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940
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Florent Revest (Anthropic)
|
17637e1a58 |
bpf: Skip detached progs in trampoline images that are still in use
bpf_tramp_image_put() makes sure a trampoline image is not freed while
a task may still be running in it, but nothing similar is done for the
progs called by that image. Detach drops the last prog reference right
away and the prog is freed after grace periods, on the basis that a
task still in the traced function skips the fexit progs once the nop at
ip_after_call is patched to a jump.
That leaves out a task sleeping in a sleepable prog that runs before
the detached one, which no grace period waits for:
CPU 0 CPU 1
in image I, sleeping in prog S
detach P from I's trampoline
-> new image, bpf_tramp_image_put(I)
bpf_prog_put(P), last ref
grace periods, P freed
back from S
__bpf_prog_enter(P)
call P->bpf_func
If S and P are fexit progs the task is already past the patched jump,
and fentry only images don't have one. On x86 this is an int3 in
poisoned bpf_prog_pack memory:
Oops: int3: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 18 UID: 0 PID: 94573 Comm: x169 Not tainted 6.18.44 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc0601d8d
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? bpf_trampoline_6442515411+0x1a4/0x21b
bpf_lsm_bprm_committed_creds+0x5/0x10
security_bprm_committed_creds+0x5f/0x70
begin_new_exec+0x2d6/0x410
...
We hit this in production when progs attached through trampolines got
detached while their hooks were busy, and it was independently found
with a fuzzer and KASAN.
Have the JITs emit a patchable nop in front of each prog call sequence
and record it in the image. When a prog is detached, patch its nop to a
jump over the call sequence. Progs that stay attached keep running for
the tasks that are in the image, and ip_after_call isn't needed anymore.
The task can be in any image that isn't freed yet, not only in the
current one. It sleeps in image I1 that calls S, P and Q, then P is
detached and the trampoline moves to image I2, then Q is detached and
its call is still in I1. So the trampoline keeps a list of its images
until they are freed, and detaching a prog patches its nop in all of
them. Images hold a reference on the trampoline for that long.
On riscv and loongarch a jump of any range takes several instructions,
and a task preempted in the middle of them could resume into half of the
new sequence. The nop is a single instruction there, patched to a near
branch through arch_bpf_trampoline_skip().
With the extra nops, BPF_MAX_TRAMP_LINKS progs no longer fit in a page
on x86 and arm64 (and already didn't on powerpc), so lower the limit
there like s390 does.
Fixes:
|
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|
Florent Revest (Anthropic)
|
0fb5751a6e |
bpf: Wait for an RCU tasks grace period before freeing trampoline progs
When a prog is detached from a trampoline, it is freed after an RCU
grace period, or an RCU tasks trace one if it is sleepable. This covers
the tasks that are running the prog, since the prog's enter helper takes
the matching read lock before the prog is called. On a preemptible
kernel, it doesn't cover a task that was preempted in the trampoline
just before the enter helper. That task holds no lock yet, and it calls
the prog after it was freed:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __bpf_prog_enter_recur+0x3a5/0x3f0
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000055040 by task candidate/110
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 110 Comm: candidate Not tainted 7.3.0-rc2-00014-g15071f2a1263-dirty #2 PREEMPT(full)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__bpf_prog_enter_recur+0x3a5/0x3f0
bpf_trampoline_6442509193+0x37/0xf1
__x64_sys_futex+0x9/0x410
do_syscall_64+0xb0/0x530
...
Wait for an RCU tasks grace period before the existing one when freeing
a prog that was linked to a trampoline. An RCU tasks grace period only
ends once the tasks that were preempted have run again, and
bpf_tramp_image_put() already relies on it to free the image. It doesn't
wait for tasks that sleep in the trampoline, the next commit takes care
of those.
Only progs that were linked to a trampoline can be called this way, so
bpf_trampoline_add_prog() marks them and other progs are still freed as
before.
Fixes:
|
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|
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
|
40c2096961 |
bpf: Verify global subprogs in each sleepability context
Global subprograms are verified independently with a fresh verifier root. do_check_common() currently seeds that root's in_sleepable state from the program, even though a global subprogram can also run from callbacks whose execution context differs from the program's main entry point. In particular, workqueue and task-work callbacks are sleepable even when the containing program is not. A global subprogram of that program is therefore verified as non-sleepable, making in_rcu_cs() true and allowing loads of RCU-protected kptrs to produce trusted MEM_RCU pointers. The same subprogram can then be called from a sleepable callback without a classic RCU reader. It can retain such a pointer while the object is freed and use it after free. The verifier's execution-context predicates are complementary. A state is sleepable only when in_sleepable is set and no RCU, preemption, IRQ, or lock region is active. Each condition which prevents sleeping also provides RCU protection, while in_rcu_cs() treats a non-sleepable state as implicitly protected. Use this relationship to represent a global subprogram caller with only the result of in_sleepable_context(). A protected sleepable caller is normalized to in_sleepable=false at the independent verification root. This both prevents sleepable operations and makes in_rcu_cs() true without copying caller-owned lock state. Track only the contexts in which each global subprogram is actually reached. Verify it once if all reachable calls use the same context, and twice only if both sleepable and non-sleepable calls reach it. Calls found while verifying globals or asynchronous callbacks mark further contexts for checking. Repeat the existing subprogram walk until all called contexts have been verified; unreachable global calls remain unchecked. Accumulate instruction counts over those verification passes. Preserve the total recorded before each pass, since path accounting has already added this pass's synchronous instructions and its root total must also include asynchronous subprograms. This makes an unprotected callback verify the global subprogram as sleepable, turning its RCU-protected kptr load into an untrusted pointer. Protected callers and global subprograms which do not depend on implicit RCU protection remain valid. Fixes: |
||
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Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
|
c3fd8e5fd1 |
bpf: Reject non-scalar bpf_loop iteration counts
bpf_loop() declares its nr_loops argument as ARG_ANYTHING. Privileged programs may pass pointer values to such arguments, so check_func_arg() lets a pointer-valued R1 reach the helper-specific checks. Since commit |
||
|
Hui Su
|
ed54bf564a |
bpf: Fix BPF_F_CPU validation for sparse CPU IDs
BPF_F_CPU stores the target CPU ID in the upper 32 bits of the map
operation flags. bpf_map_check_op_flags() currently compares that ID
with num_possible_cpus(), which is the number of possible CPUs rather
than a bound on CPU IDs.
On an arm64 QEMU guest with a CPU device-tree hole, the possible CPU
mask was 0,2-3. A userspace program using raw bpf() syscalls creates
a BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY and performs update and lookup operations
for each CPU by setting BPF_F_CPU and the CPU ID in the flags.
With the old check, CPU 1 is incorrectly accepted while valid CPU 3 is
rejected with -ERANGE. The CPU 1 update then reaches the per-CPU map
access path and triggers:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ...
pc : __pi_memcpy_generic+0x5c/0x22c
lr : bpf_percpu_array_update+0x2dc/0x2e8
Call trace:
__pi_memcpy_generic
bpf_map_update_value
map_update_elem
__sys_bpf
Check the CPU ID against nr_cpu_ids and cpu_possible() instead. This
rejects CPU IDs outside the valid range and CPUs absent from the
possible mask, while allowing valid sparse CPU IDs.
