Stephen Smalley bbaca6c2e7 [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes ...

Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve).  So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below.  Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00

..

keys

[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h

2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00

selinux

[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes

2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00

capability.c

…

commoncap.c

…

dummy.c

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inode.c

[PATCH] mark struct file_operations const 9

2007-02-12 09:48:46 -08:00

Kconfig

…

Makefile

…

root_plug.c

…

security.c

[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h

2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00