Extend the character set accepted by freebsd-update(8) in file

names in order to allow upgrades to FreeBSD 9.0-RELEASE.

Approved by:	so (cperciva)
Errata Notice:	FreeBSD-EN-12:01.freebsd-update

UPDATING

@@ -8,6 +8,58 @@ Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
 /usr/ports/UPDATING.  Please read that file before running
 portupgrade.
 
+20120104:	p10	FreeBSD-EN-12:01.freebsd-update
+	Extend the character set accepted by freebsd-update(8) in file
+	names in order to allow upgrades to FreeBSD 9.0-RELEASE.
+
+20111223:	p9	FreeBSD-SA-11:06.bind, FreeBSD-SA-11:07.chroot
+			FreeBSD-SA-11:08.telnetd, FreeBSD-SA-11:09.pam_ssh
+			FreeBSD-SA-11:10.pam
+	Fix a problem whereby a corrupt DNS record can cause named to crash.
+	[11:06]
+
+	Add an API for alerting internal libc routines to the presence of
+	"unsafe" paths post-chroot, and use it in ftpd. [11:07]
+
+	Fix a buffer overflow in telnetd. [11:08]
+
+	Make pam_ssh ignore unpassphrased keys unless the "nullok" option is
+	specified. [11:09]
+
+	Add sanity checking of service names in pam_start. [11:10]
+
+20111004:	p8	FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix (revised)
+	Fix a bug in UNIX socket handling in the linux emulator which was
+	exposed by the security fix in FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix.
+
+20110928:	p7	FreeBSD-SA-11:04.compress, FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix
+	Fix handling of corrupt compress(1)ed data. [11:04]
+
+	Add missing length checks on unix socket addresses. [11:05]
+
+20110528:	p6	FreeBSD-SA-11:02.bind
+	Fix BIND remote DoS with large RRSIG RRsets and negative
+	caching.
+
+20110420:	p5	FreeBSD-SA-11:01.mountd
+	Fix CIDR parsing bug in mountd ACLs.
+
+20101129:	p4	FreeBSD-SA-10:10.openssl
+	Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities.
+
+20100920:	p3	FreeBSD-SA-10:08.bzip2
+	Fix an integer overflow in RLE length parsing when decompressing
+	corrupt bzip2 data.
+
+20100713:	p2	FreeBSD-SA-10:07.mbuf
+	Correctly copy the M_RDONLY flag when duplicating a reference
+	to an mbuf external buffer.
+
+20100526:	p1	FreeBSD-SA-10:05.opie, FreeBSD-SA-10:06.nfsclient
+	Fix a one-NUL-byte buffer overflow in libopie. [10:05]
+
+	Correctly sanity-check a buffer length in nfs mount. [10:06]
+
 20100323:
 	FreeBSD 7.3-RELEASE
 

contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c

@@ -1250,11 +1250,9 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 			goto addname;
 		if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) {
 			dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
-			/*
-			 * Negative cache entries don't have sigrdatasets.
-			 */
-			INSIST(sigrdataset == NULL ||
-			       ! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset));
+			if (sigrdataset != NULL &&
+			    dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
 		}
 		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 			mname = NULL;
@@ -1295,8 +1293,9 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 			goto addname;
 		if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) {
 			dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
-			INSIST(sigrdataset == NULL ||
-			       ! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset));
+			if (sigrdataset != NULL &&
+			    dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
 		}
 		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 			mname = NULL;
@@ -1744,10 +1743,8 @@ query_addadditional2(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 		goto setcache;
 	if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) {
 		dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
-		/*
-		 * Negative cache entries don't have sigrdatasets.
-		 */
-		INSIST(! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset));
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
 	}
 	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
 		/* Remember the result as a cache */

contrib/bind9/lib/dns/ncache.c

@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ dns_ncache_add(dns_message_t *message, dns_db_t *cache, dns_dbnode_t *node,
 					 */
 					isc_buffer_availableregion(&buffer,
 								   &r);
-					if (r.length < 2)
+					if (r.length < 3)
 						return (ISC_R_NOSPACE);
 					isc_buffer_putuint16(&buffer,
 							     rdataset->type);

contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rbtdb.c

@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ typedef struct rdatasetheader {
 #define RDATASET_ATTR_IGNORE		0x0004
 #define RDATASET_ATTR_RETAIN		0x0008
 #define RDATASET_ATTR_NXDOMAIN		0x0010
+#define RDATASET_ATTR_NEGATIVE		0x0100
 
 typedef struct acache_cbarg {
 	dns_rdatasetadditional_t	type;
@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ struct acachectl {
 	(((header)->attributes & RDATASET_ATTR_RETAIN) != 0)
 #define NXDOMAIN(header) \
 	(((header)->attributes & RDATASET_ATTR_NXDOMAIN) != 0)
+#define NEGATIVE(header) \
+	(((header)->attributes & RDATASET_ATTR_NEGATIVE) != 0)
 
 #define DEFAULT_NODE_LOCK_COUNT		7	/*%< Should be prime. */
 #define DEFAULT_CACHE_NODE_LOCK_COUNT	1009	/*%< Should be prime. */
@@ -3656,7 +3659,7 @@ cache_find(dns_db_t *db, dns_name_t *name, dns_dbversion_t *version,
 	    result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) {
 		bind_rdataset(search.rbtdb, node, found, search.now,
 			      rdataset);
-		if (foundsig != NULL)
+		if (!NEGATIVE(found) && foundsig != NULL)
 			bind_rdataset(search.rbtdb, node, foundsig, search.now,
 				      sigrdataset);
 	}
@@ -4242,7 +4245,7 @@ cache_findrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_dbversion_t *version,
 	}
 	if (found != NULL) {
 		bind_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtnode, found, now, rdataset);
-		if (foundsig != NULL)
+		if (!NEGATIVE(found) && foundsig != NULL)
 			bind_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtnode, foundsig, now,
 				      sigrdataset);
 	}

contrib/bzip2/decompress.c

@@ -381,6 +381,13 @@ Int32 BZ2_decompress ( DState* s )
             es = -1;
             N = 1;
             do {
+               /* Check that N doesn't get too big, so that es doesn't
+                  go negative.  The maximum value that can be
+                  RUNA/RUNB encoded is equal to the block size (post
+                  the initial RLE), viz, 900k, so bounding N at 2
+                  million should guard against overflow without
+                  rejecting any legitimate inputs. */
+               if (N >= 2*1024*1024) RETURN(BZ_DATA_ERROR);
                if (nextSym == BZ_RUNA) es = es + (0+1) * N; else
                if (nextSym == BZ_RUNB) es = es + (1+1) * N;
                N = N * 2;

contrib/openpam/lib/openpam_configure.c

@@ -285,6 +285,13 @@ openpam_load_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 	size_t len;
 	int r;
 
+	/* don't allow to escape from policy_path */
+	if (strchr(service, '/')) {
+		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "invalid service name: %s",
+		    service);
+		return (-PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
+	}
+
 	for (path = openpam_policy_path; *path != NULL; ++path) {
 		len = strlen(*path);
 		if ((*path)[len - 1] == '/') {

contrib/opie/libopie/readrec.c

@@ -141,10 +141,8 @@ int __opiereadrec FUNCTION((opie), struct opie *opie)
     
     if (c = strchr(opie->opie_principal, ':'))
       *c = 0;
-    if (strlen(opie->opie_principal) > OPIE_PRINCIPAL_MAX)
-      (opie->opie_principal)[OPIE_PRINCIPAL_MAX] = 0;
     
-    strcpy(principal, opie->opie_principal);
+    strlcpy(principal, opie->opie_principal, sizeof(principal));
     
     do {
       if ((opie->opie_recstart = ftell(f)) < 0)

contrib/telnet/libtelnet/encrypt.c

@@ -721,6 +721,9 @@ encrypt_keyid(struct key_info *kp, unsigned char *keyid, int len)
 	int dir = kp->dir;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (len > MAXKEYLEN)
+		len = MAXKEYLEN;
+
 	if (!(ep = (*kp->getcrypt)(*kp->modep))) {
 		if (len == 0)
 			return;

crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/libtelnet/encrypt.c

@@ -736,6 +736,9 @@ encrypt_keyid(struct key_info *kp, unsigned char *keyid, int len)
     int dir = kp->dir;
     int ret = 0;
 
+    if (len > MAXKEYLEN)
+        len = MAXKEYLEN;
+
     if (!(ep = (*kp->getcrypt)(*kp->modep))) {
 	if (len == 0)
 	    return;

