Change the current working directory to be inside the jail created by

the jail(8) command. [10:04]

Fix a one-NUL-byte buffer overflow in libopie. [10:05]

Correctly sanity-check a buffer length in nfs mount. [10:06]

Approved by:	so (cperciva)
Approved by:	re (kensmith)
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-10:04.jail
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-10:05.opie
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-10:06.nfsclient

UPDATING

@@ -8,6 +8,60 @@ Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
 /usr/ports/UPDATING.  Please read that file before running
 portupgrade.
 
+20100526:	p8	FreeBSD-SA-10:05.opie, FreeBSD-SA-10:06.nfsclient
+	Fix a one-NUL-byte buffer overflow in libopie. [10:05]
+
+	Correctly sanity-check a buffer length in nfs mount. [10:06]
+
+20100227:	p7	FreeBSD-EN-10:02.sched_ule
+	Fix a deadlock in the ULE scheduler.
+
+20100106:	p6	FreeBSD-SA-10:01.bind, FreeBSD-SA-10:02.ntpd,
+			FreeBSD-SA-10:03.zfs
+	Fix BIND named(8) cache poisoning with DNSSEC validation.
+	[SA-10:01]
+
+	Fix ntpd mode 7 denial of service. [SA-10:02]
+
+	Fix ZFS ZIL playback with insecure permissions. [SA-10:03]
+
+20091203:	p5	FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl, FreeBSD-SA-09:16.rtld,
+			FreeBSD-SA-09:17.freebsd-update
+	Disable SSL renegotiation in order to protect against a serious
+	protocol flaw. [09:15]
+
+	Correctly handle failures from unsetenv resulting from a corrupt
+	environment in rtld-elf. [09:16]
+
+	Fix permissions in freebsd-update in order to prevent leakage of
+	sensitive files. [09:17]
+
+20091002:	p4	FreeBSD-SA-09:14.devfs FreeBSD-EN-09:05.null
+	Fix devfs / VFS NULL pointer race condition. [SA-09:14]
+
+	Add no zero mapping feature. [EN-09:05]
+
+20090729:	p3	FreeBSD-SA-09:12.bind
+	Fix BIND named(8) dynamic update message remote DoS.
+
+20090624:	p2	FreeBSD-EN-09:02.bce, FreeBSD-EN-09:03.fxp,
+			FreeBSD-EN-09:04.fork
+	Fix packet length calculation in bce(4). [EN-09:02]
+
+	Correctly set IP packet length for TSO in fxp(4). [EN-09:03]
+
+	Fix a lock order reversal bug that could cause deadlock during
+	fork(2). [EN-09:04]
+
+20090610:	p1	FreeBSD-SA-09:09.pipe, FreeBSD-SA-09:10.ipv6,
+			FreeBSD-SA-09:11.ntpd
+	Prevent integer overflow in direct pipe write code from circumventing
+	virtual-to-physical page lookups. [09:09]
+
+	Add missing permissions check for SIOCSIFINFO_IN6 ioctl. [09:10]
+
+	Fix buffer overflow in "autokey" negotiation in ntpd(8). [09:11]
+
 20090504:
 	FreeBSD 7.2-RELEASE
 

contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c

@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@
 #define DNS_GETDB_NOLOG 0x02U
 #define DNS_GETDB_PARTIAL 0x04U
 
+#define PENDINGOK(x)	(((x) & DNS_DBFIND_PENDINGOK) != 0)
+
 typedef struct client_additionalctx {
 	ns_client_t *client;
 	dns_rdataset_t *rdataset;
@@ -1721,8 +1723,8 @@ query_addadditional2(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 	 */
 	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS &&
 	    additionaltype == dns_rdatasetadditional_fromcache &&
-	    (rdataset->trust == dns_trust_pending ||
-	     rdataset->trust == dns_trust_glue) &&
+	    (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(rdataset->trust) ||
+	     DNS_TRUST_GLUE(rdataset->trust)) &&
 	    !validate(client, db, fname, rdataset, sigrdataset)) {
 		dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
 		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
@@ -1761,8 +1763,8 @@ query_addadditional2(void *arg, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t qtype) {
 	 */
 	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS &&
 	    additionaltype == dns_rdatasetadditional_fromcache &&
-	    (rdataset->trust == dns_trust_pending ||
-	     rdataset->trust == dns_trust_glue) &&
+	    (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(rdataset->trust) ||
+	     DNS_TRUST_GLUE(rdataset->trust)) &&
 	    !validate(client, db, fname, rdataset, sigrdataset)) {
 		dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
 		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
@@ -2547,14 +2549,14 @@ query_addbestns(ns_client_t *client) {
 	/*
 	 * Attempt to validate RRsets that are pending or that are glue.
 	 */
-	if ((rdataset->trust == dns_trust_pending ||
-	     (sigrdataset != NULL && sigrdataset->trust == dns_trust_pending))
+	if ((DNS_TRUST_PENDING(rdataset->trust) ||
+	     (sigrdataset != NULL && DNS_TRUST_PENDING(sigrdataset->trust)))
 	    && !validate(client, db, fname, rdataset, sigrdataset) &&
-	    (client->query.dboptions & DNS_DBFIND_PENDINGOK) == 0)
+	    !PENDINGOK(client->query.dboptions))
 		goto cleanup;
 
