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x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches. [ tglx: Add IBPB status to spectre_v2 sysfs file ] Co-developed-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@
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#define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
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#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
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#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/
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/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
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#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
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#define X86_FEATURE_VNMI ( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel Virtual NMI */
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@@ -218,5 +218,18 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
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#endif
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}
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static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
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{
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asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
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"movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
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"movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
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"movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
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"wrmsr",
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X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
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: : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
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[val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
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: "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
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}
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#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
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#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
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@@ -263,6 +263,13 @@ retpoline_auto:
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setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
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pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
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}
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/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
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if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
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boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) {
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setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
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pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
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}
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}
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#undef pr_fmt
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@@ -292,7 +299,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
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if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
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return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
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return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
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return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
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boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IPBP" : "",
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spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "");
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}
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#endif
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