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -1289,6 +1289,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
 		ecdh=NULL;
 		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+		bn_ctx = NULL;
 		EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
 		srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
 		}

include/unistd.h

@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ int	 initgroups(const char *, gid_t);
 int	 iruserok(unsigned long, int, const char *, const char *);
 int	 iruserok_sa(const void *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
 int	 issetugid(void);
+void	__FreeBSD_libc_enter_restricted_mode(void);
 char	*mkdtemp(char *);
 #ifndef	_MKNOD_DECLARED
 int	 mknod(const char *, mode_t, dev_t);

lib/libc/Versions.def

@@ -20,9 +20,13 @@ FBSD_1.1 {
 FBSD_1.2 {
 } FBSD_1.1;
 
+# This version was first added to 10.0-current.
+FBSD_1.3 {
+} FBSD_1.2;
+
 # This is our private namespace.  Any global interfaces that are
 # strictly for use only by other FreeBSD applications and libraries
 # are listed here.  We use a separate namespace so we can write
 # simple ABI-checking tools.
 FBSDprivate_1.0 {
-} FBSD_1.2;
+} FBSD_1.3;

lib/libc/gen/Makefile.inc

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRCS+=  __getosreldate.c __xuname.c \
 	getpeereid.c getprogname.c getpwent.c getttyent.c \
 	getusershell.c getvfsbyname.c glob.c \
 	initgroups.c isatty.c isinf.c isnan.c jrand48.c lcong48.c \
+	libc_dlopen.c \
 	lockf.c lrand48.c mrand48.c nftw.c nice.c \
 	nlist.c nrand48.c opendir.c \
 	pause.c pmadvise.c popen.c posixshm.c pselect.c \

lib/libc/gen/Symbol.map

@@ -345,6 +345,10 @@ FBSD_1.2 {
 	getpagesizes;
 };
 
+FBSD_1.3 {
+	__FreeBSD_libc_enter_restricted_mode;
+};
+
 FBSDprivate_1.0 {
 	/* needed by thread libraries */
 	__thr_jtable;

lib/libc/gen/libc_dlopen.c

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Xin Li <delphij@FreeBSD.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "libc_private.h"
+
+/*
+ * Whether we want to restrict dlopen()s.
+ */
+static int __libc_restricted_mode = 0;
+
+void *
+libc_dlopen(const char *path, int mode)
+{
+
+	if (__libc_restricted_mode) {
+		_rtld_error("Service unavailable -- libc in restricted mode");
+		return (NULL);
+	} else
+		return (dlopen(path, mode));
+}
+
+void
+__FreeBSD_libc_enter_restricted_mode(void)
+{
+
+	__libc_restricted_mode = 1;
+	return;
+}
+

lib/libc/include/libc_private.h

@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@
  */
 extern int	__isthreaded;
 
+/*
+ * libc should use libc_dlopen internally, which respects a global
+ * flag where loading of new shared objects can be restricted.
+ */
+void *libc_dlopen(const char *, int);
+
+/*
+ * For dynamic linker.
+ */
+void _rtld_error(const char *fmt, ...);
+
 /*
  * File lock contention is difficult to diagnose without knowing
  * where locks were set. Allow a debug library to be built which

lib/libc/net/nsdispatch.c

@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ nss_configure(void)
 	confmod = statbuf.st_mtime;
 
 #ifdef NS_CACHING
-	handle = dlopen(NULL, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GLOBAL);
+	handle = libc_dlopen(NULL, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GLOBAL);
 	if (handle != NULL) {
 		nss_cache_cycle_prevention_func = dlsym(handle,
 			"_nss_cache_cycle_prevention_function");
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ nss_load_module(const char *source, nss_module_register_fn reg_fn)
 		if (snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "nss_%s.so.%d", mod.name,
 		    NSS_MODULE_INTERFACE_VERSION) >= (int)sizeof(buf))
 			goto fin;
-		mod.handle = dlopen(buf, RTLD_LOCAL|RTLD_LAZY);
+		mod.handle = libc_dlopen(buf, RTLD_LOCAL|RTLD_LAZY);
 		if (mod.handle == NULL) {
 #ifdef _NSS_DEBUG
 			/* This gets pretty annoying since the built-in