-	if ((rdataset->trust == dns_trust_glue ||
-	     (sigrdataset != NULL && sigrdataset->trust == dns_trust_glue)) &&
+	if ((DNS_TRUST_GLUE(rdataset->trust) ||
+	     (sigrdataset != NULL && DNS_TRUST_GLUE(sigrdataset->trust))) &&
 	    !validate(client, db, fname, rdataset, sigrdataset) &&
 	    SECURE(client) && WANTDNSSEC(client))
 		goto cleanup;
@@ -3344,6 +3346,8 @@ query_find(ns_client_t *client, dns_fetchevent_t *event, dns_rdatatype_t qtype)
 	isc_boolean_t empty_wild;
 	dns_rdataset_t *noqname;
 	isc_boolean_t resuming;
+	dns_rdataset_t tmprdataset;
+	unsigned int dboptions;
 
 	CTRACE("query_find");
 
@@ -3555,9 +3559,49 @@ query_find(ns_client_t *client, dns_fetchevent_t *event, dns_rdatatype_t qtype)
 	/*
 	 * Now look for an answer in the database.
 	 */
+	dboptions = client->query.dboptions;
+	if (sigrdataset == NULL && client->view->enablednssec) {
+		/*
+		 * If the client doesn't want DNSSEC we still want to
+		 * look for any data pending validation to save a remote
+		 * lookup if possible.
+		 */
+		dns_rdataset_init(&tmprdataset);
+		sigrdataset = &tmprdataset;
+		dboptions |= DNS_DBFIND_PENDINGOK;
+	}
+ refind:
 	result = dns_db_find(db, client->query.qname, version, type,
-			     client->query.dboptions, client->now,
-			     &node, fname, rdataset, sigrdataset);
+			     dboptions, client->now, &node, fname,
+			     rdataset, sigrdataset);
+	/*
+	 * If we have found pending data try to validate it.
+	 * If the data does not validate as secure and we can't
+	 * use the unvalidated data requery the database with
+	 * pending disabled to prevent infinite looping.
+	 */
+	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS || !DNS_TRUST_PENDING(rdataset->trust))
+		goto validation_done;
+	if (validate(client, db, fname, rdataset, sigrdataset))
+		goto validation_done;
+	if (rdataset->trust != dns_trust_pending_answer ||
+	    !PENDINGOK(client->query.dboptions)) {
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
+		if (sigrdataset != NULL &&
+		    dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
+		if (sigrdataset == &tmprdataset)
+			sigrdataset = NULL;
+		dns_db_detachnode(db, &node);
+		dboptions &= ~DNS_DBFIND_PENDINGOK;
+		goto refind;
+	}
+ validation_done:
+	if (sigrdataset == &tmprdataset) {
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
+		sigrdataset = NULL;
+	}
 
  resume:
 	CTRACE("query_find: resume");

contrib/bind9/bin/named/update.c

@@ -865,7 +865,11 @@ temp_check(isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_diff_t *temp, dns_db_t *db,
 			if (type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig ||
 			    type == dns_rdatatype_sig)
 				covers = dns_rdata_covers(&t->rdata);
-			else
+			else if (type == dns_rdatatype_any) {
+				dns_db_detachnode(db, &node);
+				dns_diff_clear(&trash);
+				return (DNS_R_NXRRSET);
+			} else
 				covers = 0;
 
 			/*

contrib/bind9/lib/dns/include/dns/types.h

@@ -241,40 +241,52 @@ enum {
 	dns_trust_none = 0,
 #define dns_trust_none			((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_none)
 
