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Full release notes are available at https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-10.4 Selected highlights from the release notes: Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * sshd(8): configuration dump mode ("sshd -G") now writes directives in mixed case (e.g. "PubkeyAuthentication") whereas previously it emitted only lower-case names. * ssh(1), sshd(8): make the transport protocol stricter by disconnecting if the peer sends non-KEX messages during a post- authentication key re-exchange. Previously a malicious peer could continue sending non-key exchange messages without penalty. These would be buffered, causing memory to be wasted up until the connection terminated or the server/client hit a memory limit. Implementations that do not restrict messages sent during key exchange as per RFC4253 section 7.1 may be disconnected. Reported by Marko Jevtic. Changes since OpenSSH 10.3 ========================== This release contains a number of security fixes as well as general bugfixes and a couple of new features. Security ======== * sftp(1): when downloading files on the command-line using "sftp host:/path .", a malicious server could cause the file to be downloaded to an unexpected location. This issue was identified by the Swival Security Scanner. * scp(1): when copying files between two remote destinations, do not allow a malicious server to write files to the parent directory of the intended target directory. This issue was identified by the Swival Security Scanner. * sshd(8): DisableForwarding=yes didn't override PermitTunnel=yes as it was documented to do. Note that PermitTunnel is not enabled by default. Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of Redhat and Marko Jevtic. * sshd(8): avoid a potential pre-authentication denial of service when GSSAPIAuthentication was enabled (this feature is off by default). This was not mitigated by MaxAuthTries, but would be penalised by PerSourcePenalties. This was reported by Manfred Kaiser of the milCERT AT (Austrian Ministry of Defence). * sshd(8): fix a number of cases where the minimum authentication delay was not being enforced. Reported by the Orange Cyberdefense Vulnerability Team. * ssh(1): fix a possible client-side use-after-free if the server changes its host key during a key reexchange. This was reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin of Depthfirst. New features ------------ * All: add experimental support for a composite post-quantum signature scheme that combines ML-DSA 44 and Ed25519 as specified in draft-miller-sshm-mldsa44-ed25519-composite-sigs. This scheme is not enabled by default. To use it, you'll need to add it to HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc. Keys may be generated using "ssh-keygen -t mldsa44-ed25519". Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): avoid sending observably different messages for valid vs invalid users in GSSAPIAuthentication (disabled by default). * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix several bugs that incorrectly classified bulk traffic as interactive. bz3972, bz3958 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): skip unsupported key types when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token. Previously, downloads would abort when one was encountered. GHPR657 Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D58083
407 lines
11 KiB
C
407 lines
11 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.46 2026/05/31 04:19:16 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>, Espoo, Finland
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* All rights reserved
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* Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
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*
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* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
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* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
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* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
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* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
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* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
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*/
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2026 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "match.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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/*
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* Computes the epsilon closure of an NFA set.
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* In our wildcard grammar, epsilon transitions only exist for '*' wildcards,
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* allowing us to transition from state i to i+1 without consuming input.
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*
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* This function modifies 'states' in place.
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*/
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static void
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epsilon_closure(char *states, const char *pattern, size_t M)
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{
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size_t i;
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/* only need a forward pass as there are no back jumps in our grammar */
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for (i = 0; i < M; i++) {
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if (!states[i] || pattern[i] != '*')
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continue;
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/*
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* State i is active, and pattern[i] is '*', so we can
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* epsilon-transition to i+1.
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*/
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states[i + 1] = 1;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
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* and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match. Uses an NFA internally.
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*/
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int
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match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
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{
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size_t M;
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size_t i;
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char *states, *next_states, *tmp;
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int active, matched = 0;
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/* trivial case: empty pattern vs empty input */
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if ((M = strlen(pattern)) == 0)
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return *s == '\0';
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/* A state for each pattern character, plus one final accepting state */
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states = xcalloc(M + 1, sizeof(*states));
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next_states = xcalloc(M + 1, sizeof(*next_states));
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/* Initial state: state 0 is active */
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states[0] = 1;
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/* Other states might be reachable now if the pattern starts with '*' */
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epsilon_closure(states, pattern, M);
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for (; *s; s++) {
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memset(next_states, 0, M + 1);
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/* Calculate the reachable next states given the input char */
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for (i = 0; i < M; i++) {
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if (!states[i])
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continue;
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if (pattern[i] == '*') {
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/*
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* '*' matches any character, so we can
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* stay in state i
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*/
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next_states[i] = 1;
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} else if (pattern[i] == '?' || pattern[i] == *s) {
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/*
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* '?' matches any character, or we have
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* a literal match.