lib/libc/sys/mount.2

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ This restriction can be removed by setting the
 .Va vfs.usermount
 .Xr sysctl 8
 variable
-to a non-zero value.
+to a non-zero value; see the BUGS section for more information.
 .Pp
 The following
 .Fa flags
@@ -370,3 +370,10 @@ functions appeared in
 .At v6 .
 .Sh BUGS
 Some of the error codes need translation to more obvious messages.
+.Pp
+Allowing untrusted users to mount arbitrary media, e.g. by enabling
+.Va vfs.usermount ,
+should not be considered safe.
+Most file systems in
+.Fx
+were not built to safeguard against malicious devices.

lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c

@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ static char *const pam_ssh_agent_envp[] = { NULL };
  * struct pam_ssh_key containing the key and its comment.
  */
 static struct pam_ssh_key *
-pam_ssh_load_key(const char *dir, const char *kfn, const char *passphrase)
+pam_ssh_load_key(const char *dir, const char *kfn, const char *passphrase,
+    int nullok)
 {
 	struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
 	char fn[PATH_MAX];
@@ -98,7 +99,21 @@ pam_ssh_load_key(const char *dir, const char *kfn, const char *passphrase)
 	if (snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s/%s", dir, kfn) > (int)sizeof(fn))
 		return (NULL);
 	comment = NULL;
-	key = key_load_private(fn, passphrase, &comment);
+	/*
+	 * If the key is unencrypted, OpenSSL ignores the passphrase, so
+	 * it will seem like the user typed in the right one.  This allows
+	 * a user to circumvent nullok by providing a dummy passphrase.
+	 * Verify that the key really *is* encrypted by trying to load it
+	 * with an empty passphrase, and if the key is not encrypted,
+	 * accept only an empty passphrase.
+	 */
+	key = key_load_private(fn, NULL, &comment);
+	if (key != NULL && !(*passphrase == '\0' && nullok)) {
+		key_free(key);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	if (key == NULL)
+		key = key_load_private(fn, passphrase, &comment);
 	if (key == NULL) {
 		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed to load key from %s\n", fn);
 		return (NULL);
@@ -165,9 +180,6 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
 	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
 		return (pam_err);
 
-	if (*passphrase == '\0' && !nullok)
-		goto skip_keys;
-
 	/* switch to user credentials */
 	pam_err = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, pwd);
 	if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
@@ -175,7 +187,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
 
 	/* try to load keys from all keyfiles we know of */
 	for (kfn = pam_ssh_keyfiles; *kfn != NULL; ++kfn) {
-		psk = pam_ssh_load_key(pwd->pw_dir, *kfn, passphrase);
+		psk = pam_ssh_load_key(pwd->pw_dir, *kfn, passphrase, nullok);
 		if (psk != NULL) {
 			pam_set_data(pamh, *kfn, psk, pam_ssh_free_key);
 			++nkeys;
@@ -185,7 +197,6 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
 	/* switch back to arbitrator credentials */
 	openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
 
- skip_keys:
 	/*
 	 * If we tried an old token and didn't get anything, and
 	 * try_first_pass was specified, try again after prompting the

libexec/ftpd/ftpd.c

@@ -1546,6 +1546,7 @@ skip:
 			reply(550, "Can't change root.");
 			goto bad;
 		}
+		__FreeBSD_libc_enter_restricted_mode();
 	} else	/* real user w/o chroot */
 		homedir = pw->pw_dir;
 	/*

libexec/ftpd/popen.c

@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ ftpd_popen(char *program, char *type)
 			}
 			(void)close(pdes[1]);
 		}
+		/* Drop privileges before proceeding */
+		if (getuid() != geteuid() && setuid(geteuid()) < 0)
+			_exit(1);
 		if (strcmp(gargv[0], _PATH_LS) == 0) {
 			/* Reset getopt for ls_main() */
 			optreset = optind = optopt = 1;

sys/compat/linux/linux_socket.c

@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ do_sa_get(struct sockaddr **sap, const struct osockaddr *osa, int *osalen,
 	int oldv6size;
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
 #endif
+	int namelen;
 
 	if (*osalen < 2 || *osalen > UCHAR_MAX || !osa)
 		return (EINVAL);
@@ -158,6 +159,20 @@ do_sa_get(struct sockaddr **sap, const struct osockaddr *osa, int *osalen,
 	if (bdom == AF_INET)
 		alloclen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
 