-	/*% Subject to DNSSEC validation but has not yet been validated */
-	dns_trust_pending = 1,
-#define dns_trust_pending		((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_pending)
-
+	/*%
+	 * Subject to DNSSEC validation but has not yet been validated
+	 * dns_trust_pending_additional (from the additional section).
+	 */
+	dns_trust_pending_additional = 1,
+#define dns_trust_pending_additional \
+		((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_pending_additional)
+ 
+	dns_trust_pending_answer = 2,
+#define dns_trust_pending_answer	((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_pending_answer)
+ 
 	/*% Received in the additional section of a response. */
-	dns_trust_additional = 2,
+	dns_trust_additional = 3,
 #define dns_trust_additional		((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_additional)
-
-	/* Received in a referral response. */ 
-	dns_trust_glue = 3,
+ 
+	/* Received in a referral response. */
+	dns_trust_glue = 4,
 #define dns_trust_glue			((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_glue)
-
-	/* Answser from a non-authoritative server */
-	dns_trust_answer = 4,
+ 
+	/* Answer from a non-authoritative server */
+	dns_trust_answer = 5,
 #define dns_trust_answer		((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_answer)
-
+ 
 	/*  Received in the authority section as part of an
 	    authoritative response */
-	dns_trust_authauthority = 5,
+	dns_trust_authauthority = 6,
 #define dns_trust_authauthority		((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_authauthority)
 
-	/* Answser from an authoritative server */
-	dns_trust_authanswer = 6,
+	/* Answer from an authoritative server */
+	dns_trust_authanswer = 7,
 #define dns_trust_authanswer		((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_authanswer)
-
-	/* Successfully DNSSEC validated */	
-	dns_trust_secure = 7,
+ 
+	/* Successfully DNSSEC validated */
+	dns_trust_secure = 8,
 #define dns_trust_secure		((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_secure)
 
 	/* This server is authoritative */
-	dns_trust_ultimate = 8
+	dns_trust_ultimate = 9
 #define dns_trust_ultimate		((dns_trust_t)dns_trust_ultimate)
 };
 
+#define DNS_TRUST_PENDING(x)		((x) == dns_trust_pending_answer || \
+					 (x) == dns_trust_pending_additional)
+#define DNS_TRUST_GLUE(x)		((x) == dns_trust_glue)
+ 
+ 
 /*%
  * Name checking severites.
  */

contrib/bind9/lib/dns/masterdump.c

@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ dump_order_compare(const void *a, const void *b) {
 
 static const char *trustnames[] = {
 	"none",
-	"pending",
+	"pending-additional",
+	"pending-answer",
 	"additional",
 	"glue",
 	"answer",

contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rbtdb.c

@@ -3072,7 +3072,7 @@ cache_zonecut_callback(dns_rbtnode_t *node, dns_name_t *name, void *arg) {
 	}
 
 	if (dname_header != NULL &&
-	    (dname_header->trust != dns_trust_pending ||
+	    (!DNS_TRUST_PENDING(dname_header->trust) ||
 	     (search->options & DNS_DBFIND_PENDINGOK) != 0)) {
 		/*
 		 * We increment the reference count on node to ensure that
@@ -3586,7 +3586,7 @@ cache_find(dns_db_t *db, dns_name_t *name, dns_dbversion_t *version,
 	if (found == NULL ||
 	    (found->trust == dns_trust_glue &&
 	     ((options & DNS_DBFIND_GLUEOK) == 0)) ||
-	    (found->trust == dns_trust_pending &&
+	    (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(found->trust) &&
 	     ((options & DNS_DBFIND_PENDINGOK) == 0))) {
 		/*
 		 * If there is an NS rdataset at this node, then this is the

contrib/bind9/lib/dns/resolver.c

@@ -3887,6 +3887,7 @@ cache_name(fetchctx_t *fctx, dns_name_t *name, dns_adbaddrinfo_t *addrinfo,
 		 * for it, unless it is glue.
 		 */
 		if (secure_domain && rdataset->trust != dns_trust_glue) {
+			dns_trust_t trust;
 			/*
 			 * RRSIGs are validated as part of validating the
 			 * type they cover.
@@ -3923,12 +3924,34 @@ cache_name(fetchctx_t *fctx, dns_name_t *name, dns_adbaddrinfo_t *addrinfo,
 			}
 