Fixes:
|
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Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
|
b9c5d822f6 |
bpf: Add source and instruction diagnostic context
Teach verifier diagnostics to annotate an instruction with BTF source line information and nearby BPF instructions. The renderer keeps source text in a fixed-width lane and prints instructions in a stable right-hand gutter. Wrap annotation text under the source line so long error labels remain readable while the source and instruction lanes keep their fixed layout. Keeping source and instruction context in one commit preserves the visual layout contract that later diagnostic reports rely on. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> |
||
|
Song Liu
|
f5b57e9e9c |
bpf: Populate mmap-able array map memory lazily
An mmap-able BPF array map (BPF_F_MMAPABLE) has its backing memory
vmalloc'ed up front at map creation time. array_map_mmap() then wired up
the whole mapping eagerly via remap_vmalloc_range(), which calls
vm_insert_page() for every page of the map. For large maps this makes
every mmap() O(number of pages): an 8MiB map inserts 2048 PTEs per
mmap() and tears them all down again on munmap(), even when user space
only touches a few pages (or none at all).
Populate the mapping lazily instead, the same way the arena map already
does. array_map_mmap() now only performs the bounds check and returns,
leaving the PTEs unpopulated; pages are inserted on demand by a new
array_map_mmap_fault() handler. Because the memory is already resident,
the fault handler simply resolves the vmalloc page and hands it to the
fault path. This makes mmap() O(1), and munmap() proportional to the
number of pages that were actually faulted in rather than to the size of
the map.
The handler is reached through a new optional ->map_mmap_fault callback.
Maps that provide it get a vm_operations_struct with a .fault handler;
maps that populate their mapping eagerly keep the one they had. Both
share the same open/close callbacks, so the existing VMA accounting
(VM_MAYWRITE write-active tracking, freeze handling) stays centralized
rather than each map installing its own vm_operations_struct.
Callers that want the pages populated up front can still request that
explicitly with MAP_POPULATE. Kernel-side access to the map (via the
vmalloc address) is unaffected.
Time for one mmap()+munmap() of an 8MiB mmap-able array map:
before after
no MAP_POPULATE, no access 226us 1.1us
no MAP_POPULATE, access all pages 236us 1341us
MAP_POPULATE, no access 312us 493us
MAP_POPULATE, access all pages 318us 519us
Mapping without touching the data, which is what this change targets,
gets ~160x cheaper. Faulting in the whole mapping one page at a time is
more expensive than the eager remap_vmalloc_range() loop, so users that
do touch every page should ask for MAP_POPULATE. Note that MAP_POPULATE
is not free before this change either: it adds ~85us (226us => 312us)
for no benefit, as the mapping is already fully populated.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
|
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Hui Zhu
|
7c6beeb8c8 |
bpf: Make bpf_trampoline_multi_detach return void
bpf_trampoline_multi_detach() always returns 0 and the sole caller ignores the return value. Change it to return void and drop the WARN_ON_ONCE at the call site. Signed-off-by: Hui Zhu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Leon Hwang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/12beba657f5c9e86a016a097750209287a2f262a.1786412280.git.zhuhui@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> |
||
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Tejun Heo
|
f6c33c4479 |
bpf: Support __arena and __arena__nullable on struct_ops arguments
A struct_ops callback cannot receive an arena pointer directly, so passing one takes two steps. The pointer arrives as a bare u64 that the callback casts, and because the two sides address the arena through different bases it also has to be rebased by hand on the way in. Add the __arena and __arena__nullable stub argument suffixes to make this convenient. The callback declares the parameter as an arena pointer, receives it as a PTR_TO_ARENA register, and dereferences it directly, while the kernel caller just passes the natural kernel arena address (kaddr). The trampoline converts the value while saving the arguments into the BPF ctx, ctx[slot] = (u32)(kaddr - kern_vm_start), so the program never sees a kernel address and nothing rewrites the ctx after the fact. The converted value keeps the upper 32 bits clear as the JITs require of arena pointer registers and behaves like any cast_kern'ed arena pointer, so cast_user recovers the full user-visible address. __arena converts unconditionally and the kernel caller must not pass NULL. __arena__nullable preserves NULL, tested on the full 64-bit kernel pointer, and surfaces to the verifier as PTR_TO_ARENA (but not as a PTR_TO_ARENA | PTR_MAYBE_NULL). The reason is that PTR_TO_ARENA in the program's type state already encompasses NULL-ness, so it is not meaningful to force a NULL check for the program. The composite suffix intentionally ends in __nullable. Classify __arena__nullable before the generic suffix so scalar arena pointees do not take the generic nullable BTF pointer path. This patch adds the generic side. prepare_arg_info() records arena and nullable argument flags in the struct_ops function model, and bpf_tramp_arena_base() returns the arena base for a single-program struct_ops indirect trampoline. Only that trampoline converts: its program's arena is fixed at generation time. Generic trampolines can mix programs with different arenas and reject arena context arguments defensively, which is unreachable today as only struct_ops programs carry them. Architectures that do not implement the conversion are gated out at verification time with bpf_jit_supports_arena_args(). Co-developed-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> |
||
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Tejun Heo
|
252d367163 |
bpf: Support __arena and __arena__nullable kfunc argument suffixes
Passing an arena pointer to a kfunc takes two steps today. There is no arena pointer argument type, so the pointer crosses the boundary as a bare scalar, and the kfunc then offsets it by the arena base and casts it before it can touch the memory. Every such kfunc open-codes the same translation. Add the __arena and __arena__nullable argument suffixes to make this more convenient. The kfunc declares the parameter by its real pointer type and dereferences it directly, with the JIT rebasing the value at the call site, rN = kern_vm_start + (u32)rN. No bounds check is needed: the u32 offset stays within the guard-padded arena kernel mapping, and a fault on an unpopulated page recovers through the per-arena scratch page. A suffixed argument accepts a PTR_TO_ARENA or scalar register, matching global subprog arena arguments. __arena rebases unconditionally, so the kfunc never sees NULL and a value with zero in the low 32 bits arrives as the arena base. __arena__nullable preserves NULL for optional arguments by skipping the rebase when the truncated value, arena offset 0, is zero. Keeping the plain form NULL-free saves the NULL test on every call. The double separator makes the annotations composable: __arena__nullable also ends in __nullable and naturally follows the common nullable argument path. Plain __arena follows that path too for verifier type checking because both forms accept a constant zero; the function-model flag still determines whether the JIT preserves NULL or rebases it to the arena base. This patch adds the verifier side: the suffixes are recognized in check_kfunc_args() and distilled into argument flags in the function model stored in the kfunc descriptor. JITs retrieve the model while emitting the call, avoiding per-call state in insn_aux_data. JITs declare support with bpf_jit_supports_arena_args() and verification fails with -ENOTSUPP elsewhere. Co-developed-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> |
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Daniel Borkmann
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e2577cd620 |
bpf, riscv: Add and use bpf_atomic_is_load_acq() helper
A load-acquire is the only BPF_STX class instruction that reads from src_reg into dst_reg, that is, it has the operand roles of a BPF_LDX. JIT code which tells loads from stores apart by instruction class alone has to special case it, for example when deciding which register holds the faulting address and which one to clear from an exception handler. riscv64 already does so, open coded as a bare insn->imm test. Add a bpf_atomic_is_load_acq() helper and convert riscv64 over to it, so that the x86-64 and arm64 JITs can use the same helper in subsequent patches. Unlike bpf_atomic_is_load_store(), which presumes that its argument is already known to be a BPF_ATOMIC instruction, the new helper is called from code which still sees all instruction classes, so it checks class and mode itself. Also, move bpf_atomic_is_load_store() to filter.h next to BPF_ATOMIC_OP, so that both helpers stay together. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> |