+	if ((bdom == AF_LOCAL) && (*osalen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_un))) {
+		for (namelen = 0;
+		    namelen < *osalen - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path);
+		    namelen++)
+			if (!((struct sockaddr_un *)kosa)->sun_path[namelen])
+				break;
+		if (namelen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) >
+		    sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)) {
+			error = EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		alloclen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un);
+	}
+
 	sa = (struct sockaddr *) kosa;
 	sa->sa_family = bdom;
 	sa->sa_len = alloclen;

sys/conf/newvers.sh

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="7.3"
-BRANCH="RELEASE"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p10"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

sys/kern/uipc_mbuf.c

@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ mb_dupcl(struct mbuf *n, struct mbuf *m)
 	n->m_ext.ref_cnt = m->m_ext.ref_cnt;
 	n->m_ext.ext_type = m->m_ext.ext_type;
 	n->m_flags |= M_EXT;
+	n->m_flags |= m->m_flags & M_RDONLY;
 }
 
 /*

sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c

@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ uipc_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
 	unp = sotounpcb(so);
 	KASSERT(unp != NULL, ("uipc_bind: unp == NULL"));
 
+	if (soun->sun_len > sizeof(struct sockaddr_un))
+		return (EINVAL);
 	namelen = soun->sun_len - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path);
 	if (namelen <= 0)
 		return (EINVAL);
@@ -1141,6 +1143,8 @@ unp_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
 	unp = sotounpcb(so);
 	KASSERT(unp != NULL, ("unp_connect: unp == NULL"));
 
+	if (nam->sa_len > sizeof(struct sockaddr_un))
+		return (EINVAL);
 	len = nam->sa_len - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path);
 	if (len <= 0)
 		return (EINVAL);

sys/nfsclient/nfs_vfsops.c

@@ -1002,6 +1002,11 @@ nfs_mount(struct mount *mp, struct thread *td)
 		nfs_decode_args(mp, nmp, &args, NULL);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (args.fhsize < 0 || args.fhsize > NFSX_V3FHMAX) {
+		vfs_mount_error(mp, "Bad file handle");
+		error = EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Make the nfs_ip_paranoia sysctl serve as the default connection

usr.bin/compress/zopen.c

@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ zread(void *cookie, char *rbp, int num)
 	block_compress = maxbits & BLOCK_MASK;
 	maxbits &= BIT_MASK;
 	maxmaxcode = 1L << maxbits;
-	if (maxbits > BITS) {
+	if (maxbits > BITS || maxbits < 12) {
 		errno = EFTYPE;
 		return (-1);
 	}
@@ -517,17 +517,28 @@ zread(void *cookie, char *rbp, int num)
 			for (code = 255; code >= 0; code--)
 				tab_prefixof(code) = 0;
 			clear_flg = 1;
-			free_ent = FIRST - 1;
-			if ((code = getcode(zs)) == -1)	/* O, untimely death! */
-				break;
+			free_ent = FIRST;
+			oldcode = -1;
+			continue;
 		}
 		incode = code;
 
-		/* Special case for KwKwK string. */
+		/* Special case for kWkWk string. */
 		if (code >= free_ent) {
+			if (code > free_ent || oldcode == -1) {
+				/* Bad stream. */
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return (-1);
+			}
 			*stackp++ = finchar;
 			code = oldcode;
 		}
+		/*
+		 * The above condition ensures that code < free_ent.
+		 * The construction of tab_prefixof in turn guarantees that
+		 * each iteration decreases code and therefore stack usage is
+		 * bound by 1 << BITS - 256.
+		 */
 
 		/* Generate output characters in reverse order. */
 		while (code >= 256) {
@@ -544,7 +555,7 @@ middle:		do {
 		} while (stackp > de_stack);
 
