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Remove the kernel optoion for IPSEC_FILTERTUNNEL, which was deprecated more than 7 years ago in favour of a sysctl in r192648. MFC r305122: Remove redundant sanity checks from ipsec[46]_common_input_cb(). This check already has been done in the each protocol callback. MFC r309144,309174,309201 (by fabient): IPsec RFC6479 support for replay window sizes up to 2^32 - 32 packets. Since the previous algorithm, based on bit shifting, does not scale with large replay windows, the algorithm used here is based on RFC 6479: IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm without Bit Shifting. The replay window will be fast to be updated, but will cost as many bits in RAM as its size. The previous implementation did not provide a lock on the replay window, which may lead to replay issues. Obtained from: [email protected] Sponsored by: Stormshield Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8468 MFC r309143,309146 (by fabient): In a dual processor system (2*6 cores) during IPSec throughput tests, we see a lot of contention on the arc4 lock, used to generate the IV of the ESP output packets. The idea of this patch is to split this mutex in order to reduce the contention on this lock. Update r309143 to prevent false sharing. Reviewed by: delphij, markm, ache Approved by: so Obtained from: [email protected] Sponsored by: Stormshield Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8130 MFC r313330: Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352 MFC r313331: Add removed headers into the ObsoleteFiles.inc. MFC r313561 (by glebius): Move tcp_fields_to_net() static inline into tcp_var.h, just below its friend tcp_fields_to_host(). There is third party code that also uses this inline. MFC r313697: Remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP. The inpcb structure has inp_sp pointer that is initialized by ipsec_init_pcbpolicy() function. This pointer keeps strorage for IPsec security policies associated with a specific socket. An application can use IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options to configure these security policies. Then ip[6]_output() uses inpcb pointer to specify that an outgoing packet is associated with some socket. And IPSEC_OUTPUT() method can use a security policy stored in the inp_sp. For inbound packet the protocol-specific input routine uses IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() method to check that a packet conforms to inbound security policy configured in the inpcb. SCTP protocol doesn't specify inpcb for ip[6]_output() when it sends packets. Thus IPSEC_OUTPUT() method does not consider such packets as associated with some socket and can not apply security policies from inpcb, even if they are configured. Since IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() method is called from protocol-specific input routine, it can specify inpcb pointer and associated with socket inbound policy will be checked. But there are two problems: 1. Such check is asymmetric, becasue we can not apply security policy from inpcb for outgoing packet. 2. IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() expects that caller holds INPCB lock and access to inp_sp is protected. But for SCTP this is not correct, becasue SCTP uses own locks to protect inpcb. To fix these problems remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP. This imply that IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options will be not applicable to SCTP sockets. To be able correctly check inbound security policies for SCTP, mark its protocol header with the PR_LASTHDR flag. Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9538 MFC r313746: Add missing check to fix the build with IPSEC_SUPPORT and without MAC. MFC r313805: Fix LINT build for powerpc. Build kernel modules support only when both IPSEC and TCP_SIGNATURE are not defined. MFC r313922: For translated packets do not adjust UDP checksum if it is zero. In case when decrypted and decapsulated packet is an UDP datagram, check that its checksum is not zero before doing incremental checksum adjustment. MFC r314339: Document that the size of AH ICV for HMAC-SHA2-NNN should be half of NNN bits as described in RFC4868. PR: 215978 MFC r314812: Introduce the concept of IPsec security policies scope. Currently are defined three scopes: global, ifnet, and pcb. Generic security policies that IKE daemon can add via PF_KEY interface or an administrator creates with setkey(8) utility have GLOBAL scope. Such policies can be applied by the kernel to outgoing packets and checked agains inbound packets after IPsec processing. Security policies created by if_ipsec(4) interfaces have IFNET scope. Such policies are applied to packets that are passed through if_ipsec(4) interface. And security policies created by application using setsockopt() IP_IPSEC_POLICY option have PCB scope. Such policies are applied to packets related to specific socket. Currently there is no way to list PCB policies via setkey(8) utility. Modify setkey(8) and libipsec(3) to be able distinguish the scope of security policies in the `setkey -DP` listing. Add two optional flags: '-t' to list only policies related to virtual *tunneling* interfaces, i.e. policies with IFNET scope, and '-g' to list only policies with GLOBAL scope. By default policies from all scopes are listed. To implement this PF_KEY's sadb_x_policy structure was modified. sadb_x_policy_reserved field is used to pass the policy scope from the kernel to userland. SADB_SPDDUMP message extended to support filtering by scope: sadb_msg_satype field is used to specify bit mask of requested scopes. For IFNET policies the sadb_x_policy_priority field of struct sadb_x_policy is used to pass if_ipsec's interface if_index to the userland. For GLOBAL policies sadb_x_policy_priority is used only to manage order of security policies in the SPDB. For IFNET policies it is not used, so it can be used to keep if_index. After this change the output of `setkey -DP` now looks like: # setkey -DPt 0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any in ipsec esp/tunnel/87.250.242.144-87.250.242.145/unique:145 spid=7 seq=3 pid=58025 scope=ifnet ifname=ipsec0 refcnt=1 # setkey -DPg ::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0 out none spid=5 seq=1 pid=872 scope=global refcnt=1 Obtained from: Yandex LLC Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9805 PR: 212018 Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
