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Tianchu Chen
e6c5ed7a98
When a key is removed (data == NULL), rsi_hal_load_key() runs:
memset(&set_key[FRAME_DESC_SZ], 0, frame_len - FRAME_DESC_SZ);
set_key is a struct rsi_set_key *, so the subscript is scaled by
sizeof(struct rsi_set_key) (160 bytes): &set_key[FRAME_DESC_SZ] is
skb->data + 2560, and the memset writes 144 zero bytes starting
2.4KB past the end of the 160-byte skb data buffer, corrupting
unrelated heap objects. The intended byte offset would have been
(u8 *)set_key + FRAME_DESC_SZ.
The write fires on every DISABLE_KEY callback, so plain disconnects,
roams and interface teardowns trigger it on real networks.
The memset is redundant: the whole buffer is zeroed right after
allocation, so the frame sent to the device is byte-identical
without it. Drop the else branch; normal operation is unaffected.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
Fixes: dad0d04fa7 ("rsi: Add RS9113 wireless driver")
Cc: [email protected]
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>