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Yonghong Song
|
457d4ecb47 |
bpf: Remove unused BTF_FMODEL_STRUCT_ARG
Commit
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Amery Hung
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a49b70400b |
bpf: Generate kfunc argument prototype at add-call time
Kfunc argument checking re-derives each argument's kfunc_ptr_arg_type from BTF on every verification of a call in check_kfunc_args(). Now that get_kfunc_arg_type() is a function of the kfunc's BTF alone, it no longer inspects register state. The classification can be computed once when the call is added and cached. This is a step toward describing kfuncs with a bpf_func_proto and sharing the helper argument-checking path. Generate the classification at bpf_add_kfunc_call() time: - Extend struct bpf_func_proto to be able to describe a kfunc: widen arg_type[] and the arg_btf_id[]/arg_size[] union from 5 to MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS, since a kfunc may take up to 12 arguments (5 in registers, 7 on the stack). - Embed a bpf_func_proto in struct bpf_kfunc_desc, populated by gen_kfunc_arg_proto() which runs get_kfunc_arg_type() for each argument and stores the result in proto.arg_type[]. Grow the descriptor table's descs[] as a flexible array to not waste memory. - check_kfunc_args() reads the cached classification from meta->fn The KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX classification depends on the resolved program type, and for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT that is the target program's type, which resolve_prog_type() reads from prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type. That field is normally recorded later during verification in check_attach_btf_id(), after bpf_add_kfunc_call() has run. Record saved_dst_prog_type and saved_dst_attach_type from dst_prog at program load time in bpf_prog_load() so the resolved type is available at add-call time without reordering check_attach_btf_id(). This keeps e.g. an freplace of an XDP program calling bpf_xdp_metadata_rx_hash() classifying its struct xdp_md * argument as context. The classification result is unchanged; it is only computed earlier and cached. Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> |
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Amery Hung
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c0e091f30f |
bpf: Rename ARG_CONST_SIZE{,_OR_ZERO} to ARG_MEM_SIZE{,_OR_ZERO}
ARG_CONST_SIZE does not require a constant: check_mem_size_reg() accepts any bounded scalar and verifies the memory access against its maximum (reg_umax). Rename ARG_CONST_SIZE and ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO to ARG_MEM_SIZE and ARG_MEM_SIZE_OR_ZERO to reflect that. ARG_CONST_ALLOC_ SIZE_OR_ZERO, which does require a constant, is left unchanged. Pure rename, no functional change. Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> |
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Leon Hwang
|
61aaa8782b |
bpf: Fix WARNING in bpf_tracing_link_release
The trampoline could be corrupted by the blindly
'tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX' in verifier.
1. A fexit attached to a tail_call_reachable prog. 'tr->flags' became
'BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG | BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX'. And, the
trampoline would poke the target prog's nop insn using jmp insn instead
of call insn.
2. Another fexit loaded with the same tail_call_reachable prog target.
'tr->flags' became 'BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX'.
3. Close the first fexit link. Due to no BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG in
'tr->flags', the trampoline will fail to restore the prog's nop insn
using call insn.
[ 3.410719] WARNING: kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3551 at bpf_tracing_link_release+0x53/0x60, CPU#1: test_progs/98
...
[ 3.428793] bpf_link_free+0x58/0x130
[ 3.429293] bpf_link_release+0x23/0x30
Fix the warning by updating 'tr->flags' with '|=' and lock.
Fixes:
|
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Pu Lehui
|
6bcecae4b6 |
bpf: Extract the is_struct_ops_tramp helper
Extract the is_struct_ops_tramp helper, and use it in riscv as the current checks are somewhat hacky. Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Acked-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> |
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Leon Hwang
|
7a0855e737 |
bpf: Disallow interpreter fallback for BPF_ADDR_PERCPU insn
The BPF_MOV64_PERCPU_REG insn requires JIT to emit native code to for
'dst_reg = src_reg + <percpu_base_off>'.
However, the interpreter ignores the 'off' at its ALU64_MOV_X label.
The 'off' indicates the insn is BPF_MOV64_PERCPU_REG insn. Then, when
the interpreter loads memory from the register, it will hit a page
fault.
[ 2.545572] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffacaaf034
[ 2.546485] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 2.547167] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 2.547850] PGD 134e63067 P4D 134e63067 PUD 134e64063 PMD 10021c063 PTE 800ffffeca550062
[ 2.548912] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
Set jit_required as true in order to disallow interpreter fallback in
core.c::__bpf_prog_select_runtime(), if any BPF_ADDR_PERCPU insn is
patched to the prog.
BTW, rename the helper bpf_map_supports_cpu_flags() to
bpf_map_is_percpu_map().
Fixes:
|
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Tiezhu Yang
|
9a6df65d5c |
bpf: Introduce jit_required flag and remove bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call()
Introduce a 'jit_required' bitfield flag in struct bpf_prog to track whether a BPF program strictly requires the JIT compiler to run. This prevents a dangerous runtime fallback to the interpreter for features that are only implemented in the JIT compiler. Currently, bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call() is used only for kernel function calls, replace the kfunc-specific helper with the new 'jit_required' flag. This makes it easy to support other JIT-only BPF features, such as inlined helpers. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Suggested-by: KaFai Wan <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Leon Hwang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Leon Hwang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> |
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Daniel Borkmann
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a2d784869a |
libbpf: Drop in-loader metadata check for load-time verification
The signed gen_loader used to police its own metadata map from within BPF: emit_signature_match() read the kernel-cached map->sha[] back through hardcoded struct bpf_map offsets and compared it against a hash that compute_sha_update_offsets() baked into the signed instructions, after a BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD round-trip to populate map->sha[]. The kernel now verifies the metadata at BPF_PROG_LOAD time by folding the frozen contents of the loader's exclusive fd_array maps into the signature, so the loader no longer checks anything itself. Generated loaders thus carry no verification logic of their own anymore: Nothing in the signing chain depends on emitted loader bytecode doing the right thing. On the loading side, skel_internal.h now sets fd_array_cnt for a signed load so the kernel scans fd_array for the exclusive metadata map - still frozen, as the kernel requires - and the BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD round-trip to populate map->sha[] is gone. The struct bpf_map layout BUILD_BUG_ON()s on the kernel side are removed as well: they only pinned the ABI for the in-BPF read of map->sha[] that is no longer needed. Same for the map->excl member. Note: gen_hash is retained; it still marks a loader as signed so an untrusted host cannot re-dimension maps or override initial values now covered by the signature. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> |
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Yiyang Chen
|
9c9ee0324c |
bpf: Reject MEM_ALLOC BTF accesses past object bounds
BTF struct walks relax the struct-size check for accesses through a trailing flexible array. That is valid for ordinary BTF type walking, but PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC values point to objects allocated with the static BTF type size. When walking a MEM_ALLOC object, reject the access before applying the flexible-array relaxation if the access range extends past the struct size. Apply the same policy to struct ID matching so kfunc and kptr type checks do not walk past the allocated object bounds either. Fixes: |
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Leon Hwang
|
7cf9cd98cf |
bpf: Copy per-CPU map value padding in copy_map_value_long()
In kernel, per-CPU map elements are stored with
round_up(map->value_size, 8) bytes. On UAPI lookup paths, it copies the
rounded size for each CPU into a temporary buffer.