437 lines
13 KiB
C
437 lines
13 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* $KAME: ip6_forward.c,v 1.69 2001/05/17 03:48:30 itojun Exp $
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include "opt_inet.h"
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#include "opt_inet6.h"
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#include "opt_ipsec.h"
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#include "opt_ipstealth.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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#include <sys/domain.h>
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#include <sys/protosw.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/errno.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/syslog.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <net/if_var.h>
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#include <net/netisr.h>
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#include <net/route.h>
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#include <net/pfil.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/in_var.h>
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#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
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#include <netinet/ip.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
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#include <netinet6/in6_var.h>
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#include <netinet/ip6.h>
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#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
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#include <netinet6/scope6_var.h>
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#include <netinet/icmp6.h>
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#include <netinet6/nd6.h>
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#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
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/*
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* Forward a packet. If some error occurs return the sender
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* an icmp packet. Note we can't always generate a meaningful
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* icmp message because icmp doesn't have a large enough repertoire
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* of codes and types.
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*
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* If not forwarding, just drop the packet. This could be confusing
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* if ipforwarding was zero but some routing protocol was advancing
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* us as a gateway to somewhere. However, we must let the routing
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* protocol deal with that.
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*
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*/
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void
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ip6_forward(struct mbuf *m, int srcrt)
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{
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struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
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struct sockaddr_in6 *dst = NULL;
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struct rtentry *rt = NULL;
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struct route_in6 rin6;
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int error, type = 0, code = 0;
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struct mbuf *mcopy = NULL;
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struct ifnet *origifp; /* maybe unnecessary */
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u_int32_t inzone, outzone;
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struct in6_addr src_in6, dst_in6, odst;
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#ifdef SCTP
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int sw_csum;
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#endif
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struct m_tag *fwd_tag;
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char ip6bufs[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN], ip6bufd[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
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/*
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* Do not forward packets to multicast destination (should be handled
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* by ip6_mforward().
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* Do not forward packets with unspecified source. It was discussed
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* in July 2000, on the ipngwg mailing list.
