;
 	}
-		
@@ -273,6 +273,12 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 	return(n);
 	}

+/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
+ * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
+ * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
+ * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
 /* Call this to get a new input record.
 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
 * or non-blocking IO.
@@ -293,6 +299,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 	short version;
 	unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
 	size_t extra;
+	unsigned empty_record_count = 0;

 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess=s->session;
@@ -523,7 +530,17 @@ printf("\n");
 	s->packet_length=0;

 	/* just read a 0 length packet */
-	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+	if (rr->length == 0)
+		{
+		empty_record_count++;
+		if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		goto again;
+		}

 #if 0
 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
@@ -410,9 +411,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
 			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
 			/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
-				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
-				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
+				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 				{
 				ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -515,7 +515,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
 				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
 				 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
-				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
+				/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
 				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
 				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
 				|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
@@ -1846,7 +1848,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			n+=2+nr[i];
 			}

-		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
 			&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 			{
 			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
@@ -2166,6 +2168,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
 		{
+		unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+		int decrypt_len;
+		unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+
 		/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
 		if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
 			{
@@ -2213,54 +2219,61 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				n=i;
 			}

-		i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+		/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
+		 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
+		 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
+		 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
+		 * case that the decrypt fails. See
+		 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */

-		al = -1;
-		
-		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+		/* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
+		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+				      sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+			goto err;
+		decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+		ERR_clear_error();
+
+		/* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
+		 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
+		decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+		/* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
+		 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
+		 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+		 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+		 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
+		 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
+		 * decryption error. */
+		version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
+		version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
+
+		/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+		 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
+		 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
+		 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
+		 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
+		 * support the requested protocol version. If
+		 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+			unsigned char workaround_good;
+			workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
+			workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
+			version_good |= workaround_good;
 			}

-		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
-			{
-			/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
-			 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
-			 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
-			 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
-			 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
-			 * protocol version.
-			 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
-			if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
-				(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+		/* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
+		 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
+		decrypt_good &= version_good;

-				/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
-				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
-				 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
-				 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
-				 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
-				 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
-				 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
-				}
+		/* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
+		 * decrypt_good_mask. */
+		for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+			{
+			p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
+						      rand_premaster_secret[i]);
 			}

-		if (al != -1)
-			{
-			/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
-			 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
-			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
-			ERR_clear_error();
-			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
-			p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
-			p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
-			if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
-				goto err;
-			}
-	
 		s->session->master_key_length=
 			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
 				s->session->master_key,
@@ -130,12 +130,16 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80      0x0005
 #define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32      0x0006

+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
 int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ctx, const char *profiles);
 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);

 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);

+#endif
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
@@ -653,6 +653,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 */
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
+/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L

 /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
 * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
@@ -1511,6 +1515,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
 #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
 #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY     TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */

 #define SSL_ERROR_NONE			0
 #define SSL_ERROR_SSL			1
@@ -1621,6 +1626,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS		82
 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS	83

+#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION		119
+
 #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
 	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
 #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
@@ -2379,6 +2386,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST				 156
 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING				 283
+#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK			 373
 #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION			 340
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH			 158
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND				 280
@@ -2525,6 +2533,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED		 1021
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR			 1051
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION		 1060
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	 1086
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY		 1071
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR		 1080
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION		 1100
@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@
 extern "C" {
 #endif

-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
+/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
+ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
 #define SSL3_CK_SCSV				0x030000FF

+/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
+ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
+#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV			0x03005600
+
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5			0x03000001
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA			0x03000002
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 			0x03000003
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)   ,"https proxy request"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST)          ,"http request"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING)       ,"illegal padding"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND)       ,"invalid command"},
@@ -529,6 +530,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
@@ -1387,6 +1387,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,

 	if (sk == NULL) return(0);
 	q=p;
+	if (put_cb == NULL)
+		put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;

 	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
 		{
@@ -1411,24 +1413,36 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
 		    continue;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-		j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
+		j = put_cb(c,p);
 		p+=j;
 		}
-	/* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
-	 * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
-	 */
-	if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
+	/* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
+	 * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
+	if (p != q)
 		{
-		static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+		if (!s->renegotiate)
 			{
-			0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
-			};
-		j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
-		p+=j;
+			static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+				{
+				0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+				};
+			j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
+			p+=j;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
-		fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
+			fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
 #endif
-		}
+			}
+
+		if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+			{
+			static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+				{
+				0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+				};
+			j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
+			p+=j;
+			}
+ 		}

 	return(p-q);
 	}
@@ -1439,11 +1453,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 	int i,n;
+
 	if (s->s3)
 		s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;

 	n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
-	if ((num%n) != 0)
+	if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
 		return(NULL);
@@ -1458,7 +1473,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,

 	for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
 		{
-		/* Check for SCSV */
+		/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
 		if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
 			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
 			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
@@ -1478,6 +1493,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 			continue;
 			}