 		/* Generate the new entry. */
-		if ((code = free_ent) < maxmaxcode) {
+		if ((code = free_ent) < maxmaxcode && oldcode != -1) {
 			tab_prefixof(code) = (u_short) oldcode;
 			tab_suffixof(code) = finchar;
 			free_ent = code + 1;

usr.bin/gzip/zuncompress.c

@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ zread(void *cookie, char *rbp, int num)
 	zs->zs_block_compress = zs->zs_maxbits & BLOCK_MASK;
 	zs->zs_maxbits &= BIT_MASK;
 	zs->zs_maxmaxcode = 1L << zs->zs_maxbits;
-	if (zs->zs_maxbits > BITS) {
+	if (zs->zs_maxbits > BITS || zs->zs_maxbits < 12) {
 		errno = EFTYPE;
 		return (-1);
 	}
@@ -259,13 +259,7 @@ zread(void *cookie, char *rbp, int num)
 	}
 	zs->zs_free_ent = zs->zs_block_compress ? FIRST : 256;
 
-	zs->u.r.zs_finchar = zs->u.r.zs_oldcode = getcode(zs);
-	if (zs->u.r.zs_oldcode == -1)	/* EOF already? */
-		return (0);	/* Get out of here */
-
-	/* First code must be 8 bits = char. */
-	*bp++ = (u_char)zs->u.r.zs_finchar;
-	count--;
+	zs->u.r.zs_oldcode = -1;
 	zs->u.r.zs_stackp = de_stack;
 
 	while ((zs->u.r.zs_code = getcode(zs)) > -1) {
@@ -275,17 +269,29 @@ zread(void *cookie, char *rbp, int num)
 			    zs->u.r.zs_code--)
 				tab_prefixof(zs->u.r.zs_code) = 0;
 			zs->zs_clear_flg = 1;
-			zs->zs_free_ent = FIRST - 1;
-			if ((zs->u.r.zs_code = getcode(zs)) == -1)	/* O, untimely death! */
-				break;
+			zs->zs_free_ent = FIRST;
+			zs->u.r.zs_oldcode = -1;
+			continue;
 		}
 		zs->u.r.zs_incode = zs->u.r.zs_code;
 
 		/* Special case for KwKwK string. */
 		if (zs->u.r.zs_code >= zs->zs_free_ent) {
+			if (zs->u.r.zs_code > zs->zs_free_ent ||
+			    zs->u.r.zs_oldcode == -1) {
+				/* Bad stream. */
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return (-1);
+			}
 			*zs->u.r.zs_stackp++ = zs->u.r.zs_finchar;
 			zs->u.r.zs_code = zs->u.r.zs_oldcode;
 		}
+		/*
+		 * The above condition ensures that code < free_ent.
+		 * The construction of tab_prefixof in turn guarantees that
+		 * each iteration decreases code and therefore stack usage is
+		 * bound by 1 << BITS - 256.
+		 */
 
 		/* Generate output characters in reverse order. */
 		while (zs->u.r.zs_code >= 256) {
@@ -302,7 +308,8 @@ middle:		do {
 		} while (zs->u.r.zs_stackp > de_stack);
 
 		/* Generate the new entry. */
-		if ((zs->u.r.zs_code = zs->zs_free_ent) < zs->zs_maxmaxcode) {
+		if ((zs->u.r.zs_code = zs->zs_free_ent) < zs->zs_maxmaxcode &&
+		    zs->u.r.zs_oldcode != -1) {
 			tab_prefixof(zs->u.r.zs_code) = (u_short) zs->u.r.zs_oldcode;
 			tab_suffixof(zs->u.r.zs_code) = zs->u.r.zs_finchar;
 			zs->zs_free_ent = zs->u.r.zs_code + 1;

usr.sbin/freebsd-update/freebsd-update.sh

@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ fetch_metadata_sanity () {
 	# Some aliases to save space later: ${P} is a character which can
 	# appear in a path; ${M} is the four numeric metadata fields; and
 	# ${H} is a sha256 hash.
-	P="[-+./:=_[[:alnum:]]"
+	P="[-+./:=%@_[[:alnum:]]"
 	M="[0-9]+\|[0-9]+\|[0-9]+\|[0-9]+"
 	H="[0-9a-f]{64}"
 

usr.sbin/mountd/mountd.c

@@ -2676,7 +2676,7 @@ makemask(struct sockaddr_storage *ssp, int bitlen)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
 		bits = (bitlen > CHAR_BIT) ? CHAR_BIT : bitlen;
-		*p++ = (1 << bits) - 1;
+		*p++ = (u_char)~0 << (CHAR_BIT - bits);
 		bitlen -= bits;
 	}
 	return 0;