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*/
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if ((m->m_flags & (M_BCAST|M_MCAST)) != 0 ||
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IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_dst) ||
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IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_src)) {
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_cantforward);
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/* XXX in6_ifstat_inc(rt->rt_ifp, ifs6_in_discard) */
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if (V_ip6_log_time + V_ip6_log_interval < time_uptime) {
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V_ip6_log_time = time_uptime;
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log(LOG_DEBUG,
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"cannot forward "
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"from %s to %s nxt %d received on %s\n",
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ip6_sprintf(ip6bufs, &ip6->ip6_src),
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ip6_sprintf(ip6bufd, &ip6->ip6_dst),
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ip6->ip6_nxt,
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if_name(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif));
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}
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m_freem(m);
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return;
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}
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if (
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#ifdef IPSTEALTH
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V_ip6stealth == 0 &&
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#endif
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ip6->ip6_hlim <= IPV6_HLIMDEC) {
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/* XXX in6_ifstat_inc(rt->rt_ifp, ifs6_in_discard) */
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icmp6_error(m, ICMP6_TIME_EXCEEDED,
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ICMP6_TIME_EXCEED_TRANSIT, 0);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Save at most ICMPV6_PLD_MAXLEN (= the min IPv6 MTU -
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* size of IPv6 + ICMPv6 headers) bytes of the packet in case
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* we need to generate an ICMP6 message to the src.
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* Thanks to M_EXT, in most cases copy will not occur.
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*
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* It is important to save it before IPsec processing as IPsec
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* processing may modify the mbuf.
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*/
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mcopy = m_copy(m, 0, imin(m->m_pkthdr.len, ICMPV6_PLD_MAXLEN));
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#ifdef IPSTEALTH
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if (V_ip6stealth == 0)
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#endif
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ip6->ip6_hlim -= IPV6_HLIMDEC;
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#if defined(IPSEC) || defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT)
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if (IPSEC_ENABLED(ipv6)) {
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if ((error = IPSEC_FORWARD(ipv6, m)) != 0) {
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/* mbuf consumed by IPsec */
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m_freem(mcopy);
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if (error != EINPROGRESS)
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_cantforward);
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return;
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}
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/* No IPsec processing required */
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}
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#endif
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again:
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bzero(&rin6, sizeof(struct route_in6));
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dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&rin6.ro_dst;
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dst->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
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dst->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
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dst->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst;
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again2:
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rin6.ro_rt = in6_rtalloc1((struct sockaddr *)dst, 0, 0, M_GETFIB(m));
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rt = rin6.ro_rt;
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if (rin6.ro_rt != NULL)
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RT_UNLOCK(rin6.ro_rt);
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else {
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_noroute);
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in6_ifstat_inc(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif, ifs6_in_noroute);
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if (mcopy) {
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icmp6_error(mcopy, ICMP6_DST_UNREACH,
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ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_NOROUTE, 0);
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}
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goto bad;
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}
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/*
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* Source scope check: if a packet can't be delivered to its
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* destination for the reason that the destination is beyond the scope
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* of the source address, discard the packet and return an icmp6
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* destination unreachable error with Code 2 (beyond scope of source
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* address). We use a local copy of ip6_src, since in6_setscope()
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* will possibly modify its first argument.
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* [draft-ietf-ipngwg-icmp-v3-04.txt, Section 3.1]
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*/
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src_in6 = ip6->ip6_src;
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if (in6_setscope(&src_in6, rt->rt_ifp, &outzone)) {
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/* XXX: this should not happen */
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_cantforward);
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_badscope);
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goto bad;
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}
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if (in6_setscope(&src_in6, m->m_pkthdr.rcvif, &inzone)) {
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_cantforward);
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_badscope);
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goto bad;
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}
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if (inzone != outzone) {
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_cantforward);
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_badscope);
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in6_ifstat_inc(rt->rt_ifp, ifs6_in_discard);
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if (V_ip6_log_time + V_ip6_log_interval < time_uptime) {
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V_ip6_log_time = time_uptime;
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log(LOG_DEBUG,
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"cannot forward "
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"src %s, dst %s, nxt %d, rcvif %s, outif %s\n",
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ip6_sprintf(ip6bufs, &ip6->ip6_src),
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ip6_sprintf(ip6bufd, &ip6->ip6_dst),
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ip6->ip6_nxt,
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if_name(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif), if_name(rt->rt_ifp));
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}
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if (mcopy)
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icmp6_error(mcopy, ICMP6_DST_UNREACH,
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ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_BEYONDSCOPE, 0);
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goto bad;
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}
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/*
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* Destination scope check: if a packet is going to break the scope
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* zone of packet's destination address, discard it. This case should
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* usually be prevented by appropriately-configured routing table, but
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* we need an explicit check because we may mistakenly forward the
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* packet to a different zone by (e.g.) a default route.
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*/
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dst_in6 = ip6->ip6_dst;
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if (in6_setscope(&dst_in6, m->m_pkthdr.rcvif, &inzone) != 0 ||
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in6_setscope(&dst_in6, rt->rt_ifp, &outzone) != 0 ||
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inzone != outzone) {
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_cantforward);
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IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_badscope);
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goto bad;
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}
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if (rt->rt_flags & RTF_GATEWAY)
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dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)rt->rt_gateway;
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/*
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* If we are to forward the packet using the same interface
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* as one we got the packet from, perhaps we should send a redirect
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* to sender to shortcut a hop.
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* Only send redirect if source is sending directly to us,
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* and if packet was not source routed (or has any options).
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* Also, don't send redirect if forwarding using a route
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* modified by a redirect.
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*/
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if (V_ip6_sendredirects && rt->rt_ifp == m->m_pkthdr.rcvif && !srcrt &&
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(rt->rt_flags & (RTF_DYNAMIC|RTF_MODIFIED)) == 0) {
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if ((rt->rt_ifp->if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) != 0) {
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/*
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* If the incoming interface is equal to the outgoing
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* one, and the link attached to the interface is
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* point-to-point, then it will be highly probable
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* that a routing loop occurs. Thus, we immediately
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* drop the packet and send an ICMPv6 error message.
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*
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* type/code is based on suggestion by Rich Draves.
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* not sure if it is the best pick.
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*/
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icmp6_error(mcopy, ICMP6_DST_UNREACH,
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ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADDR, 0);
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goto bad;
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}
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type = ND_REDIRECT;
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}
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/*
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* Fake scoped addresses. Note that even link-local source or
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* destinaion can appear, if the originating node just sends the
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* packet to us (without address resolution for the destination).
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* Since both icmp6_error and icmp6_redirect_output fill the embedded
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* link identifiers, we can do this stuff after making a copy for
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* returning an error.
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*/
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if ((rt->rt_ifp->if_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) != 0) {
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/*
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* See corresponding comments in ip6_output.
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* XXX: but is it possible that ip6_forward() sends a packet
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* to a loopback interface? I don't think so, and thus
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* I bark here. ([email protected])
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* XXX: it is common to route invalid packets to loopback.
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* also, the codepath will be visited on use of ::1 in
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* rthdr. (itojun)
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*/
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#if 1
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if (0)
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#else
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if ((rt->rt_flags & (RTF_BLACKHOLE|RTF_REJECT)) == 0)
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#endif
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{
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printf("ip6_forward: outgoing interface is loopback. "
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"src %s, dst %s, nxt %d, rcvif %s, outif %s\n",
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ip6_sprintf(ip6bufs, &ip6->ip6_src),
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ip6_sprintf(ip6bufd, &ip6->ip6_dst),
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ip6->ip6_nxt, if_name(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif),
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if_name(rt->rt_ifp));
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}
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/* we can just use rcvif in forwarding. */
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origifp = m->m_pkthdr.rcvif;
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}
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else
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origifp = rt->rt_ifp;
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/*
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|
* clear embedded scope identifiers if necessary.
|
|
* in6_clearscope will touch the addresses only when necessary.
|
|
*/
|
|
in6_clearscope(&ip6->ip6_src);
|
|
in6_clearscope(&ip6->ip6_dst);
|
|
|
|
/* Jump over all PFIL processing if hooks are not active. */
|
|
if (!PFIL_HOOKED(&V_inet6_pfil_hook))
|
|
goto pass;
|
|
|
|
odst = ip6->ip6_dst;
|
|
/* Run through list of hooks for output packets. */
|
|
error = pfil_run_hooks(&V_inet6_pfil_hook, &m, rt->rt_ifp, PFIL_OUT, NULL);
|
|
if (error != 0 || m == NULL)
|
|
goto freecopy; /* consumed by filter */
|
|
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
|
|
|
|
/* See if destination IP address was changed by packet filter. */
|
|
if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&odst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) {
|
|
m->m_flags |= M_SKIP_FIREWALL;
|
|
/* If destination is now ourself drop to ip6_input(). */
|
|
if (in6_localip(&ip6->ip6_dst))
|
|
m->m_flags |= M_FASTFWD_OURS;
|
|
else {
|
|
RTFREE(rt);
|
|
goto again; /* Redo the routing table lookup. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* See if local, if yes, send it to netisr. */
|
|
if (m->m_flags & M_FASTFWD_OURS) {
|
|
if (m->m_pkthdr.rcvif == NULL)
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = V_loif;
|
|
if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6) {
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |=
|
|
CSUM_DATA_VALID_IPV6 | CSUM_PSEUDO_HDR;
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = 0xffff;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SCTP
|
|
if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP_IPV6)
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |= CSUM_SCTP_VALID;
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = netisr_queue(NETISR_IPV6, m);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Or forward to some other address? */
|
|
if ((m->m_flags & M_IP6_NEXTHOP) &&
|
|
(fwd_tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPFORWARD, NULL)) != NULL) {
|
|
dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&rin6.ro_dst;
|
|
bcopy((fwd_tag+1), dst, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
|
|
m->m_flags |= M_SKIP_FIREWALL;
|
|
m->m_flags &= ~M_IP6_NEXTHOP;
|
|
m_tag_delete(m, fwd_tag);
|
|
RTFREE(rt);
|
|
goto again2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pass:
|
|
/* See if the size was changed by the packet filter. */
|
|
if (m->m_pkthdr.len > IN6_LINKMTU(rt->rt_ifp)) {
|
|
in6_ifstat_inc(rt->rt_ifp, ifs6_in_toobig);
|
|
if (mcopy)
|
|
icmp6_error(mcopy, ICMP6_PACKET_TOO_BIG, 0,
|
|
IN6_LINKMTU(rt->rt_ifp));
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = nd6_output_ifp(rt->rt_ifp, origifp, m, dst, NULL);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
in6_ifstat_inc(rt->rt_ifp, ifs6_out_discard);
|
|
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_cantforward);
|
|
} else {
|
|
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_forward);
|
|
in6_ifstat_inc(rt->rt_ifp, ifs6_out_forward);
|
|
if (type)
|
|
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_redirectsent);
|
|
else {
|
|
if (mcopy)
|
|
goto freecopy;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mcopy == NULL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
switch (error) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
if (type == ND_REDIRECT) {
|
|
icmp6_redirect_output(mcopy, rt);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
goto freecopy;
|
|
|
|
case EMSGSIZE:
|
|
/* xxx MTU is constant in PPP? */
|
|
goto freecopy;
|
|
|
|
case ENOBUFS:
|
|
/* Tell source to slow down like source quench in IP? */
|
|
goto freecopy;
|
|
|
|
case ENETUNREACH: /* shouldn't happen, checked above */
|
|
case EHOSTUNREACH:
|
|
case ENETDOWN:
|
|
case EHOSTDOWN:
|
|
default:
|
|
type = ICMP6_DST_UNREACH;
|
|
code = ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_ADDR;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
icmp6_error(mcopy, type, code, 0);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
freecopy:
|
|
m_freem(mcopy);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
bad:
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
out:
|
|
if (rt != NULL)
|
|
RTFREE(rt);
|
|
}
|