However, copy_map_value_long() passes 'map->value_size' to
bpf_obj_memcpy(). When the map has special fields, bpf_obj_memcpy() copies
around those fields with memcpy(), and does not copy the tail padding
between 'map->value_size' and round_up(map->value_size, 8).
The temporary UAPI lookup buffers are allocated without __GFP_ZERO. As a
result, when the per-CPU map's value size is not equal to
round_up(map->value_size, 8), UAPI LOOKUP_ELEM and its variants can return
stale heap contents from that padding to user space. The same issue
applies to bpf_iter for per-CPU maps.
Pass round_up(map->value_size, 8) to bpf_obj_memcpy() from
copy_map_value_long(), so per-CPU maps both with and without special
fields copy the entire per-CPU slot. Remove the now redundant round_up()
from bpf_obj_memcpy()'s long_memcpy path.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
9c87e61e3c |
Merge tag 'bpf-next-7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"Major changes:
- Recover from BPF arena page faults using a scratch page and add
ptep_try_set() for lockless empty-slot installs on x86 and arm64.
This allows BPF kfuncs to access arena pointers directly.
The 'arena_direct_access' stable branch was created for this work
and was pulled into sched-ext and bpf-next trees (Tejun Heo, Kumar
Kartikeya Dwivedi)
- Lift old restriction and support 6+ arguments in BPF programs and
kfuncs on x86 and arm64 (Yonghong Song, Puranjay Mohan)
Other features and fixes:
- Add 24-bit BTF vlen and reclaim unused bits in the BTF UAPI to ease
addition of new BTF kinds (Alan Maguire)
- Raise the maximum BPF call chain depth from 8 to 16 frames (Alexei
Starovoitov)
- Refactor object relationship tracking in the verifier and fix a
dynptr use-after-free bug (Amery Hung)
- Harden the signed program loader and reject exclusive maps as inner
maps (Daniel Borkmann)
- Replace the verifier min/max bounds fields with a circular number
(cnum) representation and improve 32->64 bit range refinements
(Eduard Zingerman)
- Introduce the arena library and runtime (libarena) with a buddy
allocator, rbtree and SPMC queue data structures, ASAN support and
a parallel test harness. Allow subprograms to return arena pointers
and switch to a BTF type-tag based __arena annotation (Emil
Tsalapatis)
- Cache build IDs in the sleepable stackmap path and avoid faultable
build ID reads under mm locks (Ihor Solodrai)
- Introduce the tracing_multi link to attach a single BPF program to
many kernel functions at once. Allow specifying the uprobe_multi
target via FD (Jiri Olsa)
- Extend the bpf_list family of kfuncs with bpf_list_add/del(), and
bpf_list_is_first/is_last/empty() (Kaitao Cheng)
- Extend the BPF syscall with common attributes support for
prog_load, btf_load and map_create (Leon Hwang)
- Wrap rhashtable as BPF map (Mykyta Yatsenko, Herbert Xu)
- Add sleepable support for tracepoint programs and fix deadlocks in
LRU map due to NMI reentry (Mykyta Yatsenko)
- Fix OOB access in bpf_flow_keys, fix nullness analysis of inner
arrays, enforce write checks for global subprograms (Nuoqi Gui)
- Report the maximum combined stack depth and print a breakdown of
instructions processed per subprogram (Paul Chaignon)
- Add an XDP load-balancer benchmark and arm64 JIT support for stack
arguments (Puranjay Mohan)
- Add kfuncs to traverse over wakeup_sources (Samuel Wu)
- Allow sleepable BPF programs to use LPM trie maps directly (Vlad
Poenaru)
- Many more fixes and cleanups across the verifier, BTF, sockmap,
devmap, bpffs, security hooks, s390/riscv/loongarch JITs,
rqspinlock, libbpf, bpftool, selftests"
* tag 'bpf-next-7.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (336 commits)
selftests/bpf: Work around llvm stack overflow in crypto progs
selftests/bpf: add test for bpf_msg_pop_data() overflow
bpf, sockmap: fix integer overflow in bpf_msg_pop_data() bounds check
sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()
bpf, sockmap: keep sk_msg copy state in sync
bpf, sockmap: Fix wrong rsge offset in bpf_msg_push_data()
bpf, sockmap: reject overflowing copy + len in bpf_msg_push_data()
selftsets/bpf: Retry map update on helper_fill_hashmap()
selftests/bpf: Add test for sleepable lsm_cgroup rejection
selftests/bpf: Add test to verify the fix for bpf_setsockopt() helper
bpf: Fix bpf_get/setsockopt to tos for ipv4-mapped ipv6 socket
selftests/bpf: Avoid static LLVM linking for cross builds
selftests/bpf: Use common CFLAGS for urandom_read
selftests/bpf: Initialize operation name before use
tools/bpf: build: Append extra cflags
libbpf: Initialize CFLAGS before including Makefile.include
bpftool: Append extra host flags
bpftool: Avoid adding EXTRA_CFLAGS to HOST_CFLAGS
bpftool: Pass host flags to bootstrap libbpf
selftests/bpf: correct CONFIG_PPC64 macro name in comment
...
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|
Linus Torvalds
|
ff8747aaca |
Merge tag 'vfs-7.2-rc1.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull simple_xattr updates from Christian Brauner: "This reworks the simple xattr api to make it more efficient and easier to use for all consumers. The simple_xattr hash table moves from the inode into a per-superblock cache, removing the per-inode overhead for the common case of few or no xattrs. The interface now passes struct simple_xattrs ** so lazy allocation is handled internally instead of by every caller, kernfs xattr operations on kernfs nodes shared between multiple superblocks are properly serialized, and tmpfs constructs "security.foo" xattr names with kasprintf() instead of kmalloc() plus two memcpy()s. A follow-up fix links kernfs nodes to their parent before the LSM init hook runs: with the per-sb cache kernfs_xattr_set() computes the cache via kernfs_root(kn), which faulted on a freshly allocated node when selinux_kernfs_init_security() called into it - reproducible as a NULL pointer dereference on the first cgroup mkdir on SELinux-enabled systems. On top of this bpffs gains support for trusted.* and security.* xattrs so that user space and BPF LSM programs can attach metadata - for example a content hash or a security label - to pinned objects and directories and inspect it uniformly like on other filesystems. The store is in-memory and non-persistent, living only for the lifetime of the mount like everything else in bpffs" * tag 'vfs-7.2-rc1.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs kernfs: link kn to its parent before the LSM init hook simpe_xattr: use per-sb cache simple_xattr: change interface to pass struct simple_xattrs ** tmpfs: simplify constructing "security.foo" xattr names kernfs: fix xattr race condition with multiple superblocks |
||
|
Justin Suess
|
a3a81d2476 |
bpf: Cancel special fields on map value recycle
Map update and delete paths currently call bpf_obj_free_fields() when a
value is being replaced or recycled. That makes field destruction depend
on the context of the update/delete operation. For tracing programs this
can include NMI context, where referenced kptr destructors, uptr
unpinning, and graph root destruction are not generally safe.