 			/*
-			 * Cache this rdataset/sigrdataset pair as
-			 * pending data.
+			 * Reject out of bailiwick additional records
+			 * without RRSIGs as they can't possibly validate
+			 * as "secure" and as we will never never want to
+			 * store these as "answers" after validation.
 			 */
-			rdataset->trust = dns_trust_pending;
+			if (rdataset->trust == dns_trust_additional &&
+			    sigrdataset == NULL && EXTERNAL(rdataset))
+				continue;
+ 
+			/*
+			 * XXXMPA: If we store as "answer" after validating
+			 * then we need to do bailiwick processing and
+			 * also need to track whether RRsets are in or
+			 * out of bailiwick.  This will require a another
+			 * pending trust level.
+			 *
+			 * Cache this rdataset/sigrdataset pair as
+			 * pending data.  Track whether it was additional
+			 * or not.
+			 */
+			if (rdataset->trust == dns_trust_additional)
+				trust = dns_trust_pending_additional;
+			else
+				trust = dns_trust_pending_answer;
+ 
+			rdataset->trust = trust;
 			if (sigrdataset != NULL)
-				sigrdataset->trust = dns_trust_pending;
+				sigrdataset->trust = trust;
 			if (!need_validation)
 				addedrdataset = ardataset;
 			else
@@ -4276,7 +4299,7 @@ ncache_message(fetchctx_t *fctx, dns_adbaddrinfo_t *addrinfo,
 			for (trdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(tname->list);
 			     trdataset != NULL;
 			     trdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(trdataset, link))
-				trdataset->trust = dns_trust_pending;
+				trdataset->trust = dns_trust_pending_answer;
 			result = dns_message_nextname(fctx->rmessage,
 						      DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY);
 		}

contrib/bind9/lib/dns/validator.c

@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ get_key(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdata_rrsig_t *siginfo) {
 		 * We have an rrset for the given keyname.
 		 */
 		val->keyset = &val->frdataset;
-		if (val->frdataset.trust == dns_trust_pending &&
+		if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust) &&
 		    dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
 		{
 			/*
@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ get_key(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdata_rrsig_t *siginfo) {
 			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
 				return (result);
 			return (DNS_R_WAIT);
-		} else if (val->frdataset.trust == dns_trust_pending) {
+		} else if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust)) {
 			/*
 			 * Having a pending key with no signature means that
 			 * something is broken.
@@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ validatezonekey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 			 * We have DS records.
 			 */
 			val->dsset = &val->frdataset;
-			if (val->frdataset.trust == dns_trust_pending &&
+			if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust) &&
 			    dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
 			{
 				result = create_validator(val,
@@ -1818,7 +1818,7 @@ validatezonekey(dns_validator_t *val) {
 				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
 					return (result);
 				return (DNS_R_WAIT);
-			} else if (val->frdataset.trust == dns_trust_pending) {
+			} else if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust)) {
 				/*
 				 * There should never be an unsigned DS.
 				 */
@@ -2667,7 +2667,7 @@ proveunsecure(dns_validator_t *val, isc_boolean_t have_ds, isc_boolean_t resume)
 			 * There is no DS.  If this is a delegation,
 			 * we maybe done.
 			 */
-			if (val->frdataset.trust == dns_trust_pending) {
+			if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust)) {
 				result = create_fetch(val, tname,
 						      dns_rdatatype_ds,
 						      dsfetched2,

contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c

@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 			peer->issuer = emalloc(vallen + 1);
 			strcpy(peer->issuer, peer->subject);
 			temp32 = (fstamp >> 16) & 0xffff;
-			sprintf(statstr,
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "flags 0x%x host %s signature %s", fstamp,
 			    peer->subject, OBJ_nid2ln(temp32));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
@@ -636,7 +636,8 @@ crypto_recv(
 			}
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
 			temp32 = cinfo->nid;
-			sprintf(statstr, "cert %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
+			    "cert %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
 			    cinfo->subject, cinfo->flags,
 			    OBJ_nid2ln(temp32), temp32,
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
@@ -685,7 +686,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY |
 			    CRYPTO_FLAG_PROV;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "iff fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "iff fs %u",
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
@@ -733,7 +734,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY |
 			    CRYPTO_FLAG_PROV;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "gq fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "gq fs %u",
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
@@ -774,7 +775,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY |
 			    CRYPTO_FLAG_PROV;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "mv fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "mv fs %u",
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
@@ -828,7 +829,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 			peer->crypto &= ~CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AGREE;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "cook %x ts %u fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "cook %x ts %u fs %u",
 			    peer->pcookie, ntohl(ep->tstamp),
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
@@ -893,7 +894,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 				peer->crypto &= ~CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AGREE;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "cook %x ts %u fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "cook %x ts %u fs %u",
 			    peer->pcookie, ntohl(ep->tstamp),
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
@@ -944,7 +945,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 			peer->pkeyid = bp->key;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_AUTO;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr,
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "auto seq %d key %x ts %u fs %u", bp->seq,
 			    bp->key, ntohl(ep->tstamp),
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
@@ -987,7 +988,8 @@ crypto_recv(
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_SIGN;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
 			temp32 = cinfo->nid;
-			sprintf(statstr, "sign %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
+			    "sign %s 0x%x %s (%u) fs %u",
 			    cinfo->issuer, cinfo->flags,
 			    OBJ_nid2ln(temp32), temp32,
 			    ntohl(ep->fstamp));
@@ -1071,7 +1073,8 @@ crypto_recv(
 			crypto_flags |= CRYPTO_FLAG_TAI;
 			peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_LEAP;
 			peer->flash &= ~TEST8;
-			sprintf(statstr, "leap %u ts %u fs %u", vallen,
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
+			    "leap %u ts %u fs %u", vallen,
 			    ntohl(ep->tstamp), ntohl(ep->fstamp));
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
@@ -1127,7 +1130,7 @@ crypto_recv(
 		 * cheerfully ignored, as the message is not sent.
 		 */
 		if (rval > XEVNT_TSP) {
-			sprintf(statstr,
+			snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
 			    "error %x opcode %x ts %u fs %u", rval,
 			    code, tstamp, fstamp);
 			record_crypto_stats(&peer->srcadr, statstr);
@@ -1453,7 +1456,8 @@ crypto_xmit(
 	 */
 	if (rval != XEVNT_OK) {
 		opcode |= CRYPTO_ERROR;
-		sprintf(statstr, "error %x opcode %x", rval, opcode);
+		snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
+		    "error %x opcode %x", rval, opcode);
 		record_crypto_stats(srcadr_sin, statstr);
 		report_event(rval, NULL);
 #ifdef DEBUG
@@ -1952,7 +1956,8 @@ crypto_update(void)
 		if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, tai_leap.sig, &len, sign_pkey))
 			tai_leap.siglen = htonl(len);
 	}
-	sprintf(statstr, "update ts %u", ntohl(hostval.tstamp)); 
+	snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
+	    "update ts %u", ntohl(hostval.tstamp)); 
 	record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 	if (debug)
@@ -3606,7 +3611,7 @@ crypto_key(
 	 */
 	if ((ptr = strrchr(linkname, '\n')) != NULL)
 		*ptr = '\0'; 
-	sprintf(statstr, "%s mod %d", &linkname[2],
+	snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "%s mod %d", &linkname[2],
 	    EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) * 8);
 	record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
@@ -3715,8 +3720,8 @@ crypto_cert(
 
 	if ((ptr = strrchr(linkname, '\n')) != NULL)
 		*ptr = '\0'; 
-	sprintf(statstr, "%s 0x%x len %lu", &linkname[2], ret->flags,
-	    len);
+	snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN,
+	    "%s 0x%x len %lu", &linkname[2], ret->flags, len);
 	record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG
 	if (debug)
@@ -3832,7 +3837,7 @@ crypto_tai(
 	for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
 		*ptr++ = htonl(leapsec[j]);
 	crypto_flags |= CRYPTO_FLAG_TAI;
-	sprintf(statstr, "%s fs %u leap %u len %u", cp, fstamp,
+	snprintf(statstr, NTP_MAXSTRLEN, "%s fs %u leap %u len %u", cp, fstamp,
 	   leapsec[--j], len);
 	record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr);
 #ifdef DEBUG

contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_request.c

@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ process_private(
 	int mod_okay
 	)
 {
+	static u_long quiet_until;
 	struct req_pkt *inpkt;
 	struct req_pkt_tail *tailinpkt;
 	struct sockaddr_storage *srcadr;
@@ -444,8 +445,14 @@ process_private(
 	    || (++ec, INFO_MBZ(inpkt->mbz_itemsize) != 0)
 	    || (++ec, rbufp->recv_length < REQ_LEN_HDR)
 		) {
-		msyslog(LOG_ERR, "process_private: INFO_ERR_FMT: test %d failed, pkt from %s", ec, stoa(srcadr));
-		req_ack(srcadr, inter, inpkt, INFO_ERR_FMT);
+		NLOG(NLOG_SYSEVENT)
+			if (current_time >= quiet_until) {
+				msyslog(LOG_ERR,
+					"process_private: drop test %d"
+					" failed, pkt from %s",
+					ec, stoa(srcadr));
+				quiet_until = current_time + 60;
+			}
 		return;
 	}
 

contrib/opie/libopie/readrec.c

@@ -141,10 +141,8 @@ int __opiereadrec FUNCTION((opie), struct opie *opie)
     
     if (c = strchr(opie->opie_principal, ':'))
       *c = 0;
-    if (strlen(opie->opie_principal) > OPIE_PRINCIPAL_MAX)
-      (opie->opie_principal)[OPIE_PRINCIPAL_MAX] = 0;
     