+		/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+		if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+			{
+			/* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
+			 * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
+			if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+				if (s->s3)
+					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			continue;
+			}
+
 		c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
 		p+=n;
 		if (c != NULL)
@@ -2944,15 +2976,26 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)

 SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
 	{
+	CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
 	if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
 		return ssl->ctx;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
 #endif
-	if (ssl->cert != NULL)
-		ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
 	ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+	if (ocert != NULL)
+		{
+		int i;
+		/* Copy negotiated digests from original */
+		for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+			{
+			CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i;
+			CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i;
+			rpk->digest = cpk->digest;
+			}
+		ssl_cert_free(ocert);
+		}
 	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 	if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
 		SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
@@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
 	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+	case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
 #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
 	case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 
 					  (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-        if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                {
                int el;

@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
 #endif

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-        if(s->srtp_profile)
+	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
                {
                int el;

@@ -1444,7 +1444,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in

 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
+			 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
 			{
 			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
 							      al))
@@ -1698,7 +1699,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
 			{
                        if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
 							      al))
@@ -2347,7 +2348,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 		return 2;
+		}
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
 	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
@@ -159,17 +159,19 @@ extern "C" {

 #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES	0

-#define TLS1_2_VERSION			0x0303
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR		0x03
-
+#define TLS1_VERSION			0x0301
 #define TLS1_1_VERSION			0x0302
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION			0x0303
+#define TLS_MAX_VERSION			TLS1_2_VERSION
+
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR		0x01
+
 #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
 #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR		0x02

-#define TLS1_VERSION			0x0301
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR		0x01
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR		0x03

 #define TLS1_get_version(s) \
 		((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION	70	/* fatal */
 #define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY	71	/* fatal */
 #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR		80	/* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	86	/* fatal */
 #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED		90
 #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION	100
 /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
@@ -1145,6 +1145,7 @@ sub read_options
 		"dll" => \$shlib,
 		"shared" => 0,
 		"no-sctp" => 0,
+		"no-srtp" => 0,
 		"no-gmp" => 0,
 		"no-rfc3779" => 0,
 		"no-montasm" => 0,
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ my @known_algorithms = ( "RC2", "RC4", "RC5", "IDEA", "DES", "BF",
 			 "SSL_INTERN",
 			 # SCTP
 		 	 "SCTP",
+			 # SRTP
+			 "SRTP",
 			 # Unit testing
 		 	 "UNIT_TEST");

@@ -138,7 +140,7 @@ my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw;
 my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
 my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng;
 my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc; 
-my $no_nextprotoneg; my $no_sctp;
+my $no_nextprotoneg; my $no_sctp; my $no_srtp;
 my $no_unit_test;

 my $fips;
@@ -238,6 +240,7 @@ foreach (@ARGV, split(/ /, $options))
 	elsif (/^no-jpake$/)	{ $no_jpake=1; }
 	elsif (/^no-srp$/)	{ $no_srp=1; }
 	elsif (/^no-sctp$/)	{ $no_sctp=1; }
+	elsif (/^no-srtp$/)	{ $no_srtp=1; }
 	elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; }
 	}

@@ -1209,6 +1212,7 @@ sub is_valid
 			if ($keyword eq "JPAKE" && $no_jpake) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "SRP" && $no_srp) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "SCTP" && $no_sctp) { return 0; }
+			if ($keyword eq "SRTP" && $no_srtp) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "UNIT_TEST" && $no_unit_test) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "DEPRECATED" && $no_deprecated) { return 0; }