Introduce bpf_obj_cancel_fields() for the reusable-value path. It only
performs NMI-safe cleanup for timer, workqueue, and task_work fields.
Fields that need full destruction are left attached to the recycled value
and are destroyed by the final cleanup path instead.
Switch array and hashtab update/delete/recycle paths to this cancel
helper. Keep bpf_obj_free_fields() for final map destruction and for
bpf_mem_alloc destructors. Preallocated hashtabs do not have allocator
destructors, so teardown continues to walk the normal and extra elements
and fully destroy their fields.
This deliberately relaxes the eager-free semantics of map update/delete
for special fields. Programs that relied on a recycled map slot becoming
empty immediately after update/delete were relying on behavior that
cannot be implemented safely from every BPF execution context without
offloading arbitrary destructors.
There is a chance this change breaks programs making assumptions
regarding the eager freeing of fields. If so, we can relax semantics to
cancellation only when irqs_disabled() is true in the future. However,
theoretically, map values that get reused eagerly already have weaker
guarantees as parallel users can recreate freed fields before the new
element becomes visible again.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Justin Suess
|
94c8d1c21b |
bpf: Reject bpf_obj_drop() from tracing progs
bpf_obj_drop() runs bpf_obj_free_fields() synchronously for
program-allocated objects. When such an object contains NMI unsafe
fields, tracing programs that can run from arbitrary instrumented
context can reach that destruction from unsafe contexts, including NMI.
NMI is likely one instance of this problem, and other instances would
include possible unsafe reentrancy. Deferring bpf_obj_drop() is not
appealing either: it would add delayed-free machinery to a release
operation that otherwise has straightforward synchronous ownership
semantics.
Reject bpf_obj_drop() and bpf_percpu_obj_drop() from tracing programs
that may run from unsafe contexts unless every field in the object's BTF
record is explicitly NMI safe. Do not reject sleepable
BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING programs, since they are not the arbitrary/NMI
contexts that motivate the restriction.
Note that while bpf_rb_root and bpf_list_head would be NMI safe on their
own to free, the objects recursively held by them may not be; be
conservative and just mark them as not NMI safe for now.
Use a whitelist for the NMI-safe field set instead of listing only known
NMI unsafe fields. Locks, async fields, unreferenced kptrs, and
refcounts are known to be NMI safe because their destruction is either a
no-op, simple state reset, or async cancellation. Referenced kptrs,
percpu referenced kptrs, uptrs, graph roots, graph nodes, and any future
field type are rejected until audited for arbitrary tracing and NMI
contexts. This is less susceptible to future changes in fields that were
previously safe by exclusion, and to new fields being added without
updating this check.
Convert the existing recursive local-object drop success case to a
syscall program in the same commit, since this verifier change makes the
old tracing program form invalid. The test still exercises
bpf_obj_drop() releasing a referenced task kptr from a safe program
type.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
ba042ed644 |
bpf: Add support for tracing_multi link session
Adding support to use session attachment with tracing_multi link. Adding new BPF_TRACE_FSESSION_MULTI program attach type, that follows the BPF_TRACE_FSESSION behaviour but on the tracing_multi link. Such program is called on entry and exit of the attached function and allows to pass cookie value from entry to exit execution. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
46b42af27d |
bpf: Add support for tracing_multi link cookies
Add support to specify cookies for tracing_multi link. Cookies are provided in array where each value is paired with provided BTF ID value with the same array index. Such cookie can be retrieved by bpf program with bpf_get_attach_cookie helper call. We need to sort cookies array together with ids array in check_dup_ids, to keep the id->cookie relation. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
aef4dfa790 |
bpf: Add bpf_trampoline_multi_attach/detach functions
Adding bpf_trampoline_multi_attach/detach functions that allows to attach/detach tracing program to multiple functions/trampolines. The attachment is defined with bpf_program and array of BTF ids of functions to attach the bpf program to. Adding bpf_tracing_multi_link object that holds all the attached trampolines and is initialized in attach and used in detach. The attachment allocates or uses currently existing trampoline for each function to attach and links it with the bpf program. The attach works as follows: - we get all the needed trampolines - lock them and add the bpf program to each (__bpf_trampoline_link_prog) - the trampoline_multi_ops passed in __bpf_trampoline_link_prog gathers ftrace_hash (ip -> trampoline) objects - we call update_ftrace_direct_add/mod to update needed locations - we unlock all the trampolines The detach works as follows: - we lock all the needed trampolines - remove the program from each (__bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog) - the trampoline_multi_ops passed in __bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog gathers ftrace_hash (ip -> trampoline) objects - we call update_ftrace_direct_del/mod to update needed locations - we unlock and put all the trampolines We store the old image/flags in the trampoline before the update and use it in case we need to rollback the attachment. We keep the ftrace_hash objects allocated during attach in the link so they can be used for detach as well. Adding trampoline_(un)lock_all functions to (un)lock all trampolines to gate the tracing_multi attachment. Note this is supported only for archs (x86_64) with ftrace direct and have single ops support. CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_DIRECT_CALLS && CONFIG_HAVE_SINGLE_FTRACE_DIRECT_OPS It also needs CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL enabled. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
d14e6b4346 |
bpf: Add multi tracing attach types
Adding new program attach types multi tracing attachment: BPF_TRACE_FENTRY_MULTI BPF_TRACE_FEXIT_MULTI and their base support in verifier code. Programs with such attach type will use specific link attachment interface coming in following changes. This was suggested by Andrii some (long) time ago and turned out to be easier than having special program flag for that. Bpf programs with such types have 'bpf_multi_func' function set as their attach_btf_id and keep module reference when it's specified by attach_prog_fd. They are also accepted as sleepable programs during verification, and the real validation for specific BTF_IDs/functions will happen during the multi link attachment in following changes. Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
880db5d4ab |
bpf: Factor fsession link to use struct bpf_tramp_node
Now that we split trampoline attachment object (bpf_tramp_node) from the link object (bpf_tramp_link) we can use bpf_tramp_node as fsession's fexit attachment object and get rid of the bpf_fsession_link object. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
65499074ef |
bpf: Add struct bpf_tramp_node object
Adding struct bpf_tramp_node to decouple the link out of the trampoline
attachment info.
At the moment the object for attaching bpf program to the trampoline is
'struct bpf_tramp_link':
struct bpf_tramp_link {
struct bpf_link link;
struct hlist_node tramp_hlist;
u64 cookie;
}
The link holds the bpf_prog pointer and forces one link - one program
binding logic. In following changes we want to attach program to multiple
trampolines but we want to keep just one bpf_link object.
