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Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below. Bug fixes and improvements that were previously merged into FreeBSD have been elided. See the upstream release notes for full details of the 9.9p1 release (https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html). --- Future deprecation notice ========================= OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1): remove support for pre-authentication compression. * ssh(1), sshd(8): processing of the arguments to the "Match" configuration directive now follows more shell-like rules for quoted strings, including allowing nested quotes and \-escaped characters. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): add support for a new hybrid post-quantum key exchange based on the FIPS 203 Module-Lattice Key Enapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM) combined with X25519 ECDH as described by https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-03 This algorithm "mlkem768x25519-sha256" is available by default. * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): prevent private keys from being included in core dump files for most of their lifespans. This is in addition to pre-existing controls in ssh-agent(1) and sshd(8) that prevented coredumps. This feature is supported on OpenBSD, Linux and FreeBSD. * All: convert key handling to use the libcrypto EVP_PKEY API, with the exception of DSA. Bugfixes -------- * sshd(8): do not apply authorized_keys options when signature verification fails. Prevents more restrictive key options being incorrectly applied to subsequent keys in authorized_keys. bz3733 * ssh-keygen(1): include pathname in some of ssh-keygen's passphrase prompts. Helps the user know what's going on when ssh-keygen is invoked via other tools. Requested in GHPR503 * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): make parsing user@host consistently look for the last '@' in the string rather than the first. This makes it possible to more consistently use usernames that contain '@' characters. * ssh(1), sshd(8): be more strict in parsing key type names. Only allow short names (e.g "rsa") in user-interface code and require full SSH protocol names (e.g. "ssh-rsa") everywhere else. bz3725 * ssh-keygen(1): clarify that ed25519 is the default key type generated and clarify that rsa-sha2-512 is the default signature scheme when RSA is in use. GHPR505 --- Reviewed by: jlduran (build infrastructure) Reviewed by: cy (build infrastructure) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48947
200 lines
5.8 KiB
C
200 lines
5.8 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.18 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include "sshkey.h"
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#include "kex.h"
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#include "sshbuf.h"
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#include "digest.h"
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#include "ssherr.h"
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#include "ssh2.h"
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extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE],
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const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE])
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__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
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__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
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__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
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void
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kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
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{
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static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9};
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arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint);
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}
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int
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kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
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const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int raw)
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{
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u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
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u_char zero[CURVE25519_SIZE];
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int r;
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crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
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/* Check for all-zero shared secret */
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explicit_bzero(zero, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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if (timingsafe_bcmp(zero, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0)
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return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
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#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
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dump_digest("shared secret 25519", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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#endif
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if (raw)
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r = sshbuf_put(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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else
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r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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return r;
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}
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int
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kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
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const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
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{
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return kexc25519_shared_key_ext(key, pub, out, 0);
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}
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int
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kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
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{
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struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
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u_char *cp = NULL;
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int r;
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if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
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return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, CURVE25519_SIZE, &cp)) != 0)
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goto out;
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kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
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#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
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dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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#endif
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kex->client_pub = buf;
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buf = NULL;
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out:
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sshbuf_free(buf);
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return r;
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}
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int
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kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
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struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
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{
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struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
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struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
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const u_char *client_pub;
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u_char *server_pub;
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u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
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int r;
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*server_blobp = NULL;
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*shared_secretp = NULL;
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if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
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r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
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goto out;
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}
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client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
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#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
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dump_digest("client public key 25519:", client_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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#endif
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/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
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if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
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r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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goto out;
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}
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if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(server_blob, CURVE25519_SIZE, &server_pub)) != 0)
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goto out;
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kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
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/* allocate shared secret */
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if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
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r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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goto out;
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}
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if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 0)) < 0)
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goto out;
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#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
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dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
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#endif
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*server_blobp = server_blob;
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*shared_secretp = buf;
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server_blob = NULL;
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buf = NULL;
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out:
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explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
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sshbuf_free(server_blob);
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sshbuf_free(buf);
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return r;
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}
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int
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kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
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struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
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{
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struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
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const u_char *server_pub;
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int r;
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*shared_secretp = NULL;
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if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
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r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
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goto out;
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}
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server_pub = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
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#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
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dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
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#endif
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/* shared secret */
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if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
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r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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goto out;
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}
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if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
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buf, 0)) < 0)
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goto out;
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#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
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dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
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#endif
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*shared_secretp = buf;
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buf = NULL;
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out:
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sshbuf_free(buf);
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return r;
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}
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