Files
Ed Maste bb5c77e9d2 OpenSSH: Update to 10.4p1
Full release notes are available at
https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-10.4

Selected highlights from the release notes:

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

 * sshd(8): configuration dump mode ("sshd -G") now writes directives
   in mixed case (e.g. "PubkeyAuthentication") whereas previously it
   emitted only lower-case names.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): make the transport protocol stricter by
   disconnecting if the peer sends non-KEX messages during a post-
   authentication key re-exchange. Previously a malicious peer could
   continue sending non-key exchange messages without penalty. These
   would be buffered, causing memory to be wasted up until the
   connection terminated or the server/client hit a memory limit.
   Implementations that do not restrict messages sent during key
   exchange as per RFC4253 section 7.1 may be disconnected.
   Reported by Marko Jevtic.

Changes since OpenSSH 10.3
==========================

This release contains a number of security fixes as well as general
bugfixes and a couple of new features.

Security
========

 * sftp(1): when downloading files on the command-line using
   "sftp host:/path .", a malicious server could cause the file to
   be downloaded to an unexpected location. This issue was identified
   by the Swival Security Scanner.

 * scp(1): when copying files between two remote destinations, do
   not allow a malicious server to write files to the parent
   directory of the intended target directory.  This issue was
   identified by the Swival Security Scanner.

 * sshd(8): DisableForwarding=yes didn't override PermitTunnel=yes
   as it was documented to do. Note that PermitTunnel is not enabled
   by default. Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of
   Redhat and Marko Jevtic.

 * sshd(8): avoid a potential pre-authentication denial of service
   when GSSAPIAuthentication was enabled (this feature is off by
   default). This was not mitigated by MaxAuthTries, but would be
   penalised by PerSourcePenalties. This was reported by Manfred
   Kaiser of the milCERT AT (Austrian Ministry of Defence).

 * sshd(8): fix a number of cases where the minimum authentication
   delay was not being enforced. Reported by the Orange Cyberdefense
   Vulnerability Team.

 * ssh(1): fix a possible client-side use-after-free if the server
   changes its host key during a key reexchange. This was reported by
   Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin of Depthfirst.

New features
------------

 * All: add experimental support for a composite post-quantum
   signature scheme that combines ML-DSA 44 and Ed25519 as specified
   in draft-miller-sshm-mldsa44-ed25519-composite-sigs.

   This scheme is not enabled by default. To use it, you'll need
   to add it to HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc.
   Keys may be generated using "ssh-keygen -t mldsa44-ed25519".

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): avoid sending observably different messages for valid vs
   invalid users in GSSAPIAuthentication (disabled by default).

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix several bugs that incorrectly
   classified bulk traffic as interactive. bz3972, bz3958

 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): skip unsupported key types when
   downloading resident keys from a FIDO token. Previously, downloads
   would abort when one was encountered. GHPR657

Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D58083
2026-07-09 17:17:11 +00:00

474 lines
12 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.129 2026/06/19 05:26:04 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <[email protected]>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cipher.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
#endif
struct sshcipher_ctx {
int plaintext;
int encrypt;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp;
struct chachapoly_ctx *cp_ctx;
struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
};
struct sshcipher {
char *name;
u_int block_size;
u_int key_len;
u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
u_int auth_len;
u_int flags;
#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
#else
void *ignored;
#endif
};
static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
{ "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
#endif
{ "aes128-cbc", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
{ "aes192-cbc", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
{ "aes256-cbc", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
{ "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
{ "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
{ "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
{ "[email protected]",
16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
{ "[email protected]",
16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
#else
{ "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
#endif
{ "[email protected]",
8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL },
{ "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL },
{ NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
};
/*--*/
/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
char *
cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
{
char *ret = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *c;
char sep_str[2] = {sep, '\0'};
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0)
continue;
if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
continue;
xextendf(&ret, sep_str, "%s", c->name);
}
return ret;
}
const char *
compression_alg_list(int compression)
{
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
return compression ? "[email protected],none" :
"none,[email protected]";
#else
return "none";
#endif
}
u_int
cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->block_size);
}
u_int
cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->key_len);
}
u_int
cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0)
return 14;
return cipher_keylen(c);
}
u_int
cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->auth_len);
}
u_int
cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
/*
* Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that
* needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default?
*/
return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ?
c->iv_len : c->block_size;
}
u_int
cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0;
}
u_int
cipher_is_internal(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0;
}
u_int
cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
return cc->plaintext;
}
const struct sshcipher *
cipher_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct sshcipher *c;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
return c;
return NULL;
}
#define CIPHER_SEP ","
int
ciphers_valid(const char *names)
{
const struct sshcipher *c;
char *cipher_list, *cp;
char *p;
int found = 0;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
c = cipher_by_name(p);
if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) {
free(cipher_list);
return 0;
} else
found = 1;
}
free(cipher_list);
return found;
}
const char *
cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
return NULL;
/* XXX repurpose for CBC warning */
return NULL;
}
int
cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
int do_encrypt)
{
struct sshcipher_ctx *cc = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const EVP_CIPHER *type;
int klen;
#endif
*ccp = NULL;
if ((cc = calloc(1, sizeof(*cc))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0;
cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
if (keylen < cipher->key_len ||
(iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
cc->cipher = cipher;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
cc->cp_ctx = chachapoly_new(key, keylen);
ret = cc->cp_ctx != NULL ? 0 : SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen);
aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
type = (*cipher->evptype)();
if ((cc->evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
(do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_authlen(cipher) &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
-1, (u_char *)iv) <= 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(cc->evp);
if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(cc->evp, keylen) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
out:
if (ret == 0) {
/* success */
*ccp = cc;
} else {
if (cc != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
}
}
return ret;
}
/*
* cipher_crypt() operates as following:
* Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'.
* These bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
* authenticated encryption modes.
* En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'.
* Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag.
* This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
* Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
*/
int
cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
{
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
return chachapoly_crypt(cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src,
len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len);
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
if (aadlen)
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen,
dest + aadlen, len);
return 0;
}
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#else
if (authlen) {
u_char lastiv[1];
if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* increment IV */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
1, lastiv) <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
/* set tag on decryption */
if (!cc->encrypt &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len) <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
if (aadlen) {
if (authlen &&
EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
}
if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
len) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (authlen) {
/* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
return cc->encrypt ?
SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
if (cc->encrypt &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
authlen, dest + aadlen + len) <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
return 0;
#endif
}
/* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */
int
cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
const u_char *cp, u_int len)
{
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return chachapoly_get_length(cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
cp, len);
if (len < 4)
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
*plenp = PEEK_U32(cp);
return 0;
}
void
cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
if (cc == NULL)
return;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
cc->cp_ctx = NULL;
} else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
cc->evp = NULL;
#endif
freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
}
int
cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, size_t len)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
if (len != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len);
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
if (evplen == 0)
return 0;
else if (evplen < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if ((size_t)evplen != len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, len,
iv) <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(cc->evp, iv, len) <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
#endif
return 0;
}