Splitting struct bpf_tramp_link into:
struct bpf_tramp_link {
struct bpf_link link;
struct bpf_tramp_node node;
};
struct bpf_tramp_node {
struct bpf_link *link;
struct hlist_node tramp_hlist;
u64 cookie;
};
The 'struct bpf_tramp_link' defines standard single trampoline link
and 'struct bpf_tramp_node' is the attachment trampoline object with
pointer to the bpf_link object.
This will allow us to define link for multiple trampolines, like:
struct bpf_tracing_multi_link {
struct bpf_link link;
...
int nodes_cnt;
struct bpf_tracing_multi_node nodes[] __counted_by(nodes_cnt);
};
Cc: Hengqi Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Jiri Olsa
|
e6abd4cd15 |
bpf: Use mutex lock pool for bpf trampolines
Adding mutex lock pool that replaces bpf trampolines mutex. For tracing_multi link coming in following changes we need to lock all the involved trampolines during the attachment. This could mean thousands of mutex locks, which is not convenient. As suggested by Andrii we can replace bpf trampolines mutex with mutex pool, where each trampoline is hash-ed to one of the locks from the pool. It's better to lock all the pool mutexes (32 at the moment) than thousands of them. There is 48 (MAX_LOCK_DEPTH) lock limit allowed to be simultaneously held by task, so we need to keep 32 mutexes (5 bits) in the pool, so when we lock them all in following changes the lockdep won't scream. Removing the mutex_is_locked in bpf_trampoline_put, because we removed the mutex from bpf_trampoline. Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
||
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
9722955b54 |
bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs
Add support for extended attributes on bpffs inodes so that user space and BPF LSM programs can attach metadata, for example, a content hash or a security label - to a pinned object or directory. BPF LSM or user space tooling can then uniformly look at this (e.g. security.bpf.*) in similar way to other fs'es. The store is in-memory and non-persistent: it lives only for the lifetime of the mount, like everything else in bpffs. The modelling is similar to tmpfs. bpffs serves the trusted.* and security.* namespaces; user.* is left unsupported. As bpffs is FS_USERNS_MOUNT, security.* is reachable by the unprivileged mounter in a user namespace, and thus we are using the simple_xattr_set_limited infra there (trusted.* needs global CAP_SYS_ADMIN). bpf_fill_super() is open-coded instead of using simple_fill_super(), because the root inode must now be allocated through bpf_fs_alloc_inode() i.e. carry the bpf_fs_inode wrapper and come from the right cache - which requires s_op (and s_xattr) to be installed before the first inode is created. While at it, also harden s_iflags with SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV. bpf_fs_listxattr() is only reachable through the filesystem via i_op->listxattr, so the BPF token inode is left untouched. Name-based fsetxattr()/fgetxattr() on a token fd still work since the get/set handlers are installed at the superblock. For security.* namespace, we use simple_xattr_set_limited() but there was no simple_xattr_add_limited() API yet which was needed in bpf_fs_initxattrs() to avoid underflows in the accounting. The symlink target is freed in bpf_free_inode() rather than in bpf_destroy_inode() so that it is released only after an RCU grace period, as an RCU path walk following the symlink may still dereference inode->i_link in security_inode_follow_link(). Lastly, the bpf_symlink() allocated the symlink target is switched to GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, so the string is charged to the caller's memcg. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <[email protected]> |
||
|
KP Singh
|
63a673e8a4 |
bpf: Expose signature verdict via bpf_prog_aux
BPF_PROG_LOAD verifies the loader signature but does not record the
outcome on the BPF program. [BPF] LSMs and audit can read attr->signature
and attr->keyring_id to infer "was this signed, and if so, against which
keyring".
Add prog->aux->sig (verdict + keyring_{type,serial}), populated by
bpf_prog_load before the LSM hook. keyring_type classifies the keyring
the load referenced (builtin, secondary, platform or user), while
keyring_serial records the serial of the keyring the signature was
actually validated against. System keyrings carry a pseudo key pointer
with no user-visible serial and are reported as 0, as are unsigned loads.
Failed verifications reject the load before the hook runs, so it observes
only either UNSIGNED or VERIFIED.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
|
||
|
KP Singh
|
0fb6c9ed64 |
libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader
The loader verifies map->sha against the metadata hash in its
instructions. map->sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is
called on the frozen map.
While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map
is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just
omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can
mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data.
With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to
move on with map->sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
c48c3a7e7d |
bpf: Drop redundant hash_buf from map_get_hash operation
bpf_map_get_info_by_fd() is the only caller of the ->map_get_hash and always invokes it with hash_buf == map->sha and hash_buf_size of SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE. array_map_get_hash() in turn lets sha256() write the digest directly into that buffer (map->sha) and then performs a trailing memcpy(), which evaluates to memcpy(map->sha, map->sha, 32): a redundant self-copy. The hash_buf_size argument was never used at all. Simplify this a bit, no functional change. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
||
|
Amery Hung
|
308c7a0ae8 |
bpf: Refactor object relationship tracking and fix dynptr UAF bug
Refactor object relationship tracking in the verifier and fix a dynptr
use-after-free bug where file/skb dynptrs are not invalidated when the
parent referenced object is freed.
Add parent_id to bpf_reg_state to precisely track child-parent
relationships. A child object's parent_id points to the parent object's
id. This replaces the PTR_TO_MEM-specific dynptr_id.
Remove ref_obj_id from bpf_reg_state by folding its role into the
existing id field. Previously, id tracked pointer identity for null
checking while ref_obj_id tracked the owning reference for lifetime
management. These are now unified: acquire helpers and kfuncs set id
to the acquired reference id, and release paths use id directly.
Add reg_is_referenced() which checks if a register is referenced by
looking up its id in the reference array. This replaces all former
ref_obj_id checks.
For release_reference(), invalidating an object now also invalidates
all descendants by traversing the object tree. This is done using
stack-based DFS to avoid recursive call chains of release_reference() ->
unmark_stack_slots_dynptr() -> release_reference(). Referenced objects
encountered during tree traversal are reported as leaked references.
Add parent_id to bpf_reference_state to enable hierarchical reference
tracking. When acquiring a reference, a parent_id can be specified to
link the new reference to an existing one (e.g., referenced dynptrs
acquire a reference with parent_id linking to the parent object's
reference).
Pointer casting:
For pointer casting helpers (bpf_sk_fullsock, bpf_tcp_sock), instead of
propagating ref_obj_id, the cast result reuses the same reference id as
the source pointer. Since the cast may return NULL for a non-NULL input,
the NULL case is explored as a separate verifier branch. This allows
releasing any of the original or cast pointers to invalidate all others.
Referenced dynptrs:
When constructing a referenced dynptr, acquire a intermediate reference
with parent_id linking to the parent referenced object. The dynptr and
all clones share the same parent_id (pointing to the intermediate ref)
but get unique ids for independent slice tracking. Releasing a
referenced dynptr releases the parent reference, which in turn
invalidates all clones and their derived slices.
Owning to non-owning reference conversion:
After converting owning to non-owning by clearing id (e.g.,
object(id=1) -> object(id=0)), the verifier releases the reference
state via release_reference_nomark().
