mirror of
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src.git
synced 2026-10-28 11:25:21 +01:00
Ed Maste
bb5c77e9d2
Full release notes are available at https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-10.4 Selected highlights from the release notes: Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * sshd(8): configuration dump mode ("sshd -G") now writes directives in mixed case (e.g. "PubkeyAuthentication") whereas previously it emitted only lower-case names. * ssh(1), sshd(8): make the transport protocol stricter by disconnecting if the peer sends non-KEX messages during a post- authentication key re-exchange. Previously a malicious peer could continue sending non-key exchange messages without penalty. These would be buffered, causing memory to be wasted up until the connection terminated or the server/client hit a memory limit. Implementations that do not restrict messages sent during key exchange as per RFC4253 section 7.1 may be disconnected. Reported by Marko Jevtic. Changes since OpenSSH 10.3 ========================== This release contains a number of security fixes as well as general bugfixes and a couple of new features. Security ======== * sftp(1): when downloading files on the command-line using "sftp host:/path .", a malicious server could cause the file to be downloaded to an unexpected location. This issue was identified by the Swival Security Scanner. * scp(1): when copying files between two remote destinations, do not allow a malicious server to write files to the parent directory of the intended target directory. This issue was identified by the Swival Security Scanner. * sshd(8): DisableForwarding=yes didn't override PermitTunnel=yes as it was documented to do. Note that PermitTunnel is not enabled by default. Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of Redhat and Marko Jevtic. * sshd(8): avoid a potential pre-authentication denial of service when GSSAPIAuthentication was enabled (this feature is off by default). This was not mitigated by MaxAuthTries, but would be penalised by PerSourcePenalties. This was reported by Manfred Kaiser of the milCERT AT (Austrian Ministry of Defence). * sshd(8): fix a number of cases where the minimum authentication delay was not being enforced. Reported by the Orange Cyberdefense Vulnerability Team. * ssh(1): fix a possible client-side use-after-free if the server changes its host key during a key reexchange. This was reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin of Depthfirst. New features ------------ * All: add experimental support for a composite post-quantum signature scheme that combines ML-DSA 44 and Ed25519 as specified in draft-miller-sshm-mldsa44-ed25519-composite-sigs. This scheme is not enabled by default. To use it, you'll need to add it to HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc. Keys may be generated using "ssh-keygen -t mldsa44-ed25519". Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): avoid sending observably different messages for valid vs invalid users in GSSAPIAuthentication (disabled by default). * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix several bugs that incorrectly classified bulk traffic as interactive. bz3972, bz3958 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): skip unsupported key types when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token. Previously, downloads would abort when one was encountered. GHPR657 Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D58083
115 lines
4.3 KiB
C
115 lines
4.3 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.55 2026/05/31 11:30:50 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <[email protected]>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
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#define _MM_WRAP_H_
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#define MONITOR_MAX_MSGLEN (4 * 1024 * 1024)
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/* The configuration has to fit in a monitor message along with other state */
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#define MONITOR_MAX_CFGLEN (MONITOR_MAX_MSGLEN - (64 * 1024))
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enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
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struct ssh;
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struct monitor;
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struct Authctxt;
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struct sshkey;
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struct sshauthopt;
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struct sshkey_sig_details;
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void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
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int mm_is_monitor(void);
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#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
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#endif
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void mm_sshkey_setcompat(struct ssh *);
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int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
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const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
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const char *, u_int compat);
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void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
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struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
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char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
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int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
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int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *,
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int, struct sshauthopt **);
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int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
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struct sshauthopt **);
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int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
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const char *, struct sshkey *);
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int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
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const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
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void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
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#ifdef GSSAPI
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OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
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OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
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gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
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int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
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OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
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#endif
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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void mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh);
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u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
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void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
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int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
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int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
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void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
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#endif
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#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
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#include "audit.h"
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void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
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void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
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#endif
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struct Session;
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void mm_terminate(void);
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int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
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void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
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void mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor*);
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/* state */
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struct ServerOptions;
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void mm_get_state(struct ssh *, struct ServerOptions *,
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struct sshbuf **, uint64_t *, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **,
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u_char **, struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **);
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/* bsdauth */
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int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
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int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
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/* config / channels glue */
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void server_process_permitopen(struct ssh *);
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void server_process_channel_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh);
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struct connection_info *
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server_get_connection_info(struct ssh *, int, int);
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#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
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