@@ -310,14 +310,14 @@ TLSv1_2_method                          350	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 SSL_SESSION_get_id_len                  351	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ              352	EXIST::FUNCTION:KRB5
 SSL_export_keying_material              353	EXIST::FUNCTION:TLSEXT
-SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp                 354	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp                 354	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRTP
 SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb   355	EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
 SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_adv_cb          355	EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
 SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated          356	EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
-SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile           357	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp             358	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile           357	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRTP
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp             358	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRTP
 SSL_select_next_proto                   359	EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
-SSL_get_srtp_profiles                   360	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SSL_get_srtp_profiles                   360	EXIST::FUNCTION:SRTP
 SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb        361	EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
 SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_sel_cb           361	EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
 SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id             362	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ synchronous_dhclient="NO"	# Start dhclient directly on configured
 				# interfaces during startup.
 defaultroute_delay="30"		# Time to wait for a default route on a DHCP interface.
 defaultroute_carrier_delay="5"	# Time to wait for carrier while waiting for a default route.
+netif_ipexpand_max="2048"	# Maximum number of IP addrs in a range spec.
 wpa_supplicant_program="/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant"
 wpa_supplicant_flags="-s"	# Extra flags to pass to wpa_supplicant
 wpa_supplicant_conf_file="/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf"
@@ -276,17 +277,31 @@ local_unbound_enable="NO"	# local caching resolver
 #
 # kerberos. Do not run the admin daemons on slave servers
 #
-kerberos5_server_enable="NO"	# Run a kerberos 5 master server (or NO).
-kerberos5_server="/usr/libexec/kdc"	# path to kerberos 5 KDC
-kerberos5_server_flags="--detach"	# Additional flags to the kerberos 5 server
-kadmind5_server_enable="NO"	# Run kadmind (or NO)
-kadmind5_server="/usr/libexec/kadmind"	# path to kerberos 5 admin daemon
-kpasswdd_server_enable="NO"	# Run kpasswdd (or NO)
-kpasswdd_server="/usr/libexec/kpasswdd"	# path to kerberos 5 passwd daemon
+kdc_enable="NO"			# Run a kerberos 5 KDC (or NO).
+kdc_program="/usr/libexec/kdc"	# path to kerberos 5 KDC
+kdc_flags=""			# Additional flags to the kerberos 5 KDC
+kadmind_enable="NO"		# Run kadmind (or NO)
+kadmind_program="/usr/libexec/kadmind"	# path to kadmind
+kpasswdd_enable="NO"		# Run kpasswdd (or NO)
+kpasswdd_program="/usr/libexec/kpasswdd" # path to kpasswdd
 kfd_enable="NO"			# Run kfd (or NO)
 kfd_program="/usr/libexec/kfd"	# path to kerberos 5 kfd daemon
+kfd_flags=""
+ipropd_master_enable="NO"	# Run Heimdal incremental propagation daemon
+				# (master daemon).
+ipropd_master_program="/usr/libexec/ipropd-master"
+ipropd_master_flags=""		# Flags to ipropd-master.
+ipropd_master_keytab="/etc/krb5.keytab"	# keytab for ipropd-master.
+ipropd_master_slaves=""		# slave node names used for /var/heimdal/slaves.
+ipropd_slave_enable="NO"	# Run Heimdal incremental propagation daemon
+				# (slave daemon).
+ipropd_slave_program="/usr/libexec/ipropd-slave"
+ipropd_slave_flags=""		# Flags to ipropd-slave.
+ipropd_slave_keytab="/etc/krb5.keytab"	# keytab for ipropd-slave.
+ipropd_slave_master=""		# master node name.

 gssd_enable="NO"		# Run the gssd daemon (or NO).
+gssd_program="/usr/sbin/gssd"	# Path to gssd.
 gssd_flags=""			# Flags for gssd.

 rwhod_enable="NO"		# Run the rwho daemon (or NO).
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Documents installed with the system are in the /usr/local/share/doc/freebsd/
 directory, or can be installed later with:  pkg install en-freebsd-doc
 For other languages, replace "en" with a language code like de or fr.

-Show the version of FreeBSD installed:  uname -a
+Show the version of FreeBSD installed:  freebsd-version ; uname -a
 Please include that output and any error messages when posting questions.
 Introduction to manual pages:  man man
 FreeBSD directory layout:      man hier
@@ -25,9 +25,7 @@
 # $FreeBSD$
 #
 IFCONFIG_CMD="/sbin/ifconfig"
-
-# Maximum number of addresses expanded from a address range specification.
-_IPEXPANDMAX=31
+: ${netif_ipexpand_max:=2048}

 #
 # Subroutines commonly used from network startup scripts.
@@ -134,13 +132,6 @@ ifconfig_up()
 		_cfg=0
 	fi

-	# ifconfig_IF
-	ifconfig_args=`ifconfig_getargs $1`
-	if [ -n "${ifconfig_args}" ]; then
-		eval ${IFCONFIG_CMD} $1 ${ifconfig_args}
-		_cfg=0
-	fi
-
 	# inet6 specific
 	if ! noafif $1 && afexists inet6; then
 		if checkyesno ipv6_activate_all_interfaces; then
@@ -176,7 +167,17 @@ ifconfig_up()
 		if [ -n "${_ipv6_opts}" ]; then
 			${IFCONFIG_CMD} $1 inet6 ${_ipv6_opts}
 		fi
+	fi