-    strcpy(principal, opie->opie_principal);
+    strlcpy(principal, opie->opie_principal, sizeof(principal));
     
     do {
       if ((opie->opie_recstart = ftell(f)) < 0)

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c

@@ -2375,6 +2375,9 @@ int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s)
 	if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)
 		return(0);
 
+	if (1)
+		return(0);
+
 	s->s3->renegotiate=1;
 	return(1);
 	}

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -976,9 +976,7 @@ start:
 		if (s->msg_callback)
 			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
-		if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
-			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
-			!s->s3->renegotiate)
+		if (0)
 			{
 			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
 			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
@@ -1109,8 +1107,7 @@ start:
 	/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
 	if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&	!s->in_handshake)
 		{
-		if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
-			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
+		if (0)
 			{
 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -672,6 +672,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
 
+	if (s->new_session)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
 	/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
 	 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
 	 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.

etc/mtree/BSD.var.dist

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
     db
         entropy         uname=operator gname=operator mode=0700
         ..
-        freebsd-update
+        freebsd-update  mode=0700
         ..
         ipf             mode=0700
         ..

lib/libc/stdlib/malloc.c

@@ -4715,16 +4715,41 @@ _malloc_thread_cleanup(void)
 void
 _malloc_prefork(void)
 {
-	unsigned i;
+	bool again;
+	unsigned i, j;
+	arena_t *larenas[narenas], *tarenas[narenas];
 
 	/* Acquire all mutexes in a safe order. */
 
-	malloc_spin_lock(&arenas_lock);
-	for (i = 0; i < narenas; i++) {
-		if (arenas[i] != NULL)
-			malloc_spin_lock(&arenas[i]->lock);
-	}
-	malloc_spin_unlock(&arenas_lock);
+	/*
+	 * arenas_lock must be acquired after all of the arena mutexes, in
+	 * order to avoid potential deadlock with arena_lock_balance[_hard]().
+	 * Since arenas_lock protects the arenas array, the following code has
+	 * to race with arenas_extend() callers until it succeeds in locking
+	 * all arenas before locking arenas_lock.
+	 */
+	memset(larenas, 0, sizeof(arena_t *) * narenas);
+	do {
+		again = false;
+
+		malloc_spin_lock(&arenas_lock);
+		for (i = 0; i < narenas; i++) {
+			if (arenas[i] != larenas[i]) {
+				memcpy(tarenas, arenas, sizeof(arena_t *) *
+				    narenas);
+				malloc_spin_unlock(&arenas_lock);
+				for (j = 0; j < narenas; j++) {
+					if (larenas[j] != tarenas[j]) {
+						larenas[j] = tarenas[j];
+						malloc_spin_lock(
+						    &larenas[j]->lock);
+					}
+				}
+				again = true;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	} while (again);
 
 	malloc_mutex_lock(&base_mtx);
 
@@ -4739,6 +4764,7 @@ void
 _malloc_postfork(void)
 {
 	unsigned i;
+	arena_t *larenas[narenas];
 
 	/* Release all mutexes, now that fork() has completed. */
 
@@ -4750,12 +4776,12 @@ _malloc_postfork(void)
 
 	malloc_mutex_unlock(&base_mtx);
 
-	malloc_spin_lock(&arenas_lock);
-	for (i = 0; i < narenas; i++) {
-		if (arenas[i] != NULL)
-			malloc_spin_unlock(&arenas[i]->lock);
-	}
+	memcpy(larenas, arenas, sizeof(arena_t *) * narenas);
 	malloc_spin_unlock(&arenas_lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < narenas; i++) {
+		if (larenas[i] != NULL)
+			malloc_spin_unlock(&larenas[i]->lock);
+	}
 }
 
 /*

lib/libc/sys/mount.2

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ This restriction can be removed by setting the
 .Va vfs.usermount
 .Xr sysctl 8
 variable
-to a non-zero value.
+to a non-zero value; see the BUGS section for more information.
 .Pp
 The following
 .Fa flags
@@ -370,3 +370,10 @@ functions appeared in
 .At v6 .
 .Sh BUGS
 Some of the error codes need translation to more obvious messages.
+.Pp
+Allowing untrusted users to mount arbitrary media, e.g. by enabling
+.Va vfs.usermount ,
+should not be considered safe.
+Most file systems in
+.Fx
+were not built to safeguard against malicious devices.