Note that the error message "reference has not been acquired before" in
the helper and kfunc release paths is removed. This message was already
unreachable. The verifier only calls release_reference() after
confirming the reference is valid, so the condition could never trigger
in practice.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Alexei Starovoitov
|
8496d9020f |
Merge branch 'arena_direct_access'
Tejun Heo says: ==================== This makes BPF arena memory directly dereferenceable from kernel code (struct_ops callbacks, kfuncs). Each arena gets a per-arena scratch page that an arch fault hook installs into empty PTEs on kernel-side faults, after KFENCE. The faulting instruction retries and the violation is reported through the program's BPF stream. v4: - Patch 1: note that the strict-zero cmpxchg is narrower than pte_none() in inline comments on both x86 and arm64. (Andrea) - Patch 2: stub bpf_arena_handle_page_fault() for !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL via a new include/linux/bpf_defs.h. (lkp) - Patch 7: scx_arena_alloc() retries via a loop instead of a single retry on pool growth. (Andrea) - Picked up Reviewed-by tags from Emil and Andrea. v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] v1 (RFC): https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Motivation ---------- sched_ext's ops_cid.set_cmask() hands the BPF scheduler a struct scx_cmask *. The kernel translates a kernel cpumask to a cmask, but it had no way to write into the arena, so the cmask lived in kernel memory and was passed as a trusted pointer. BPF cmask helpers all operate on arena cmasks though, so the BPF side had to word-by-word probe-read the kernel cmask into an arena cmask via cmask_copy_from_kernel() before any helper could touch it. It works, but is clumsy. The shape isn't unique to set_cmask. Sub-scheduler support is on the way and more sched_ext callbacks will want to pass structured data to BPF. Anywhere a kfunc or struct_ops callback wants to hand a struct to a BPF program, arena residence is the natural answer. Approach -------- Each arena gets a per-arena scratch page. Arenas stay sparsely mapped as today - PTEs are populated only for allocated pages. A new arch fault hook (bpf_arena_handle_page_fault) is wired into x86 page_fault_oops() and arm64 __do_kernel_fault(), after KFENCE. When a kernel-side access faults inside an arena's kern_vm range, the helper walks the stack to find the BPF program responsible, range-checks the fault address against prog->aux->arena, and atomically installs the scratch page into the empty PTE via the new ptep_try_set() wrapper. The kernel instruction retries and reads/writes the scratch page. Free paths and map destruction treat scratch as non-owned. Real allocation refuses to overwrite scratch (apply_range_set_cb returns -EBUSY). A scratched address stays dead until map destroy, since its presence means the BPF program has already malfunctioned. The mechanism is default behavior - no UAPI flag. What this preserves ------------------- All the debugging properties of today's sparse-PTE design are preserved: * BPF programs still fault on unmapped arena accesses. The fault semantics (instruction retry with rdst = 0) and the violation report through bpf_streams are unchanged for prog-side accesses. * The first kernel-side touch of an unmapped address is reported via bpf_streams the same way as a prog-side fault, with the stack walk attributing it to the originating prog. * User-side fault on a never-scratched address still lazy-allocates a real page (or returns SIGSEGV under BPF_F_SEGV_ON_FAULT). User-side fault on a scratched address SIGSEGVs. What changes for the kernel-side caller is just that an unmapped deref no longer oopses - it retries through the scratch page and emits a violation report. The same shape today's BPF instruction faults have. Patches 1-2 (atomic PTE install + arena scratch-page recovery) -------------------------------------------------------------- mm: Add ptep_try_set() for lockless empty-slot installs bpf: Recover arena kernel faults with scratch page Patches 3-5 (helpers used by struct_ops registration) ----------------------------------------------------- bpf: Add sleepable variant of bpf_arena_alloc_pages for kernel callers bpf: Add bpf_struct_ops_for_each_prog() bpf/arena: Add bpf_arena_map_kern_vm_start() and bpf_prog_arena() ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
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Alexei Starovoitov
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eb19eead36 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf 7.1-rc5
Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
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Tejun Heo
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53cc12a2dc |
bpf/arena: Add bpf_arena_map_kern_vm_start() and bpf_prog_arena()
struct bpf_arena is opaque to callers outside arena.c. Add two helpers
for struct_ops subsystems that need to reach into an arena:
bpf_arena_map_kern_vm_start(struct bpf_map *map)
returns @map's kern_vm_start. A sched_ext follow-up needs this
to translate kern_va <-> uaddr.
bpf_prog_arena(struct bpf_prog *prog)
returns the bpf_map of the arena referenced by @prog (NULL if
@prog references no arena). The verifier enforces at most one
arena per program. Used by struct_ops callers that auto-discover
an arena from a member prog and need to take a map reference.
Suggested-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Tejun Heo
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7c48a28c1b |
bpf: Add bpf_struct_ops_for_each_prog()
Add a helper that walks the member progs of the struct_ops map containing a given @kdata vmtable. struct_ops ->reg() callbacks (and similar) sometimes need to inspect the loaded BPF programs, e.g. to discover maps they reference via prog->aux->used_maps. The implementation mirrors bpf_struct_ops_id(): container_of @kdata to recover the bpf_struct_ops_map, then iterate st_map->links[i]->prog for i in [0, funcs_cnt). Same access pattern, no new locking - by the time ->reg() fires st_map is fully populated and stable. A sched_ext follow-up walks the member progs of a cid-form scheduler's struct_ops map, reads prog->aux->arena directly, and requires all member progs to reference exactly one arena, without requiring the BPF program to call a registration kfunc. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
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Tejun Heo
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f211c81ddc |
bpf: Add sleepable variant of bpf_arena_alloc_pages for kernel callers
The existing kernel-side export of bpf_arena_alloc_pages is _non_sleepable only - it's used by the verifier to inline the kfunc when the call site is non-sleepable. There is no sleepable equivalent for kernel callers. The kfunc bpf_arena_alloc_pages itself is BPF-only. sched_ext needs sleepable kernel-side allocs for its arena pool init/grow paths. Add bpf_arena_alloc_pages_sleepable() mirroring the _non_sleepable wrapper but passing sleepable=true to arena_alloc_pages(). Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
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Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
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dc11a4dba2 |
bpf: Recover arena kernel faults with scratch page
BPF arena usage is becoming more prevalent, but kernel <-> BPF communication over arena memory is awkward today. Data has to be staged through a trusted kernel pointer with extra code and copying on the BPF side. While reads through arena pointers can use a fault-safe helper, writes don't have a good solution. The in-line alternative would need instruction emulation or asm fixup labels. Enable direct kernel-side reads and writes within GUARD_SZ / 2 of any handed-in arena pointer, without bounds checking. A per-arena scratch page is installed by the arch fault path into empty arena kernel PTEs - x86 from page_fault_oops() for not-present faults, arm64 from __do_kernel_fault() for translation faults, both after the existing exception-table and KFENCE handling. The faulting instruction retries and the access is also reported through the program's BPF stream, preserving error reporting. bpf_prog_find_from_stack() resolves the current BPF program (and its arena) from the kernel stack - no new bpf_run_ctx state is added. Recovery covers the 4 GiB arena plus the upper half-guard (GUARD_SZ / 2). The lower half-guard is excluded because well-behaved kfuncs only access forward from arena pointers. The kfunc-author contract - access at most GUARD_SZ / 2 past a handed-in pointer - is documented in Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst. The install is lock-free via ptep_try_set(). On race-loss the winning installer's PTE is already valid, so the access retry succeeds. The arena clear path uses ptep_get_and_clear() so installer and clearer race through atomic accessors. No flush_tlb_kernel_range() afterwards. Stale "not mapped" entries just cause one extra re-fault, cheaper than a global IPI on every install. Scratch exists only to keep the kernel from oopsing on an in-line arena access. Its presence at a PTE means the BPF program has already malfunctioned, and the violation is reported through the program's BPF stream. The only requirement for behavior on a scratched PTE is that the kernel doesn't crash. In particular, any user-side access through such a PTE may segfault. The shared scratch page is freed once during map destruction. BPF instruction faults continue to use the existing JIT exception-table path. This patch changes only the kernel-text fault path. No UAPI flag is added. The new behavior is the default. v2: Use ptep_get_and_clear() in apply_range_clear_cb(). (David) v3: Stub bpf_arena_handle_page_fault() for !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL. (lkp) Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <[email protected]> Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
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Yonghong Song
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18a37465b0 |
bpf,x86: Fix exception unwinding with outgoing stack arguments
When a main program with exception_boundary has outgoing stack
arguments (e.g. from calling subprogs with >5 args), bpf_throw() fails
to correctly restore callee-saved registers, causing a kernel crash.