+	# ifconfig_IF
+	ifconfig_args=`ifconfig_getargs $1`
+	if [ -n "${ifconfig_args}" ]; then
+		eval ${IFCONFIG_CMD} $1 ${ifconfig_args}
+		_cfg=0
+	fi
+
+	# inet6 specific
+	if ! noafif $1 && afexists inet6; then
 		# ifconfig_IF_ipv6
 		ifconfig_args=`ifconfig_getargs $1 ipv6`
 		if [ -n "${ifconfig_args}" ]; then
@@ -888,8 +889,8 @@ ifalias_expand_addr_inet()
 		_ipcount=$_iplow
 		while [ "$_ipcount" -le "$_iphigh" ]; do
 			_retstr="${_retstr} ${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_ipcount}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail}${_plen:+/}${_plen}"
-			if [ $_ipcount -gt $(($_iplow + $_IPEXPANDMAX)) ]; then
-				warn "Range specification is too large (${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_iplow}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail}-${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_iphigh}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail}).  ${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_iplow}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail}-${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_ipcount}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail} was processed."
+			if [ $_ipcount -gt $(($_iplow + $netif_ipexpand_max)) ]; then
+				warn "Range specification is too large (${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_iplow}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail}-${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_iphigh}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail}).  ${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_iplow}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail}-${_iphead}${_iphead:+.}${_ipcount}${_iptail:+.}${_iptail} was processed.  Increase \$netif_ipexpand_max in rc.conf."
 				break
 			else
 				_ipcount=$(($_ipcount + 1))
@@ -978,9 +979,9 @@ ifalias_expand_addr_inet6()
 					    $_ipleft $_ipcount $_ipright \
 					    ${_plen:+/}$_plen`
 					_retstr="$_retstr $_r"
-					if [ $_ipcount -gt $(($_iplow + $_IPEXPANDMAX)) ]
+					if [ $_ipcount -gt $(($_iplow + $netif_ipexpand_max)) ]
 					then
-						warn "Range specification is too large $(printf '(%s:%04x%s-%s:%04x%s)' $_ipleft $_iplow $_ipright $_ipleft $_iphigh $_ipright). $(printf '%s:%04x%s-%s:%04x%s' $_ipleft $_iplow $_ipright $_ipleft $_ipcount $_ipright) was processed."
+						warn "Range specification is too large $(printf '(%s:%x%s-%s:%x%s)' "$_ipleft" "$_iplow" "$_ipright" "$_ipleft" "$_iphigh" "$_ipright"). $(printf '%s:%x%s-%s:%x%s' "$_ipleft" "$_iplow" "$_ipright" "$_ipleft" "$_ipcount" "$_ipright") was processed.  Increase \$netif_ipexpand_max in rc.conf."
 						break
 					else
 						_ipcount=$(($_ipcount + 1))
@@ -1042,7 +1043,7 @@ ifalias_af_common_handler()
 		case $_c in
 		${_af})
 			case $_tmpargs in
-			${_af}\ *-*)
+			${_af}\ *[0-9a-fA-F]-*)
 				ifalias_af_common_handler $_if $_af $_action \
 				`ifalias_expand_addr $_af $_action ${_tmpargs#${_af}\ }`
 			;;
@@ -1060,7 +1061,7 @@ ifalias_af_common_handler()
 	# Process the last component if any.
 	if [ -n "$_tmpargs}" ]; then
 		case $_tmpargs in
-		${_af}\ *-*)
+		${_af}\ *[0-9a-fA-F]-*)
 			ifalias_af_common_handler $_if $_af $_action \
 			`ifalias_expand_addr $_af $_action ${_tmpargs#${_af}\ }`
 		;;
@@ -64,13 +64,15 @@ FILES=	DAEMON \
 	ipfw \
 	ipmon \
 	ipnat \
+	ipropd_master \
+	ipropd_slave \
 	ipsec \
 	${_ipxrouted} \
 	iscsictl \
 	iscsid \
 	jail \
 	kadmind \
-	kerberos \
+	kdc \
 	keyserv \
 	kfd \
 	kld \
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #

 # PROVIDE: SERVERS
-# REQUIRE: mountcritremote abi ldconfig savecore watchdogd
+# REQUIRE: mountcritremote abi ldconfig savecore watchdogd kdc