libexec/rtld-elf/rtld.c

@@ -360,11 +360,12 @@ _rtld(Elf_Addr *sp, func_ptr_type *exit_proc, Obj_Entry **objp)
      * future processes to honor the potentially un-safe variables.
      */
     if (!trust) {
-        unsetenv(LD_ "PRELOAD");
-        unsetenv(LD_ "LIBMAP");
-        unsetenv(LD_ "LIBRARY_PATH");
-        unsetenv(LD_ "LIBMAP_DISABLE");
-        unsetenv(LD_ "DEBUG");
+        if (unsetenv(LD_ "PRELOAD") || unsetenv(LD_ "LIBMAP") ||
+	    unsetenv(LD_ "LIBRARY_PATH") || unsetenv(LD_ "LIBMAP_DISABLE") ||
+	    unsetenv(LD_ "DEBUG")) {
+		_rtld_error("environment corrupt; aborting");
+		die();
+	}
     }
     ld_debug = getenv(LD_ "DEBUG");
     libmap_disable = getenv(LD_ "LIBMAP_DISABLE") != NULL;

sys/cddl/contrib/opensolaris/uts/common/fs/zfs/zfs_replay.c

@@ -59,10 +59,14 @@ zfs_init_vattr(vattr_t *vap, uint64_t mask, uint64_t mode,
 {
 	VATTR_NULL(vap);
 	vap->va_mask = (uint_t)mask;
-	vap->va_type = IFTOVT(mode);
-	vap->va_mode = mode & MODEMASK;
-	vap->va_uid = (uid_t)uid;
-	vap->va_gid = (gid_t)gid;
+	if (mask & AT_TYPE)
+		vap->va_type = IFTOVT(mode);
+	if (mask & AT_MODE)
+		vap->va_mode = mode & MODEMASK;
+	if (mask & AT_UID)
+		vap->va_uid = (uid_t)uid;
+	if (mask & AT_GID)
+		vap->va_gid = (gid_t)gid;
 	vap->va_rdev = zfs_cmpldev(rdev);
 	vap->va_nodeid = nodeid;
 }

sys/conf/newvers.sh

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="7.2"
-BRANCH="RELEASE"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p8"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

sys/dev/bce/if_bce.c

@@ -5895,6 +5895,9 @@ bce_rx_intr(struct bce_softc *sc)
 			/* Set the total packet length. */
 			m0->m_pkthdr.len = m0->m_len = pkt_len;
 		}
+#else
+        /* Set the total packet length. */
+		m0->m_pkthdr.len = m0->m_len = pkt_len;
 #endif
 
 		/* Remove the trailing Ethernet FCS. */

sys/dev/fxp/if_fxp.c

@@ -1486,7 +1486,8 @@ fxp_encap(struct fxp_softc *sc, struct mbuf **m_head)
 		 * checksum in the first frame driver should compute it.
 		 */
 		ip->ip_sum = 0;
-		ip->ip_len = htons(ifp->if_mtu);
+		ip->ip_len = htons(m->m_pkthdr.tso_segsz + (ip->ip_hl << 2) +
+		    (tcp->th_off << 2));
 		tcp->th_sum = in_pseudo(ip->ip_src.s_addr, ip->ip_dst.s_addr,
 		    htons(IPPROTO_TCP + (tcp->th_off << 2) +
 		    m->m_pkthdr.tso_segsz));

sys/fs/devfs/devfs_vnops.c

@@ -890,6 +890,7 @@ devfs_open(struct vop_open_args *ap)
 	if (fp != NULL) {
 		FILE_LOCK(fp);
 		fp->f_data = dev;
+		fp->f_vnode = vp;
 		FILE_UNLOCK(fp);
 	}
 	fpop = td->td_fpop;

sys/kern/kern_exec.c

@@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ u_long ps_arg_cache_limit = PAGE_SIZE / 16;
 SYSCTL_ULONG(_kern, OID_AUTO, ps_arg_cache_limit, CTLFLAG_RW, 
     &ps_arg_cache_limit, 0, "");
 
+static int map_at_zero = 1;
+TUNABLE_INT("security.bsd.map_at_zero", &map_at_zero);
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, map_at_zero, CTLFLAG_RW, &map_at_zero, 0,
+    "Permit processes to map an object at virtual address 0.");
+
 static int
 sysctl_kern_ps_strings(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 {
@@ -939,7 +944,7 @@ exec_new_vmspace(imgp, sv)
 	int error;
 	struct proc *p = imgp->proc;
 	struct vmspace *vmspace = p->p_vmspace;
-	vm_offset_t stack_addr;
+	vm_offset_t sv_minuser, stack_addr;
 	vm_map_t map;
 	u_long ssiz;
 