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*/
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next_states[i + 1] = 1;
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}
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}
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/* Expand the reachable next states with epsilon transitions */
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epsilon_closure(next_states, pattern, M);
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/* Swap states and next_states */
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tmp = states;
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states = next_states;
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next_states = tmp;
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/* Check if we have any active pattern states left */
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active = 0;
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for (i = 0; i <= M; i++) {
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if (states[i]) {
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active = 1;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!active)
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goto out; /* No active states, fail early */
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}
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/*
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* We matched only if we ended up in the final, accepting state
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* after consuming all the input.
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*/
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matched = states[M];
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out:
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free(states);
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free(next_states);
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return matched;
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}
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/*
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* Tries to match the string against the
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* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
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* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
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* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
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*/
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int
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match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
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{
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char sub[1024];
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int negated;
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int got_positive;
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u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
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got_positive = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < len;) {
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/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
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if (pattern[i] == '!') {
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negated = 1;
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i++;
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} else
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negated = 0;
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/*
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* Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
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* subpattern to lowercase.
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*/
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for (subi = 0;
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i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
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subi++, i++)
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sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ?
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tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
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/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
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if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
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return 0;
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/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
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if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
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i++;
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/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
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sub[subi] = '\0';
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/* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
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if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
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if (negated)
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return -1; /* Negative */
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else
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got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
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}
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}
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/*
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* Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
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* match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
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*/
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return got_positive;
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}
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/* Match a list representing users or groups. */
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int
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match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern)
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{
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#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
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/* Windows usernames may be Unicode and are not case sensitive */
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return cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(string, pattern);
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#else
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/* Case sensitive match */
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return match_pattern_list(string, pattern, 0);
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
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* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
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* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
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* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
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*/
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int
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match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
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{
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char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host);
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int r;
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lowercase(hostcopy);
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r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1);
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free(hostcopy);
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return r;
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}
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/*
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* returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
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* or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on
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* successful match.
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*/
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int
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match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
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const char *patterns)
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{
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int mhost, mip;
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if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
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return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
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else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
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return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
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/* negative hostname match */
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if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
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return 0;
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/* no match at all */
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if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
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* If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
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* Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
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*/
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int
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match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
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const char *pattern)
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{
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char *p, *pat;
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int ret;
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/* test mode */
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if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
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if ((p = strrchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
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match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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if (user == NULL)
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return 0; /* shouldn't happen */
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if (strrchr(pattern, '@') == NULL)
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return match_pattern(user, pattern);
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pat = xstrdup(pattern);
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p = strrchr(pat, '@');
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*p++ = '\0';
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if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
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ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
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free(pat);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
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* caller must free the returned string.
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*/
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#define MAX_PROP 40
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#define SEP ","
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char *
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match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
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{
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char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
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char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
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int i, j, nproposals;
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c = cp = xstrdup(client);
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s = sp = xstrdup(server);
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for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
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(p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
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if (i < MAX_PROP)
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sproposals[i] = p;
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else
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break;
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}
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nproposals = i;
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for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
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(p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
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for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
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if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
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ret = xstrdup(p);
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if (next != NULL)
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*next = (cp == NULL) ?
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strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
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free(c);
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free(s);
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return ret;
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}
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}
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}
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if (next != NULL)
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*next = strlen(c);
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free(c);
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free(s);
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Filter proposal using pattern-list filter.
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* "denylist" determines sense of filter:
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* non-zero indicates that items matching filter should be excluded.
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* zero indicates that only items matching filter should be included.
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* returns NULL on allocation error, otherwise caller must free result.
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*/
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static char *
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filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int denylist)
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{
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size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1;
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char *fix_prop = malloc(len);
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char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal);
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char *cp, *tmp;
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int r;
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if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) {
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free(orig_prop);
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free(fix_prop);
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return NULL;
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}
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tmp = orig_prop;
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*fix_prop = '\0';
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while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
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r = match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0);
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if ((denylist && r != 1) || (!denylist && r == 1)) {
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if (*fix_prop != '\0')
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strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len);
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strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len);
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}
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}
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free(orig_prop);
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return fix_prop;
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}
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/*
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* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching
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* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
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*/
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char *
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match_filter_denylist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
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{
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return filter_list(proposal, filter, 1);
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}
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/*
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* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, including only entries matching
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* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
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*/
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char *
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match_filter_allowlist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
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{
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return filter_list(proposal, filter, 0);
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}
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