 #	This is a dummy dependency, for early-start servers relying on
 #	some basic configuration.
@@ -9,10 +9,8 @@

 . /etc/rc.subr

-name="gssd"
+name=gssd
+rcvar=gssd_enable

 load_rc_config $name
-rcvar="gssd_enable"
-command="${gssd:-/usr/sbin/${name}}"
-eval ${name}_flags=\"${gssd_flags}\"
 run_rc_command "$1"
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ ip6addrctl_start()
 		else
 			if checkyesno ipv6_activate_all_interfaces; then
 				ip6addrctl_prefer_ipv6
+			elif [ -n "$(list_vars ifconfig_\*_ipv6)" ]; then
+				ip6addrctl_prefer_ipv6
 			else
 				ip6addrctl_prefer_ipv4
 			fi
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# $FreeBSD$
+#
+
+# PROVIDE: ipropd_master
+# REQUIRE: kdc
+# KEYWORD: shutdown
+
+. /etc/rc.subr
+
+name=ipropd_master
+rcvar=${name}_enable
+required_files="$ipropd_master_keytab"
+start_precmd=${name}_start_precmd
+start_postcmd=${name}_start_postcmd
+
+ipropd_master_start_precmd()
+{
+
+	if [ -z "$ipropd_master_slaves" ]; then
+		warn "\$ipropd_master_slaves is empty."
+		return 1
+	fi
+	for _slave in $ipropd_master_slaves; do
+		echo $_slave
+	done > /var/heimdal/slaves || return 1
+	command_args="$command_args \
+	    --keytab=\"$ipropd_master_keytab\" \
+	    --detach \
+	"
+}
+ipropd_master_start_postcmd()
+{
+
+	echo "${name}: slave nodes: $ipropd_master_slaves"
+}
+
+load_rc_config $name
+run_rc_command "$1"
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# $FreeBSD$
+#
+
+# PROVIDE: ipropd_slave
+# REQUIRE: kdc
+# KEYWORD: shutdown
+
+. /etc/rc.subr
+
+name=ipropd_slave
+rcvar=${name}_enable
+required_files="$ipropd_slave_keytab"
+start_precmd=${name}_start_precmd
+
+ipropd_slave_start_precmd()
+{
+
+	if [ -z "$ipropd_slave_master" ]; then
+		warn "\$ipropd_slave_master is empty."
+		return 1
+	fi
+	command_args=" \
+	    $command_args \
+	    --keytab=\"$ipropd_slave_keytab\" \
+	    --detach \
+	    $ipropd_slave_master"
+}
+
+load_rc_config $name
+run_rc_command "$1"
@@ -207,6 +207,10 @@ parse_options()
 		extract_var $_j consolelog exec.consolelog - \
 		    /var/log/jail_${_j}_console.log

+		if [ -r $_fstab ]; then
+			echo "	mount.fstab = \"$_fstab\";"
+		fi
+
 		eval : \${jail_${_j}_devfs_enable:=${jail_devfs_enable:-NO}}
 		if checkyesno jail_${_j}_devfs_enable; then
 			echo "	mount.devfs;"
@@ -222,11 +226,7 @@ parse_options()
 			;;
 			*)	warn "devfs_ruleset must be an integer." ;;
 			esac
-			if [ -r $_fstab ]; then
-				echo "	mount.fstab = \"$_fstab\";"
-			fi
 		fi
-
 		eval : \${jail_${_j}_fdescfs_enable:=${jail_fdescfs_enable:-NO}}
 		if checkyesno jail_${_j}_fdescfs_enable; then
 			echo "	mount.fdescfs;"
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ jail_status()