The x86 JIT allocates the outgoing stack arg area below the
callee-saved registers via 'sub rsp, outgoing_rsp' in the prologue.
When bpf_throw() unwinds, it captures the main program's sp (which
includes this outgoing area) and passes it to the exception callback.
The callback gets rsp and rbp, followed by pop_callee_regs, but rsp
points into the outgoing arg area rather than the callee-saved
registers, so the pops restore garbage values. Returning to the
kernel with corrupted callee-saved registers causes a crash.
Fix this by adjusting the sp (adding stack_arg_sp_adjust) passed to
the exception callback, so it points to the bottom of the callee-saved
registers instead of the outgoing arg area. When stack_arg_sp_adjust
is 0 (the common case), this is a no-op.
Fixes:
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Yonghong Song
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324c3ca6ee |
bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments
Add x86_64 JIT support for BPF functions and kfuncs with more than 5 arguments. The extra arguments are passed through a stack area addressed by register r11 (BPF_REG_PARAMS) in BPF bytecode, which the JIT translates to native code. The JIT follows the x86-64 calling convention for both BPF-to-BPF and kfunc calls: - Arg 6 is passed in the R9 register - Args 7+ are passed on the stack Incoming arg 6 (BPF r11+8) is translated to a MOV from R9 rather than a memory load. Incoming args 7+ (BPF r11+16, r11+24, ...) map directly to [rbp + 16], [rbp + 24], ..., matching the x86-64 stack layout after CALL + PUSH RBP, so no offset adjustment is needed. tail_call_reachable is rejected by the verifier and priv_stack is disabled by the JIT when stack args exist, so R9 is always available. When BPF bytecode writes to the arg-6 stack slot (offset -8), the JIT emits a MOV into R9 instead of a memory store. Outgoing args 7+ are placed at [rsp] in a pre-allocated area below callee-saved registers, using: native_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - bpf_off - 16 The native x86_64 stack layout with stack arguments: high address +-------------------------+ | incoming stack arg N | [rbp + 16 + (N-7)*8] (from caller) | ... | | incoming stack arg 7 | [rbp + 16] +-------------------------+ | return address | [rbp + 8] | saved rbp | [rbp] +-------------------------+ | BPF program stack | (round_up(stack_depth, 8) bytes) +-------------------------+ | callee-saved regs | (r12, rbx, r13, r14, r15 as needed) +-------------------------+ | outgoing arg M | [rsp + (M-7)*8] | ... | | outgoing arg 7 | [rsp] +-------------------------+ rsp low address Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
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Leon Hwang
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503c039ffe |
bpf: Refactor reporting log_true_size for prog_load
The next commit will add support for reporting logs via extended common attributes, including 'log_true_size'. To prepare for that, refactor the 'log_true_size' reporting logic by introducing a new struct bpf_log_attr to encapsulate log-related behavior: * bpf_log_attr_init(): initialize log fields, which will support extended common attributes in the next commit. * bpf_log_attr_finalize(): handle log finalization and write back 'log_true_size' to userspace. Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
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Yazhou Tang
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58a8f3e250 |
bpf: Fix s16 truncation for large bpf-to-bpf call offsets
Currently, the BPF instruction set allows bpf-to-bpf calls (or internal
calls, pseudo calls) to use a 32-bit imm field to represent the relative
jump offset.
However, when JIT is disabled or falls back to the interpreter, the
verifier invokes bpf_patch_call_args() to rewrite the call instruction.
In this function, the 32-bit imm is downcast to s16 and stored in the off
field.
void bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth)
{
stack_depth = max_t(u32, stack_depth, 1);
insn->off = (s16) insn->imm;
insn->imm = interpreters_args[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1] -
__bpf_call_base_args;
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS;
}
If the original imm exceeds the s16 range (i.e., a jump offset greater
than 32767 instructions), this downcast silently truncates the offset,
resulting in an incorrect call target.
Fix this by:
1. In bpf_patch_call_args(), keeping the imm field unchanged and using the
off field to store the index of the interpreter function.
2. In ___bpf_prog_run() for the JMP_CALL_ARGS case, retrieving the
interpreter function pointer from the interpreters_args array using the
off field as the index, and passing the original imm to calculate the
last argument of the interpreter function.
After these changes, the truncation issue is resolved, and __bpf_call_base_args
is also no longer needed and can be removed, which makes the code cleaner.
Performance: In ___bpf_prog_run() for the JMP_CALL_ARGS case, changing the
retrieval of the interpreter function pointer from pointer addition to
direct array indexing improves performance. The possible reason is that the
latter has better instruction-level parallelism. See the v5 discussion [1]
for more details.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
To avoid requiring bpftool changes, keep the new imm/off encoding internal
and restore the legacy xlated dump layout in bpf_insn_prepare_dump().
For bpf-to-bpf call offsets that do not fit in s16, export off as 0 instead
of a truncated and misleading value.
Fixes:
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Yazhou Tang
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4314a44564 |
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read in bpf_patch_call_args()
The interpreters_args array only accommodates stack depths up to
MAX_BPF_STACK (512 bytes). However, do_misc_fixups() may allow a larger
stack depth if JIT is requested.
If JIT compilation later fails and falls back to the interpreter, the
verifier invokes bpf_patch_call_args() with this oversized stack depth.
This causes a load-time out-of-bounds (OOB) read when calculating the
interpreter function pointer index.
Fix this by changing bpf_patch_call_args() to return an int and explicitly
rejecting the JIT fallback (returning -EINVAL) if the stack depth exceeds
MAX_BPF_STACK.
Fixes:
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Alexei Starovoitov
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7e033543a2 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf 7.1-rc3
Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
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Yonghong Song
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4439328d38 |
bpf: Reuse MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS for maximum number of arguments
Currently, MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS is used for tracepoint related progs where the number of parameters cannot exceed MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS. Here, MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS is reused to set a limit of the number of arguments for bpf functions and kfuncs. The current value for MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS is 12 which should be sufficient for majority of bpf functions and kfuncs. Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |