Files
Ed Maste 3d9fd9fcb4 openssh: Update to 9.9p1
Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below.  Bug fixes and
improvements that were previously merged into FreeBSD have been elided.

See the upstream release notes for full details of the 9.9p1 release
(https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html).

---

Future deprecation notice
=========================

OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in
early 2025.

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

 * ssh(1): remove support for pre-authentication compression.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): processing of the arguments to the "Match"
   configuration directive now follows more shell-like rules for
   quoted strings, including allowing nested quotes and \-escaped
   characters.

New features
------------

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): add support for a new hybrid post-quantum key
   exchange based on the FIPS 203 Module-Lattice Key Enapsulation
   mechanism (ML-KEM) combined with X25519 ECDH as described by
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-03
   This algorithm "mlkem768x25519-sha256" is available by default.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): prevent private keys from being
   included in core dump files for most of their lifespans. This is
   in addition to pre-existing controls in ssh-agent(1) and sshd(8)
   that prevented coredumps. This feature is supported on OpenBSD,
   Linux and FreeBSD.

 * All: convert key handling to use the libcrypto EVP_PKEY API, with
   the exception of DSA.

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): do not apply authorized_keys options when signature
   verification fails. Prevents more restrictive key options being
   incorrectly applied to subsequent keys in authorized_keys. bz3733

 * ssh-keygen(1): include pathname in some of ssh-keygen's passphrase
   prompts. Helps the user know what's going on when ssh-keygen is
   invoked via other tools. Requested in GHPR503

 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): make parsing user@host consistently look for
   the last '@' in the string rather than the first. This makes it
   possible to more consistently use usernames that contain '@'
   characters.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): be more strict in parsing key type names. Only
   allow short names (e.g "rsa") in user-interface code and require
   full SSH protocol names (e.g. "ssh-rsa") everywhere else. bz3725

 * ssh-keygen(1): clarify that ed25519 is the default key type
   generated and clarify that rsa-sha2-512 is the default signature
   scheme when RSA is in use. GHPR505

---

Reviewed by:	jlduran (build infrastructure)
Reviewed by:	cy (build infrastructure)
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48947
2025-02-19 19:08:59 +00:00

200 lines
5.8 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.18 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE],
const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE])
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
void
kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
{
static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9};
arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint);
}
int
kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int raw)
{
u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
u_char zero[CURVE25519_SIZE];
int r;
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
/* Check for all-zero shared secret */
explicit_bzero(zero, CURVE25519_SIZE);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(zero, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("shared secret 25519", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
#endif
if (raw)
r = sshbuf_put(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
else
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
return r;
}
int
kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
{
return kexc25519_shared_key_ext(key, pub, out, 0);
}
int
kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
u_char *cp = NULL;
int r;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, CURVE25519_SIZE, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
#endif
kex->client_pub = buf;
buf = NULL;
out:
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}
int
kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
{
struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
const u_char *client_pub;
u_char *server_pub;
u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
int r;
*server_blobp = NULL;
*shared_secretp = NULL;
if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
}
client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("client public key 25519:", client_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
#endif
/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(server_blob, CURVE25519_SIZE, &server_pub)) != 0)
goto out;
kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
/* allocate shared secret */
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 0)) < 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
#endif
*server_blobp = server_blob;
*shared_secretp = buf;
server_blob = NULL;
buf = NULL;
out:
explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
sshbuf_free(server_blob);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}
int
kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
const u_char *server_pub;
int r;
*shared_secretp = NULL;
if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
}
server_pub = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
#endif
/* shared secret */
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
buf, 0)) < 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
#endif
*shared_secretp = buf;
buf = NULL;
out:
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}