Files
Ed Maste bb5c77e9d2 OpenSSH: Update to 10.4p1
Full release notes are available at
https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-10.4

Selected highlights from the release notes:

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

 * sshd(8): configuration dump mode ("sshd -G") now writes directives
   in mixed case (e.g. "PubkeyAuthentication") whereas previously it
   emitted only lower-case names.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): make the transport protocol stricter by
   disconnecting if the peer sends non-KEX messages during a post-
   authentication key re-exchange. Previously a malicious peer could
   continue sending non-key exchange messages without penalty. These
   would be buffered, causing memory to be wasted up until the
   connection terminated or the server/client hit a memory limit.
   Implementations that do not restrict messages sent during key
   exchange as per RFC4253 section 7.1 may be disconnected.
   Reported by Marko Jevtic.

Changes since OpenSSH 10.3
==========================

This release contains a number of security fixes as well as general
bugfixes and a couple of new features.

Security
========

 * sftp(1): when downloading files on the command-line using
   "sftp host:/path .", a malicious server could cause the file to
   be downloaded to an unexpected location. This issue was identified
   by the Swival Security Scanner.

 * scp(1): when copying files between two remote destinations, do
   not allow a malicious server to write files to the parent
   directory of the intended target directory.  This issue was
   identified by the Swival Security Scanner.

 * sshd(8): DisableForwarding=yes didn't override PermitTunnel=yes
   as it was documented to do. Note that PermitTunnel is not enabled
   by default. Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of
   Redhat and Marko Jevtic.

 * sshd(8): avoid a potential pre-authentication denial of service
   when GSSAPIAuthentication was enabled (this feature is off by
   default). This was not mitigated by MaxAuthTries, but would be
   penalised by PerSourcePenalties. This was reported by Manfred
   Kaiser of the milCERT AT (Austrian Ministry of Defence).

 * sshd(8): fix a number of cases where the minimum authentication
   delay was not being enforced. Reported by the Orange Cyberdefense
   Vulnerability Team.

 * ssh(1): fix a possible client-side use-after-free if the server
   changes its host key during a key reexchange. This was reported by
   Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin of Depthfirst.

New features
------------

 * All: add experimental support for a composite post-quantum
   signature scheme that combines ML-DSA 44 and Ed25519 as specified
   in draft-miller-sshm-mldsa44-ed25519-composite-sigs.

   This scheme is not enabled by default. To use it, you'll need
   to add it to HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc.
   Keys may be generated using "ssh-keygen -t mldsa44-ed25519".

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): avoid sending observably different messages for valid vs
   invalid users in GSSAPIAuthentication (disabled by default).

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix several bugs that incorrectly
   classified bulk traffic as interactive. bz3972, bz3958

 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): skip unsupported key types when
   downloading resident keys from a FIDO token. Previously, downloads
   would abort when one was encountered. GHPR657

Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D58083
2026-07-09 17:17:11 +00:00

522 lines
12 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.151 2026/06/29 09:14:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "krl.h"
/* Save a key blob to a file */
static int
sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
{
int r;
mode_t omask;
omask = umask(077);
r = sshbuf_write_file(filename, keybuf);
umask(omask);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
int r;
if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return r;
}
/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */
int
sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
{
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/*
* if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
* permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
* then we don't care.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(filename))
#endif
if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
(u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
error("This private key will be ignored.");
return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int fd, r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
r = sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename);
if (r != 0)
goto out;
r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
out:
close(fd);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
return sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, passphrase,
keyp, commentp);
}
int
sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type,
passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return r;
}
/* Load a pubkey from the unencrypted envelope of a new-format private key */
static int
sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(const char *filename, struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
int r, fd;
if (pubkeyp != NULL)
*pubkeyp = NULL;
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(buffer,
KEY_UNSPEC, &pubkey)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (pubkeyp != NULL) {
*pubkeyp = pubkey;
pubkey = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
close(fd);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
return r;
}
static int
sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey **kp, const char *filename,
char **commentp)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
int r;
struct stat st;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
if (kp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*kp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if (stat(filename, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) &&
st.st_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) {
fclose(f);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
fclose(f);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
cp = line;
switch (*cp) {
case '#':
case '\n':
case '\0':
continue;
}
/* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */
if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 ||
strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0)
break;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
;
if (*cp) {
if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) {
cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
if (commentp) {
*commentp = strdup(*cp ?
cp : filename);
if (*commentp == NULL)
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
/* success */
*kp = k;
free(line);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
}
}
free(k);
free(line);
fclose(f);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
/* load public key from any pubkey file */
int
sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
char *pubfile = NULL;
int r, oerrno;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, filename, commentp)) == 0)
goto out;
/* try .pub suffix */
if (asprintf(&pubfile, "%s.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, pubfile, commentp)) == 0)
goto out;
/* finally, try to extract public key from private key file */
if ((r = sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(filename, keyp)) == 0)
goto out;
/* Pretend we couldn't find the key */
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
errno = ENOENT;
out:
oerrno = errno;
free(pubfile);
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
int
sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
char *file = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, file, NULL);
free(file);
sshkey_free(pub);
return r;
}
/* Load private key and certificate */
int
sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_MLDSA44_ED25519:
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename,
passphrase, &key, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = key;
key = NULL;
}
out:
sshkey_free(key);
sshkey_free(cert);
return r;
}
/*
* Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
* SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error.
* If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly,
* otherwise a comparison that ignores certificate data is performed.
* If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is
* also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found.
*/
int
sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
int check_ca)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
int r = 0;
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) =
strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
sshkey_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
cp = line;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
;
/* Skip comments and empty lines */
switch (*cp) {
case '#':
case '\n':
case '\0':
continue;
}
if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
continue;
default:
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
(check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
}
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
out:
free(line);
sshkey_free(pub);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
/*
* Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not,
* SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something
* unexpected happened.
* This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too.
* "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
*/
int
sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
{
int r;
r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
/* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
return r;
/*
* If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
* parse the file as a flat list of keys.
*/
switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
case 0:
/* Key found => revoked */
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
/* Key not found => not revoked */
return 0;
default:
/* Some other error occurred */
return r;
}
}
/*
* Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted
* whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g.
* unterminated quotes).
*/
int
sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp)
{
char *cp = *cpp;
int quoted = 0;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
else if (*cp == '"')
quoted = !quoted;
}
*cpp = cp;
/* return failure for unterminated quotes */
return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
}
/* Save a public key */
int
sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path,
const char *comment)
{
int fd, oerrno;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
close(fd);
goto fail;
}
if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) != 0)
goto fail;
fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
if (ferror(f)) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (fclose(f) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
f = NULL;
fail:
if (f != NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
fclose(f);
errno = oerrno;
}
return r;
}
return 0;
}