@@ -955,13 +960,17 @@ exec_new_vmspace(imgp, sv)
 	 * not disrupted
 	 */
 	map = &vmspace->vm_map;
-	if (vmspace->vm_refcnt == 1 && vm_map_min(map) == sv->sv_minuser &&
+	if (map_at_zero)
+		sv_minuser = sv->sv_minuser;
+	else
+		sv_minuser = MAX(sv->sv_minuser, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (vmspace->vm_refcnt == 1 && vm_map_min(map) == sv_minuser &&
 	    vm_map_max(map) == sv->sv_maxuser) {
 		shmexit(vmspace);
 		pmap_remove_pages(vmspace_pmap(vmspace));
 		vm_map_remove(map, vm_map_min(map), vm_map_max(map));
 	} else {
-		error = vmspace_exec(p, sv->sv_minuser, sv->sv_maxuser);
+		error = vmspace_exec(p, sv_minuser, sv->sv_maxuser);
 		if (error)
 			return (error);
 		vmspace = p->p_vmspace;

sys/kern/sched_ule.c

@@ -1822,18 +1822,24 @@ sched_switch_migrate(struct tdq *tdq, struct thread *td, int flags)
 	 */
 	spinlock_enter();
 	thread_block_switch(td);	/* This releases the lock on tdq. */
-	TDQ_LOCK(tdn);
-	tdq_add(tdn, td, flags);
-	tdq_notify(td->td_sched);
+
 	/*
-	 * After we unlock tdn the new cpu still can't switch into this
-	 * thread until we've unblocked it in cpu_switch().  The lock
-	 * pointers may match in the case of HTT cores.  Don't unlock here
-	 * or we can deadlock when the other CPU runs the IPI handler.
+	 * Acquire both run-queue locks before placing the thread on the new
+	 * run-queue to avoid deadlocks created by placing a thread with a
+	 * blocked lock on the run-queue of a remote processor.  The deadlock
+	 * occurs when a third processor attempts to lock the two queues in
+	 * question while the target processor is spinning with its own
+	 * run-queue lock held while waiting for the blocked lock to clear.
 	 */
-	if (TDQ_LOCKPTR(tdn) != TDQ_LOCKPTR(tdq)) {
-		TDQ_UNLOCK(tdn);
+	if (TDQ_LOCKPTR(tdn) == TDQ_LOCKPTR(tdq)) {
 		TDQ_LOCK(tdq);
+		tdq_add(tdn, td, flags);
+		tdq_notify(td->td_sched);
+	} else {
+		tdq_lock_pair(tdn, tdq);
+		tdq_add(tdn, td, flags);
+		tdq_notify(td->td_sched);
+		TDQ_UNLOCK(tdn);
 	}
 	spinlock_exit();
 #endif

sys/kern/sys_pipe.c

@@ -755,6 +755,8 @@ pipe_build_write_buffer(wpipe, uio)
 	pmap = vmspace_pmap(curproc->p_vmspace);
 	endaddr = round_page((vm_offset_t)uio->uio_iov->iov_base + size);
 	addr = trunc_page((vm_offset_t)uio->uio_iov->iov_base);
+	if (endaddr < addr)
+		return (EFAULT);
 	for (i = 0; addr < endaddr; addr += PAGE_SIZE, i++) {
 		/*
 		 * vm_fault_quick() can sleep.  Consequently,

sys/netinet6/in6.c

@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ in6_control(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data,
 	case SIOCSRTRFLUSH_IN6:
 	case SIOCSDEFIFACE_IN6:
 	case SIOCSIFINFO_FLAGS:
+	case SIOCSIFINFO_IN6:
 		if (td != NULL) {
 			error = priv_check(td, PRIV_NETINET_ND6);
 			if (error)
@@ -362,7 +363,6 @@ in6_control(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data,
 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
 	case OSIOCGIFINFO_IN6:
 	case SIOCGIFINFO_IN6:
-	case SIOCSIFINFO_IN6:
 	case SIOCGDRLST_IN6:
 	case SIOCGPRLST_IN6:
 	case SIOCGNBRINFO_IN6:

sys/nfsclient/nfs_vfsops.c

@@ -1002,6 +1002,11 @@ nfs_mount(struct mount *mp, struct thread *td)
 		nfs_decode_args(mp, nmp, &args, NULL);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (args.fhsize < 0 || args.fhsize > NFSX_V3FHMAX) {
+		vfs_mount_error(mp, "Bad file handle");
+		error = EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Make the nfs_ip_paranoia sysctl serve as the default connection

usr.sbin/freebsd-update/freebsd-update.sh

@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ fetch_check_params () {
 		echo ${WORKDIR}
 		exit 1
 	fi
+	chmod 700 ${WORKDIR}
 	cd ${WORKDIR} || exit 1
 
 	# Generate release number.  The s/SECURITY/RELEASE/ bit exists