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Liu Chao
9062d50e75
generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of
ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:
u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */
...
con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */
struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as
a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44
bytes past the end of the array on the heap.
A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR
request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds
access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.
Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions.
Fixes: c47d7b0989 ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>