 jail_start()
 {
-	local _j _jid _jn _jl
+	local _j _jid _jl

 	if [ $# = 0 ]; then
 		return
@@ -433,12 +433,10 @@ jail_start()
 		command_args="-f $jail_conf -c"
 		_tmp=`mktemp -t jail` || exit 3
 		if $command $rc_flags $command_args >> $_tmp 2>&1; then
-			$jail_jls -nq | while read IN; do
-				_jn=$(echo $IN | tr " " "\n" | grep ^name=)
-				_jid=$(echo $IN | tr " " "\n" | grep ^jid=)
-				echo -n " ${_jn#name=}"
-				echo "${_jid#jid=}" \
-				    > /var/run/jail_${_jn#name=}.id
+			$jail_jls jid name | while read IN; do
+				set -- $IN
+				echo -n " $2"
+				echo $1 > /var/run/jail_$2.id
 			done
 		else
 			tail -1 $_tmp
@@ -468,9 +466,8 @@ jail_start()
 		sleep 1
 		for _j in $_jl; do
 			echo -n " ${_hostname:-${_j}}"
-			if _jid=$($jail_jls -n -j $_j | tr " " "\n" | \
-			    grep ^jid=); then
-				echo "${_jid#jid=}" > /var/run/jail_${_j}.id
+			if _jid=$($jail_jls -j $_j jid); then
+				echo "$_jid" > /var/run/jail_${_j}.id
 			else
 				rm -f /var/run/jail_${_j}.id
 				echo " cannot start jail " \
@@ -492,9 +489,8 @@ jail_start()
 			if $command $rc_flags $command_args \
 			    >> $_tmp 2>&1 </dev/null; then
 				echo -n " ${_hostname:-${_j}}"
-				_jid=$($jail_jls -n -j $_j | \
-				    tr " " "\n" | grep ^jid=)
-				echo "${_jid#jid=}" > /var/run/jail_${_j}.id
+				_jid=$($jail_jls -j $_j jid)
+				echo $_jid > /var/run/jail_${_j}.id
 			else
 				rm -f /var/run/jail_${_j}.id
 				echo " cannot start jail " \
@@ -509,7 +505,7 @@ jail_start()

 jail_stop()
 {
-	local _j _jn
+	local _j

 	if [ $# = 0 ]; then
 		return
@@ -520,16 +516,14 @@ jail_stop()
 		command=$jail_program
 		rc_flags=$jail_flags
 		command_args="-f $jail_conf -r"
-		$jail_jls -nq | while read IN; do
-			_jn=$(echo $IN | tr " " "\n" | grep ^name=)
-			echo -n " ${_jn#name=}"
+		$jail_jls name | while read _j; do
+			echo -n " $_j"
 			_tmp=`mktemp -t jail` || exit 3
-			$command $rc_flags $command_args ${_jn#name=} \
-			    >> $_tmp 2>&1
-			if $jail_jls -j ${_jn#name=} > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+			$command $rc_flags $command_args $_j >> $_tmp 2>&1
+			if $jail_jls -j $_j > /dev/null 2>&1; then
 				tail -1 $_tmp
 			else
-				rm -f /var/run/jail_${_jn#name=}.id
+				rm -f /var/run/jail_${_j}.id
 			fi
 			rm -f $_tmp
 		done
@@ -3,18 +3,26 @@
 # $FreeBSD$
 #

-# PROVIDE: kadmin
-# REQUIRE: kerberos
-# BEFORE: DAEMON
+# PROVIDE: kadmind
+# REQUIRE: kdc
+# KEYWORD: shutdown

 . /etc/rc.subr

-name="kadmind5"
-load_rc_config $name
-rcvar="kadmind5_server_enable"
-unset start_cmd
-command="${kadmind5_server}"
-command_args="&"
-required_vars="kerberos5_server_enable"
+name=kadmind
+rcvar=${name}_enable
+required_vars=kdc_enable
+start_precmd=${name}_start_precmd

+set_rcvar_obsolete kadmind5_server_enable kadmind_enable
+set_rcvar_obsolete kadmind5_server kadmind_program
+set_rcvar_obsolete kerberos5_server_enable kdc_enable
+
+kadmind_start_precmd()
+{
+
+	command_args="$command_args &"
+}
+
+load_rc_config $name
 run_rc_command "$1"
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# $FreeBSD$
+#
+
+# PROVIDE: kdc
+# REQUIRE: NETWORKING
+# KEYWORD: shutdown
+
+. /etc/rc.subr
+
+name=kdc
+rcvar=${name}_enable
+start_precmd=${name}_start_precmd
+
+set_rcvar_obsolete kerberos5_server_enable kdc_enable
+set_rcvar_obsolete kerberos5_server kdc_program
+set_rcvar_obsolete kerberos5_server_flags kdc_flags
+
+kdc_start_precmd()
+{
+
+	command_args="$command_args --detach"
+}
+
+load_rc_config $name
+run_rc_command "$1"
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# $FreeBSD$
-#
-
-# PROVIDE: kerberos
-# REQUIRE: NETWORKING
-
-. /etc/rc.subr
-
-name="kerberos5"
-rcvar="kerberos5_server_enable"
-
-load_rc_config $name
-command="${kerberos5_server}"
-kerberos5_flags="${kerberos5_server_flags}"
-run_rc_command "$1"